Locke's Ideas of Power by Tiller, Michaela Iman
1 
 






A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 










































Michaela Tiller: Locke’s Ideas of Power 
(Under the direction of Alan Nelson) 
 
I propose a novel reading of John Locke’s account of powers and use this to resolve the 
issues of Locke’s apparently problematic account of sensitive knowledge. The project is 
therefore primarily an interpretation of his 1690 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and it 
is historical in that it is intended to capture Locke’s view strictly as expressed in the text. Locke 
describes the work in his Epistle to the Reader as an effort to clear the way for scientists like 
Newton and Huygens by establishing the limits of knowledge and opinion. I particularly 
emphasize this by taking the whole of the Essay as naturalized epistemology, or an effort to 
understand knowledge and opinion by a method comparable to that of contemporary physical 
sciences. 
Locke is an empiricist and thus argued against the possibility of any innate ideas. He 
stipulates that the ideas which we receive come only from sensation and reflection. Locke 
thereby intends to provide an account whereby the ideas we receive from these sources are 
sufficient to explain all mental activity, including all knowledge. An empiricist like Locke is 
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therefore particularly challenged in addressing external objects. Our sensations are commonly 
taken to be of external objects, but they in fact contain nothing beyond ideas like redness or 
sweetness. These ideas of qualities are not external objects. It therefore seems as though we have 
no access to anything external, and thus no sensitive knowledge. 
I argue that Locke’s account of powers fills this gap. I propose that the term ‘power’ is 
used to signify a number of different types of idea, including ideas of what I call ‘particular 
powers,’ which cause simple ideas of sensation. These particular powers, when we experience 
their effects, are known to really exist as features of external objects. Sensitive knowledge is 
limited to knowledge of the existence of such powers. We therefore do have knowledge of 
external objects, but only in a limited and subjective form. This is sufficient for Locke to avoid 
any skepticism about the existence of external objects. 
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SECTION 1: Introduction 
Locke’s intent for the project of the Essay is epistemological and not metaphysical, as others 
have claimed. This I believe is made clear by many of his comments, particularly those in the 
Epistle, or so I will argue. In addition to its strong textual support, my epistemological reading of 
the Essay has the added benefit of resolving many of the apparent problems of the Essay, which 
many scholars consider to be an influential but flawed work. In this dissertation, I show how the 
epistemological reading permits a coherent view of the idea of power as it is presented in the 
Essay. Locke has been accused of many errors in what he writes on power, but my interpretation 
avoids these. This success at making Locke’s account feasible where metaphysical readings have 
failed is further support for the epistemological reading, although I take its textual warrant to be 
sufficient to justify it. 
 Locke’s study of ideas is an investigation of their origins in the mind. For each idea he 
lists in the Essay, his concern is how one comes to think it. Locke has insisted that there are no 
innate ideas. The only alternative then is that every idea must have its source in experience and 
the operation of mental activity thereupon. To support his empiricist position for the origin of 
ideas, he considers a number of ideas and explains their origins in perception and subsequent 
mental operation. He demonstrates that whatever claims are made in common speech can be 
explained without recourse to innate ideas. Locke’s account of power consists of identification of 
different ideas of power by reference to their origins. It turns out that there is not one but many 
ideas which can be associated with the term power, and they differ in genetic structure. Once 
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correctly individuated, the distinctions between these different ideas of powers can be shown to 
resolve many of the purported issues in Locke’s text. 
 Locke’s ideas of powers are ideas of qualities, which are the main constituent of ideas of 
individual and types of substances, and these are particularly relevant to questions about 
sensitive knowledge and the external world. Issues with his account of power are frequently 
thought to result in failures of his claims to knowledge of the external world through sensation. 
Since knowledge is the agreement of ideas for Locke, clarifying the ideas of power which are 
involved reveals some of the limits and nature of sensitive knowledge. I argue that because 
sensations are caused in a particular set of conditions of environment and perceiver, ideas of 
particular powers producing simple ideas are specific to these circumstances, and therefore that 
sensitive knowledge is knowledge of the real existence of a power to bring about some simple 
idea of sense in current conditions. 
Locke’s Essay is frequently considered and taught as an empiricist response to 
Descartes.1 Locke is taken to have differed in his methodology but to have been similarly 
concerned with questions such as what a substance is and what proof can be given for the 
existence of material objects. On such a reading, then, Locke’s project is first and foremost one 
of metaphysics. Locke is limited, however, by his commitment to empiricism, which means that 
he makes his arguments on the basis of the claim that all we know is through sense (both internal 
and external). He denies the possibility of any innate ideas (Essay I.ii) and therefore cannot 
provide certainty through something like Descartes’ clear and distinct perceptions, which are 
based on an innate knowledge of God’s nature. As a result, then, Locke is often taken to have 
 
1 As in Jolley (2015) 
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provided a particularly bad set of answers to a set of metaphysical questions, insofar as he cannot 
prove his claims (concerning the nature of substance, the causation of secondary qualities, and 
the existence of material objects, among others).2 Later empiricists, such as Berkeley and Hume, 
realize that if we are only acquainted with external objects through the ideas provided by 
sensation as Locke claims, then we have no access to the material substances themselves and it is 
impossible to make claims of knowledge about them. Locke is thus also supposed to be a bad 
empiricist, one who shares the commitment that ideas are acquired through the senses, but fails 
to appropriately limit himself to what those ideas can prove about the external world in his 
pursuit of answers to metaphysical questions. Even when Locke is regarded as having addressed 
some issue well, this is in the context of a failed project, wherein he departs from his own 
intended methodology to make claims he cannot substantiate. Locke’s valuable work is supposed 
to be limited to very specific, but merely minor contributions, like the explanation of the 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Even here Locke is taken to make claims he 
cannot substantiate, as when he makes claims about how certain qualities somehow more closely 
resemble what is present in the material body than other qualities, without having any access to 
the body in itself and therefore having no grounds to say what can resemble it. Locke is thus 
accused of a significant number of particularly bad positions.3 I suggest that these accusations all 
result from systematically incorrect interpretations of Locke, according to which his central 
concerns in the Essay include speculative metaphysics or empirical science.  On this kind of 
 
2 As in Berkeley, Bennett (2001), Mandelbaum (1964), and Yolton (1970) among others. 
 
3 As for instance in his account of personal identity (Essay II.xxvii.9) as tied to memory, to which Reid objects with 
the Brave Officer Paradox. Locke is supposed to have failed to recognize the issue of the transitivity of identity 
when someone remembers a previous time, at which time they are supposed to have remembered some other earlier 
time which they have since forgotten. His account is far more reasonable if we assume that Locke is not trying to 
explain in what personal identity consists, but rather explaining what is included in or a source for the idea of one’s 
own identity.   
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interpretation, the main questions concern existence (i.e. what exists?). This is opposed to the 
Strict Interpretation I adopt in which his concerns are epistemological, with the main question 
being that of understanding (i.e. how do we come to understand our ideas?), as suggested by the 
“human understanding” in the title and the focus on ideas (not substances) as its main objects. Of 
course, Locke indulges in some metaphysical speculation, as when he hypothesizes about the 
relationship between primary and secondary qualities, but I believe that these occasions are 
properly understood as discursions from the main project (and even from the chapters of the 
Essay that they are in), which is to be understood epistemologically. Locke even admits “I have 
in what just goes before been engaged in physical inquiries a little farther than perhaps I 
intended.” (Essay II.viii.22) He also speculates about natural philosophy, as when he provides 
corpuscularian explanations for the operation of vision, but this is another aside.4 Locke intends 
for his epistemology to explain how metaphysical inquiry ought to be performed (that is, 
epistemology is methodologically prior to metaphysics for Locke), and these discursions serve to 
provide examples. Further, he is conscious of some objections which may be raised, and 
therefore tries to forestall them. For instance, when he claims that it is the qualities of objects 
which cause our simple ideas of sense, he recognizes that some might raise privative causes of 
sensations as an objection, and his explanation of this case explains what metaphysics arises in 
his chapter on qualities (in the primary/secondary distinction).  
 
4 “I do not say, that the nature of light consists in very small round globules, nor of whiteness in such a texture of 
parts, as gives a certain rotation to these globules, when it reflects them; for I am not now treating physically of light 
or colours. But this, I think, I may say, that I cannot (and I would be glad any one would make intelligible that he 
did) conceive how bodies without us can any ways affect our senses, but by the immediate contact of the sensible 
bodies themselves, as in tasting and feeling, or the impulse of some insensible particles coming from them, as in 
seeing, hearing, and smelling; by the different impulse of which parts, caused by their different size, figure, and 




In what follows, I will apply what I call the Strict Interpretation5 to Locke’s account of 
powers. This Strict Interpretation emphasizes Locke’s description of his project as concerned 
with knowledge and opinion and thereby recontextualizes the Essay in such a way that the work 
presents a coherent system. This in turn permits us to reconsider particular problematic positions 
of Locke and show them for the successful epistemological arguments that I claim they are.6 I 
call this interpretation “Strict” insofar as it assumes that Locke does consistently hold himself to 
what his empiricism allows him to access and also insofar as it restricts any reading to fit within 
the description of the Essay’s purpose which Locke gives in his ‘Epistle to the Reader’ and in 
other places, and as shown in the structure of the Essay. 
When non-philosophers speak about the external world, they do so in terms of the objects 
(more technically, material substances) that exist in it. For this reason, many early modern 
philosophers argue about the nature and the existence of these objects. Rationalists like 
Descartes, Malebranche and Leibniz write of the true natures of material substances as 
something within the bounds of human understanding. Empiricists like Berkeley deny the 
possibility of material substances because they think we cannot acquire ideas of material nature. 
Other empiricists, like Hume, deny that we can know that these substances exist, although they 
are possible. Locke is therefore somewhat anomalous in that he is frequently read to occupy 
some sort of middle territory: he thinks we do not have a clear idea of substance or its nature, 
(Essay II.xxiii.1) but he also appears to insist that particular material substances do exist and that 
we know this. “Nobody can, in earnest, be so sceptical, as to be uncertain of the existence of 
those things which he sees and feels.” (Essay IV.xi.3) To understand Locke’s position on our 
 
5 This language originates with Brown (2006). 
 
6 Impressive Strict Interpretations are provided for Locke’s account of memory by Brown (2006), of causation by 
Connolly (2013), and of knowledge by Priselac (2013 and 2017). 
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knowledge of the external world requires consideration of his account of these material 
substances which populate it in our experience. Our ideas of particular substances consist of the 
idea of substratum and ideas of the qualities and powers we have experienced. (Essay II.xxiii.3) 
It is these ideas of qualities and power which provide the evidence for the existence of material 
substances: “the knowledge of the existence of any other thing, we can have only by sensation.” 
(Essay IV.xi.1) I believe that my novel approach to understanding powers provides insight into 
how our ideas of particular substances, even varying between individuals as they do, can count 
as real knowledge about existence. Different ideas of an individual body might both conform to 
the reality of the powers it possesses, although they include different ideas of powers, because 
these powers are not incompatible when conditions of perceiver and environment are different. 
Being red seems incompatible with being green, but the powers to cause simple ideas of red in 
some circumstances and simple ideas of green in other circumstances can in fact co-exist in 
reality. The extreme specificity of powers at least partially explains why some substance which 
is supposed to have a consistent real essence may be adequately represented by very disparate 
ideas produced by the experiences of different perceivers in different circumstances. This relates 
to Locke’s advocacy of tolerance.7 Some forms of tolerance (particularly religious tolerance) 
consist of a recognition that different people’s experiences might predispose them to differently 
evaluate probability, and therefore to have different opinions. Buddhism will seem more likely to 
be true if I have grown up in a Buddhist society where many authority figures claim its truth than 
if my experience has been restricted to Catholic people and texts, and I am evaluating the 
principles of Buddhism for the first time. The specificity of powers indicates that different 
perceivers or differences in environment will result in different simple ideas of sense, and 
 
7 A topic which extends beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
7 
 
therefore in apparently incompatible sensitive knowledge. We must not expect that other 
individuals, or our future selves in different circumstances, ought to have the same sensations 
that we do on interaction with some material substance, and therefore we should have tolerance 
for the value of their claims of sensitive knowledge. 
The difficulties, described below, of explaining Locke’s account of power makes it a 
worthy test of the Strict Interpretation, because it indicates the ability of this reading to resolve 
apparent puzzles or faults in the text. Dean (1824) writes in his introduction to the Essay: “that 
well-known chapter of Power has been termed the worst part of his whole essay, and seems 
indeed the least defensible.” (p. xiii) As I will demonstrate, however, the Strict Interpretation 
allows a strong defense of Locke’s work, where his account of power is coherent and consistent 
with his project as a whole.
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SECTION 2: Overview of the Essay 
Much of the commentary written on qualities and powers in Locke’s Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding has assumed that these topics must be metaphysical.8 I argue that a 
proper reading of the plan of the Essay9 reveals that he does not intend qualities and powers as 
features of material substances, but rather discusses the ideas we possess of qualities and powers 
and which we include in our ideas of material substances. The Essay is a prelude to any future 
science which might strive to describe the properties of objects: “before we set ourselves upon 
enquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our 
understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with.” (Essay ‘Epistle to the Reader’) Locke aims 
only to clarify the appropriate uses and limits of the human faculty of the understanding. Once 
these have been established, it will be possible, for other people in other works, to consider the 
 
8 For examples, see Ayers (1993), Stuart (2013), Bolton (1976), and Woolhouse (2005) among others. 
 





real properties which cause our ideas of sense.10 He describes the ideas we have and how they 
relate to the words we use, but not the features and mechanisms whereby our perceptions are 
caused by the objects of the external world.11 This is obscured by Locke’s frequent elisions from 
“an idea of something,” like “an idea of white,” to simply naming using the name signifying the 
idea, “white,” which encourages confusion with the cause of the idea.1213 If one, unlike Locke, 
takes words to refer to entities rather than ideas, there is an inclination to think that “white” is 
that feature of substances, and therefore to perceive a divide between what he says about ideas 
and what he says when he uses only the name. It is also confused by his tendency to 
metaphysical digressions beyond the stated scope of his project, usually in the form of 
 
10 “The commonwealth of learning is not at this time without master-builders, whose mighty designs in advancing 
the sciences, will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity; but every one must not hope to be a Boyle, 
or a Sydenham; and in an age that produces such masters as the great Huygenius, and the incomparable Mr. Newton, 
with some others of that strain; it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a 
little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge; which certainly had been very much 
more advanced in the world, if the endeavours of ingenious and industrious men had not been much cumbered with 
the learned but frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible terms, introduced into the sciences, and there 
made an art of, to that degree that philosophy, which is nothing but the true knowledge of things, was thought unfit, 
or uncapable to be brought into well-bred company, and polite conversation. Vague and insignificant forms of 
speech, and abuse of language, have so long passed for mysteries of science; and hard and misapplied words, with 
little or no meaning, have, by prescription, such a right to be mistaken for deep learning, and height of speculation, 
that it will not be easy to persuade, either those who speak, or those who hear them, that they are but the covers of 
ignorance, and hindrance of true knowledge.” (Essay ‘Epistle to the Reader’) 
 
11 “I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind; or trouble myself to examine, wherein 
its essence consists, or by what motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any sensation by 
our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any, or all of them, 
depend on matter or no: These are speculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying 
out of my way in the design I am now upon.” (Essay I.i.2) 
 
12 As occurs in: “There are some ideas which have admittance only through one sense, which is peculiarly adapted 
to receive them. Thus light and colours, as white, red, yellow, blue, with their several degrees or shades and 
mixtures, as green, scarlet, purple, sea-green, and the rest, come in only by the eyes: All kinds of noises, sounds, and 
tones, only by the ears: The several tastes and smells, by the nose and palate.” (Essay II.iii.1) 
 
13 By his own admission as of the second edition, the Essay is not simple to read: “Whether the subject I have in 
hand requires often more thought and attention than cursory readers, at least such as are prepossessed, are willing to 
allow; or, whether any obscurity in my expressions casts a cloud over it, and these notions are made difficult to 
others apprehensions in my way of treating them: So it is, that my meaning, I find, is often mistaken, and I have not 




corpuscularian explanations, particularly of qualities.1415 Locke expects that the mechanisms 
hypothesized by the scientists who follow his cleared path will be based on the movements of 
corpuscles, and he therefore sometimes anticipates what he otherwise claims he will leave to 
others.16 His personal belief in corpuscularianism is consistent with both the agnosticism of the 
Essay towards the metaphysical causes of sensory ideas and the impossibility of knowledge of 
corpuscles from our sensory experience, because it is an opinion rather than knowledge.1718 
 
14 E.g. “I do not say, that the nature of light consists in very small round globules, nor of whiteness in such a texture 
of parts, as gives a certain rotation to these globules, when it reflects them; for I am not now treating physically of 
light or colours. But this, I think, I may say, that I cannot (and I would be glad any one would make intelligible that 
he did) conceive how bodies without us can any ways affect our senses, but by the immediate contact of the sensible 
bodies themselves, as in tasting and feeling, or the impulse of some insensible particles coming from them, as in 
seeing, hearing, and smelling; by the different impulse of which parts, caused by their different size, figure, and 
motion, the variety of sensations is produced in us.” (Essay IV.ii.11) 
 
15 “Not that we may not, to explain any phenomena of nature, make use of any probable hypothesis whatsoever: 
Hypotheses, if they are well made, are at least great helps to the memory, and often direct us to new discoveries. But 
my meaning is, that we should not take up any one too hastily (which the mind, that would always penetrate into the 
causes of things, and have principles to rest on, is very apt to do) till we have very well examined particulars, and 
made several experiments, in that thing which we would explain by our hypothesis, and see whether it will agree to 
them all; whether our principles will carry us quite through, and not be as inconsistent with one phenomenon of 
nature, as they seem to accommodate and explain another. And at least that we take care, that the name of principles 
deceive us not, nor impose on us, by making us receive that for an unquestionable truth, which is really at best but a 
very doubtful conjecture, such as are most (I had almost said all) of the hypotheses in natural philosophy.” (Essay 
IV.xii.13) 
 
16 “I have here instanced in the corpuscularian hypothesis, as that which is thought to go farthest in an intelligible 
explication of those qualities of bodies; and I fear the weakness of human understanding is scarce able to substitute 
another, which will afford us a fuller and clearer discovery of the necessary connexion and co-existence of the 
powers which are to be observed united in several sorts of them. This at least is certain, that which-ever hypothesis 
be clearest and truest, (for of that it is not my business to determine) our knowledge concerning corporeal substances 
will be very little advanced by any of them, till we are made to see what qualities and powers of bodies have a 
necessary connexion or repugnancy one with another; which in the present state of philosophy, I think, we know but 
to a very small degree: And I doubt whether, with those faculties we have, we shall ever be able to carry our general 
knowledge (I say not particular experience) in this part much farther.” (Essay IV.iii.16) 
 
17 “I think not only, that it becomes the modesty of philosophy not to pronounce magisterially, where we want that 
evidence that can produce knowledge; but also, that it is of use to us to discern how far our knowledge does reach; 
for the state we are at present in, not being that of vision, we must, in many things, content ourselves with faith and 
probability.” (Essay IV.iii.6) 
 
18 “I deny not, but a man, accustomed to rational and regular experiments, shall be able to see farther into the nature 
of bodies, and guess righter at their yet unknown properties, than one that is a stranger to them: But yet, as I have 




 Locke frames the Essay as a work of epistemology.19 He describes his purpose as “to 
enquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge; together with the grounds 
and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent.” (Essay I.i.2) In particular, he aims to distinguish 
between knowledge and opinion, since he is troubled by the frequency with which people 
disagree in what they claim to know and how these controversies lend support to skeptical 
conclusions.20 He plans to go about this in three steps: first, to examine the origins of our ideas; 
second, to determine what might be known from such ideas; and third, to explain why we assent 
to opinions beyond the scope of knowledge.21 The majority of the Essay is concerned with the 
first of these steps, while the latter pair are restricted to discussion in Book IV. 
 In this section, I will summarize the Essay as guided by the Strict Interpretation. This 
summary will set up my treatment of power by showing its context in Locke’s project. The 
prima facie problems of Locke’s account of ideas of power primarily result from his empirical 
commitments and his division of ideas into simple and complex, therefore understanding these 
positions is informative as to the limits of potential solutions. Powers in the Essay are closely 
linked to the treatments of qualities, substances and sensitive knowledge, so covering these 
 
19 I will return to this claim in more detail later in the dissertation. 
 
20 “Those persuasions which are to be found amongst men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet 
asserted somewhere or other, with such assurance and confidence, that he that shall take a view of the opinions of 
mankind, observe their Opposition, and at the same time consider the fondness and devotion wherewith they are 
embraced, the resolution and eagerness wherewith they are maintained, may perhaps have reason to suspect, that 
either there is no such thing as truth at all; or that mankind hath no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of 
it.” (Essay I.i.2) 
 
21 “First, I shall enquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a 
man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be 
furnished with them. 
Secondly, I shall endeavour to shew what knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas; and the certainty, 
evidence, and extent of it. 
Thirdly, I shall make some enquiry into the nature and grounds of faith, or opinion; whereby I mean that assent, 
which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge; and here we shall have 
occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of assent.” (Essay I.i.3) 
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topics is also useful for later discussions. Locke’s account of language, explaining the 
relationship between words and ideas, is crucial for many interpretive questions. 
2.1 Book I: Against innatism 
Locke’s first step in the Essay is to argue for strict empiricism. He does this by a close 
examination of the genesis of our ideas, which he defines broadly as “whatsoever is the object of 
the understanding when a man thinks,” (Essay I.i.8) thereby encompassing concepts, principles 
and knowledge. He begins in Book I with an argument against the existence of innate ideas22 and 
then continues in Books II-IV to illustrate how ideas received from experience are adequate for 
the explanation of all the objects of human understanding. He is particularly concerned in these 
later books with the explanation of that knowledge for which rationalist philosophers give a 
priori accounts, such as the necessity of substances to support properties, the nature of identity, 
and the existence of God. He takes it to be the case that a successful account of the empiricist 
origins of such concepts would in itself be an argument against innate ideas: “It would be 
sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I should only 
shew (as I hope I shall in the following parts of this discourse) how men, barely by the use of 
their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate 
impressions; and may arrive at certainty, without any such original notions or principles.” (Essay 
I.ii.1) Locke believes that God would not provide the faculties to acquire some idea and then 
make them irrelevant by providing the idea innately.23 The Essay can thus be divided into two 
 
22 These are described as “some primary notions, as it were, stamped upon the mind of man, which the soul receives 
in its very first being; and brings into the world with it.” (Essay I.ii.1) 
 
23 “For I imagine any one will easily grant, that it would be impertinent to suppose, the ideas of colours innate in a 
creature, to whom God hath given sight, and a power to receive them by the eyes, from external objects: And no less 
unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature, and innate characters, when we may 
observe in ourselves faculties, fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them, as if they were originally 
imprinted on the mind.” (Essay I.ii.1) 
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separate arguments against innate ideas: the first contesting the evidence of their existence and 
the second showing that they are unnecessary. 
 The argument against innate ideas given in Book I is a refutation of what Locke considers 
the strongest argument offered by rationalists for innate ideas: that their apparent ubiquity 
suggests that they are imprinted on human minds rather than acquired through later experience.24 
He makes the counter claim that no concepts are universally possessed. If an idea is truly innate, 
then it is present in the mind of every human prior to any possible experience. However, even the 
most basic knowledge, like the principle that nothing both is and is not, does not have universal 
assent, given the lack of this knowledge by “children and idiots.”25 Furthermore, as relates to 
practical rather than speculative principles, adults frequently disagree.26 Locke denies any 
recourse to claiming that individuals who do not assent nonetheless innately possess the 
knowledge without current awareness of it. He admits no account of innate ideas as dispositions, 
whether to assent upon reaching the age of reason or to assent on first encounter with some 
 
24 “There is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain principles, both speculative and 
practical, (for they speak of both), universally agreed upon by all mankind: Which therefore, they argue, must needs 
be the constant impressions, which the souls of men receive in their first beings, and which they bring into the world 
with them, as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent faculties.” (Essay I.ii.2) 
 
25 “For, first, it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them; and the 
want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent, which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate 
truths: It seeming to me near a contradiction, to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or 
understands not; imprinting, if it signify any thing, being nothing else, but the making certain truths to be perceived. 
For to imprint any thing on the mind, without the mind's perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore 
children and idiots have souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive 
them, and necessarily know and assent to these truths: Which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such 
impressions.” (Essay I.ii.5) 
 
26 “Whether there be any such moral principles, wherein all men do agree, I appeal to any, who have been but 
moderately conversant in the history of mankind, and looked abroad beyond the smoke of their own chimneys. 





principle, on the basis that such dispositions are identical to recognizing the capacity of a mind 
without innate ideas to acquire principles from the relevant experiences.27 
Locke’s second line of argument is that innate ideas have no explanatory value given that 
empiricism can adequately explain all the ideas and principles which are the objects of human 
understanding. Were there to be some thought which could not be explained by the combination 
of ideas from experience, then his project would be undermined by evidence of the existence and 
explanatory necessity of innate ideas. He treats the ideas received from experience (both sensory 
and reflective) or derived therefrom in Book II, verbal communication and definitions in Book 
III, and knowledge in Book IV. He explains how each of these is constituted through mental 
activity from ideas received from experience. This order is determined by their pattern of 
acquisition: “The senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet, and the 
mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names 
got to them. Afterwards the mind, proceeding farther, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the 
use of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, 
the materials about which to exercise its discursive faculty: And the use of reason becomes daily 
more visible, as these materials, that give it employment, increase.” (Essay I.ii.15) Whereas his 
 
27 “No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. For if 
any one may, then, by the same reason, all propositions that are true, and the mind is capable ever of assenting to, 
may be said to be in the mind, and to be imprinted: Since, if any one can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet 
knew, it must be only, because it is capable of knowing it, and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know. Nay, 
thus truths may be imprinted on the mind, which it never did, nor ever shall know: For a man may live long, and die 
at last in ignorance of many truths, which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that if the 
capacity of knowing, be the natural impression contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to know, will, by this 
account, be every one of them innate; and this great point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way 
of speaking; which, whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from those, who deny innate 
principles. For nobody, I think, ever denied that the mind was capable of knowing several truths. The capacity, they 
say, is innate, the knowledge acquired. But then to what end such contest for certain innate maxims? If truths can be 
imprinted on the understanding without being perceived, I can see no difference there can be, between any truths the 
mind is capable of knowing in respect of their original: They must all be innate, or all adventitious: In vain shall a 




negative argument against innate ideas is accepted,28 Locke’s positive arguments in these later 
books are often taken to be deeply flawed. 
2.2 Book II: Ideas 
Book II is titled “Of Ideas” and discusses an alternative explanation for the source of our 
ideas. Since it is indubitable that there are objects of our understanding, there must therefore be a 
way to acquire these ideas if they are not innate.29 Locke argues that this source is experience.30 
He divides ideas into the categories of simple and complex and gives different explanations of 
how these ideas are acquired. Simple ideas are acquired directly from experience, whereas 
complex ideas are constructions composed of simple ideas.31 Simple ideas are received passively 
and cannot be altered by the mind’s activity.32 There are two types of experience which occasion 
 
28 To the extent that some view Locke as critiquing a straw man argument, in that the account of innate ideas he 
describes (although accurate to the views of some of his contemporaries) is viewed as too flawed for contention, in 
the ways that he illustrates. 
 
29 “Every man being conscious to himself that he thinks, and that which his mind is applied about, whilst thinking, 
being the ideas that are there, it is past doubt that men have in their minds several ideas, such as are those expressed 
by the words, Whiteness, Hardness, Sweetness, Thinking, Motion, Man, Elephant, Army, Drunkenness, and others. 
It is in the first place then to be enquired, how he comes by them. I know it is a received doctrine, that men have 
native ideas, and original characters, stamped upon their minds, in their very first being. This opinion I have, at 
large, examined already; and, I suppose, what I have said, in the foregoing book, will be much more easily admitted, 
when I have shewn, whence the understanding may get all the ideas it has, and by what ways and degrees they may 
come into the mind for which I shall appeal to every one's own observation and experience.” (Essay II.i.1) 
 
30 “Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes 
it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it 
with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one 
word, from experience; in all that our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself.” (Essay II.i.2) 
 
31 “These simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the mind only by those 
two ways above-mentioned, viz. sensation and reflection. When the understanding is once stored with these simple 
ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at 
pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understanding, by any 
quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before 
mentioned.” (Essay II.ii.2) 
 
32 “For the objects of our senses do, many of them, obtrude their particular ideas upon our minds whether we will or 
no; and the operations of our minds will not let us be without, at least, some obscure notions of them. No man can be 
wholly ignorant of what he does when he thinks. These simple ideas, when offered to the mind, the understanding 
can no more refuse to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted, nor blot them out, and make new ones itself, than a 
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simple ideas, and so they can be categorized according to whether their source is sensory, 
reflective, or (potentially) both.33 Sensation supplies those ideas which are of the qualities of 
external objects.34 Reflection supplies ideas of the mind’s activities.35 There are some ideas 
which one might acquire from either fountain, one of which is an idea of power (the topic of this 
dissertation).36 Complex ideas are formed by mental operations upon simple ideas.37 Three kinds 
of operation are possible: conjunction, comparison and abstraction.38 Locke analogizes the 
 
mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the images or ideas which the objects set before it do therein produce. As the 
bodies that surround us do diversely affect our organs, the mind is forced to receive the impressions, and cannot 
avoid the perception of those ideas that are annexed to them.” (Essay II.i.25) 
 
33 “Our observation employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, 
perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. 
These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.” 
(Essay II.i.2) 
 
34 “First, Our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct 
perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them: And thus we come by 
those ideas we have of Yellow, White, Heat, Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all those which we call sensible 
qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the 
mind what produces there those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon 
our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call SENSATION.” (Essay II.i.3) 
 
35 “Secondly, The other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the perception of 
the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which operations, when the 
soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had 
from things without. And such are Perception, Thinking, Doubting, Believing, Reasoning, Knowing, Willing, and all 
the different actings of our own minds; which we being conscious of and observing in ourselves, do from these 
receive into our understandings as distinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas 
every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is 
very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other sensation, so I call this 
REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within 
itself.” (Essay II.i.4) 
 
36 “There be other simple ideas which convey themselves into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection, 
viz. Pleasure or Delight, and its opposite, Pain or Uneasiness; Power; Existence; Unity.” (Essay II.vii.1) 
 
37 “As simple ideas are observed to exist in several combinations united together, so the mind has a power to 
consider several of them united together as one idea; and that not only as they are united in external objects, but as 
itself has joined them. Ideas thus made up of several simple ones put together, I call complex; such as are beauty, 
gratitude, a man, an army, the universe; which though complicated of various simple ideas, or complex ideas made 
up of simple ones, yet are, when the mind pleases, considered each by itself, as one entire thing, and signified by one 
name.” (Essay II.xii.1) 
 
38 “The acts of the mind, wherein it exerts its power over its simple ideas, are chiefly these three: 1. Combining 
several simple ideas into one compound one, and thus all complex ideas are made. 2. The second is bringing two 
ideas, whether simple or complex, together, and setting them by one another, so as to take a view of them at once, 
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relationship between simple and complex ideas to that between atoms and molecules: simple 
ideas, like atoms, cannot be modified or divided, but can be assembled into molecule-style 
conglomerations in the form of complex ideas.3940 Book II is structured as a catalogue of these 
types of ideas, offering elaboration on some particular examples in individual chapters. 
After a single chapter on “Ideas in general,”41 Locke describes simple ideas42 and then 
considers simple ideas received from sensory experience,43 from reflection,44 and from both 
sources.45 A chapter on “Other considerations concerning simple ideas” follows these.46 While 
this chapter is best known for including the distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities,4748 its main purpose is to explain how simple ideas of sense might be received from 
 
without uniting them into one; by which way it gets all its ideas of relations. 3. The third is separating them from all 
other ideas that accompany them in their real existence; this is called abstraction: And thus all its general ideas are 
made.” (Essay II.xii.1) 
 
39 “The dominion of man, in this little world of his own understanding, being much-what the same as it is in the 
great world of visible things; wherein his power, however managed by art and skill, reaches no farther than to 
compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand; but can do nothing towards the making the least 
particle of new matter, or destroying one atom of what is already in being.” (Essay II.ii.2)  
 
40 “This shews man's power, and its ways of operation, to be much the same in the material and intellectual world. 
For the materials in both being such as he has no power over, either to make or destroy, all that man can do is either 
to unite them together, or to set them by one another, or wholly separate them. I shall here begin with the first of 
these in the consideration of complex ideas, and come to the other two in their due places.” (Essay II.xii.1) 
 
41 Essay II.i 
 
42 Essay II.ii 
 
43 Essay II.iii-v, where II.iii considers simple ideas received from a single sense, II.iv covers the idea of solidity in 
particular, and II.v simple ideas received from multiple senses. 
 
44 Essay II.vi 
 
45 Essay II.vii 
 
46 Essay II.viii 
 
47 Essay II.viii.9-10 
 




apparently privative causes.49 Any idea of a quality is an idea of a power to cause some simple 
idea of sense.50 While much has been made of the metaphysical difference between primary and 
secondary qualities, Locke’s purpose seems to be only to distinguish between those qualities 
which seem to be always matched by positive properties (primary) and those which are already 
accepted not to correspond to resembling causes (secondary) to illustrate that ideas from 
apparently privative causes are not inconsistent with the common view of sensation. 
Aristotelians believed that cold was privative, being caused by the absence of heat.51 Locke 
suggests that a more plausible explanation involves the motions of corpuscles. Our idea of cold is 
not supposed to be caused by an absence, but by these motions, even if cold does not resemble 
them. He then pivots to catalogue simple ideas of reflection: perception,52 retention,53 and 
discernment.54 The next chapters of Book II define complex ideas55 and then provide accounts of 
 
49 “Concerning the simple ideas of sensation it is to be considered that whatsoever is so constituted in nature as to be 
able, by affecting our senses, to cause any perception in the mind, doth thereby produce in the understanding a 
simple idea; which, whatever be the external cause of it, when it comes to be taken notice of by our discerning 
faculty, it is by the mind looked on and considered there to be a real positive idea in the understanding, as much as 
any other whatsoever; though perhaps the cause of it be but a privation of the subject.” (Essay II.viii.1) 
 
50 “The power to produce any idea in our mind I call a quality of the subject wherein that power is.” (Essay II.viii.8) 
 
51 See Descartes’ Third Meditation and Schechtman (2014) p493-4. 
 
52 Essay II.ix 
 
53 Essay II.x 
 
54 Essay II.xi 
 




particular examples, including: space,56 number,57 power,58 substance,59 and identity.60 The 
remainder of Book II is concerned with evaluation of complex ideas, in terms of their clarity or 
obscurity, and of their relationship to the sources of the simple ideas included in them.61 
2.3 Book III: Language 
Book III addresses the signification of words. Words are often considered to have 
meanings, whereby they refer to a shared definition.62 One might also assume that words are 
intended to name objects, and that the signification of ‘table’ is a material table, or perhaps the 
class of tables or the form of a table.63 However, Locke’s position is that words are only signs of 
ideas.64 In particular, a word signifies some idea in the mind of the speaker.65 It is arbitrary, and 
 
56 Essay II.xiii 
 
57 Essay II.xvi 
 
58 Essay II.xxi; As this dissertation is about ideas of power, I am particularly concerned with this text. 
 
59 Essay II.xxiii 
 
60 Essay II.xxvii 
 
61 Essay II.xxix-xxxiii 
 
62 “They suppose their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds also of other men, with whom they communicate: 
For else they should talk in vain, and could not be understood, if the sounds they applied to one idea were such as by 
the hearer were applied to another: Which is to speak two languages. But in this, men stand not usually to examine, 
whether the idea they and those they discourse with have in their minds, be the same; but think it enough that they 
use the word, as they imagine, in the common acceptation of that language; in which they suppose, that the idea they 
make it a sign of is precisely the same, to which the understanding men of that country apply that name.” (Essay 
III.ii.4) 
 
63 “Because men would not be thought to talk barely of their own imagination, but of things as really they are; 
therefore they often suppose the words to stand also for the reality of things.” (Essay III.ii.5) 
 
64 “The use then of words is to be sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas they stand for are their proper and 
immediate signification.” (Essay III.ii.1) 
 
65 “That then which words are the marks of are the ideas of the speaker: Nor can any one apply them as marks, 




therefore voluntary, what idea a specific word is taken to signify.66 It is thus the idea which the 
speaker intends the word to signify which it signifies, regardless of any common use or 
definition.67 This explains why the same word may be used with different significance by 
different speakers.68 A physicist, a buyer of jewelry and a child will have different complex ideas 
in mind when they use the word gold, including different collections of simple ideas, but the uses 
are equally valid significations. The majority of words are general terms69 and refer to ideas of 
species rather than ideas of particular objects in the fashion of proper nouns, as a result of the 
large numbers of possible ideas and the limits of our memory.70 Since a word may be general 
 
66 “Thus we may conceive how words which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, came to be made use of 
by men, as the signs of their ideas; not by any natural connexion that there is between particular articulate sounds 
and certain ideas, for then there would be but one language amongst all men; but by a voluntary imposition, whereby 
such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea.” (Essay III.ii.1) 
 
67 Although we might restrict proper use to cases where people communicate successfully (insofar as the word 
signifies a closely equivalent idea in the mind of the listener) or according to the norms of other speakers of the 
language: “It is true, common use by a tacit consent appropriates certain sounds to certain ideas in all languages, 
which so far limits the signification of that sound, that unless a man applies it to the same idea, he does not speak 
properly: And let me add, that unless a man's words excite the same ideas in the hearer, which he makes them stand 
for in speaking, he does not speak intelligibly.” (Essay III.ii.8) 
 
68 “This is so necessary in the use of language, that in this respect the knowing and the ignorant, the learned and the 
unlearned, use the words they speak (with any meaning) all alike. They, in every man's mouth, stand for the ideas he 
has, and which he would express by them. A child having taken notice of nothing in the metal he hears called gold, 
but the bright shining yellow colour, he applies the word gold only to his own idea of that colour, and nothing else; 
and therefore calls the same colour in a peacock's tail gold. Another that hath better observed, adds to shining yellow 
great weight: And then the sound gold when he uses it, stands for a complex idea of a shining yellow and very 
weighty substance. Another adds to those qualities fusibility; and then the word gold signifies to him a body, bright, 
yellow, fusible, and very heavy. Another adds malleability. Each of these uses equally the word gold when they 
have occasion to express the idea which they have applied it to: But it is evident, that each can apply it only to his 
own idea; nor can he make it stand as a sign of such a complex idea as he has not.” (Essay III.ii.3) 
69 A significant exception being the names of simple ideas, because simple ideas are not susceptible to abstraction. 
General terms for classes of simple ideas signify ideas of receiving a perception through some particular route, e.g. 
‘colors’ for simple ideas of sight. (Essay III.iv.16) I argue later that Locke makes a mistake in this discussion of the 
names of simple ideas insofar as many of examples do seem to be general terms, as ‘green’ signifies an idea 
encompassing the more limited ideas of lime, emerald and pine. Even names which seem to describe a particular 
sensation, like ‘the taste of pineapple’ might equally signify a simple idea of a particular taste sensation or an idea of 
a range of associated simple ideas of taste, each of a different degree of sweetness or acidity. 
 
70 “The far greatest part of words, that make all languages, are general terms; which has not been the effect of 
neglect or chance, but of reason and necessity…. It is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct 
peculiar name. For the signification and use of words, depending on that connexion which the mind makes between 
its ideas and the sounds it uses as signs of them, it is necessary, in the application of names to things that the mind 
should have distinct ideas of the things, and retain also the particular name that belongs to every one, with its 
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only if the idea which it signifies is general, Locke provides an account of the formation of 
general ideas of sorts by abstraction from particular ideas of individuals.71 To abstract, one 
compares multiple complex ideas and removes any features which are not shared by all.72 The 
idea signified by the word ‘dog’ is one formed of the common features of the ideas of Balto, 
Lassie and Toto. The essence which determines whether something belongs to a species consists 
only of conformity with the abstract idea of that species.73 Fido is a dog not because of anything 
in Fido, but because my idea of Fido conforms appropriately to the idea which the word ‘dog’ 
 
peculiar appropriation to that idea. But it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of 
all the particular things we meet with: Every bird and beast men saw, every tree and plant that affected the senses, 
could not find a place in the most capacious understanding. If it be looked on as an instance of a prodigious memory, 
that some generals have been able to call every soldier in their army by his proper name, we may easily find a 
reason, why men have never attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock, or crow that flies over their heads; 
much less to call every leaf of plants, or grain of sand that came in their way, by a peculiar name.” (Essay III.iii.1-2) 
 
71 “Words become general, by being made the signs of general ideas; and ideas become general, by separating from 
them the circumstances of time, and place, and any other ideas, that may determine them to this or that particular 
existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one; each of 
which having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call it) of that sort.” (Essay III.iii.6) 
 
72 “For let any one reflect, and then tell me, wherein does his idea of man differ from that of Peter and Paul, or his 
idea of horse from that of Bucephalus, but in the leaving out something that is peculiar to each individual, and 
retaining so much of those particular complex ideas of several particular existences, as they are found to agree in? 
Of the complex ideas signified by the names man and horse, leaving out but those particulars wherein they differ, 
and retaining only those wherein they agree, and of those making a new distinct complex idea, and giving the name 
animal to it; one has a more general term, that comprehends with man several other creatures. Leave out of the idea 
of animal, sense and spontaneous motion; and the remaining complex idea, made up of the remaining simple ones of 
body, life, and nourishment, becomes a more general one, under the more comprehensive term vivens. And not to 
dwell longer upon this particular, so evident in itself, by the same way the mind proceeds to body, substance, and at 
last to being, thing, and such universal terms which stand for any of our ideas whatsoever.” (Essay III.iii.9) 
73 “That then which general words signify is a sort of things; and each of them does that, by being a sign of an 
abstract idea in the mind, to which idea, as things existing are found to agree, so they come to be ranked under that 
name; or, which is all one, be of that sort. Whereby it is evident, that the essences of the sorts, or (if the Latin word 
pleases better) species of things, are nothing else but these abstract ideas. For the having the essence of any species, 
being that which makes any thing to be of that species, and the conformity to the idea to which the name is annexed, 
being that which gives a right to that name; the having the essence, and the having that conformity, must needs be 
the same thing: Since to be of any species, and to have a right to the name of that species, is all one. As for example, 
to be a man, or of the species man, and to have right to the name man, is the same thing. Again, to be a man, or of 
the species man, and have the essence of a man, is the same thing. Now since nothing can be a man, or have a right 
to the name man, but what has a conformity to the abstract idea the name man stands for; nor any thing be a man, or 
have a right to the species man, but what has the essence of that species; it follows, that the abstract idea for which 
the name stands, and the essence of the species, is one and the same. From whence it is easy to observe, that the 
essences of the sorts of things, and consequently the sorting of things, is the workmanship of the understanding, that 
abstracts and makes those general ideas.” (Essay III.iii.12) 
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signifies when used by me. Given that the signification of ‘dog’ is dependent on my personal 
abstract idea, it is possible for me to consider Fido a dog (because my idea of Fido includes the 
ideas of being furry, able to bark, and carnivorous which together fully constitute the idea I 
associate with the word ‘dog’) while someone else would not (because their idea of the species 
dog further includes being four-legged, while Fido has only three legs). This leads Locke to 
distinguish between real and nominal essence, where real essence is the constitution of an 
individual and nominal essence is conformity with some abstract idea.747576 His intent is to 
clarify the basis on which we attribute membership in a species by providing the true 
 
74 “First, essence may be taken for the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is. And thus the real internal, 
but generally, in substances, unknown constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualities depend, may be 
called their essence. This is the proper original signification of the word, as is evident from the formation of it; 
essentia, in its primary notation, signifying properly being. And in this sense it is still used, when we speak of the 
essence of particular things, without giving them any name. 
Secondly, the learning and disputes of the schools having been much busied about genus and species, the word 
essence has almost lost its primary signification: And instead of the real constitution of things, has been almost 
wholly applied to the artificial constitution of genus and species. It is true, there is ordinarily supposed a real 
constitution of the sorts of things; and it is past doubt, there must be some real constitution, on which any collection 
of simple ideas co-existing must depend. But it being evident, that things are ranked under names into sorts or 
species, only as they agree to certain abstract ideas, to which we have annexed those names: The essence of each 
genus, or sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract idea, which the general, or sortal (if I may have leave so to call 
it from sort, as I do general from genus) name stands for. And this we shall find to be that which the word essence 
imports in its most familiar use. These two sorts of essences, I suppose, may not unfitly be termed, the one the real, 
the other nominal essence.” (Essay III.iii.15) 
 
75 “The measure and boundary of each sort, or species, whereby it is constituted that particular sort, and 
distinguished from others, is that we call its essence, which is nothing but that abstract idea to which the name is 
annexed; so that every thing contained in that idea is essential to that sort. This, though it be all the essence of 
natural substances that we know, or by which we distinguish them into sorts; yet I call it by a peculiar name, the 
nominal essence, to distinguish it from the real constitution of substances, upon which depends this nominal essence, 
and all the properties of that sort; which therefore, as has been said, may be called the real essence: V.g. the nominal 
essence of gold is that complex idea the word gold stands for, let it be, for instance, a body yellow, of a certain 
weight, malleable, fusible, and fixed. But the real essence is the constitution of the insensible parts of that body, on 
which those qualities, and all the other properties of gold depend. How far these two are different, though they are 
both called essence, is obvious at first sight to discover.” (Essay III.vi.2) 
 
76 Real and nominal essence do coincide in the case of simple ideas, but this because they are particular and, given 




signification of general terms, and thereby to resolve many disagreements.7778 Locke further 
hoped to improve the progress of science by showing that distinguishing species of substances by 
their real essences, which are inaccessible and thus unknown, is impossible and thus to redirect 
efforts which were being wasted.7980 Book III is capped by chapters on the limits of language,81 
common abuses,82 and remedies for both.83 
 
77 “Nor will any one wonder, that I say these essences, or abstract ideas, (which are the measures of name, and the 
boundaries of species) are the workmanship of the understanding, who considers, that at least the complex ones are 
often, in several men, different collections of simple ideas: And therefore that is covetousness to one man, which is 
not so to another. Nay, even in substances, where their abstract ideas seem to be taken from the things themselves, 
they are not constantly the same; no not in that species which is most familiar to us, and with which we have the 
most intimate acquaintance: It having been more than once doubted, whether the foetus born of a woman were a 
man; even so far, as that it hath been debated, whether it were or were not to be nourished and baptized: Which 
could not be, if the abstract idea or essence, to which the name man belonged, were of nature's making; and were not 
the uncertain and various collection of simple ideas, which the understanding put together, and then abstracting it, 
affixed a name to it.” (Essay III.iii.14) 
 
78 “Thus, if the idea of body, with some people, be bare extension or space, then solidity is not essential to body: If 
others make the idea, to which they give the name body, to be solidity and extension, then solidity is essential to 
body. That therefore, and that alone, is considered as essential, which makes a part of the complex idea the name of 
a sort stands for, without which no particular thing can be reckoned of that sort, nor be entitled to that name. Should 
there be found a parcel of matter that had all the other qualities that are in iron, but wanted obedience to the 
loadstone; and would neither be drawn by it, nor receive direction from it; would any one question whether it 
wanted any thing essential? It would be absurd to ask, Whether a thing really existing wanted any thing essential to 
it. Or could it be demanded, Whether this made an essential or specific difference or no, since we have no other 
measure of essential or specific but our abstract ideas? And to talk of specific differences in nature, without 
reference to general ideas and names, is to talk unintelligibly.” (Essay III.vi.5) 
 
79 “But were there no other reason against it, yet the supposition of essences that cannot be known, and the making 
of them nevertheless to be that which distinguishes the species of things, is so wholly useless, and unserviceable to 
any part of our knowledge, that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by, and content ourselves with such 
essences of the sorts or species of things as come within the reach of our knowledge: Which, when seriously 
considered, will be found, as I have said, to be nothing else but those abstract complex ideas, to which we have 
annexed distinct general names.” (Essay III.iii.17) 
 
80 “Those therefore who have been taught, that the several species of substances had their distinct internal substantial 
forms; and that it was those forms which made the distinction of substances into their true species and genera; were 
led yet farther out of the way, by having their minds set upon fruitless inquiries after substantial forms, wholly 
unintelligible, and whereof we have scarce so much as any obscure or confused conception in general.” (Essay 
III.vi.10) 
 
81 Essay III.ix 
 
82 Essay III.x 
 
83 Essay III.xi 
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2.4 Book IV: Knowledge and opinion 
Book IV is on the topic of knowledge and opinion. It is in this book that he most clearly 
returns to his stated purpose, “to enquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human 
knowledge; together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent.” (Essay I.i.2) 
Books II and III are necessary to this project insofar as they respectively address the material of 
knowledge and the terms in which we claim it, but they are prefatory in that they do not address 
knowledge and its difference from opinion. Book IV can be divided into one section describing 
the limits and kinds of knowledge and a second covering the ways in which opinion goes beyond 
the realm of knowledge.  
 The first part of Book IV addresses the second step of Locke’s stated project: what our 
ideas make it possible for us to know. Furthermore, while Locke has shown how we might 
acquire all our ideas, including those which others have assumed innate, he must still show that 
empiricism is adequate for the production of knowledge to complete his anti-nativist argument. 
Figures like Descartes rely on innate knowledge to avert skepticism,84 but Locke has denied that 
such knowledge is possible. His treatment of knowledge explains why this denial is not an 
embrace of skepticism. According to Locke, knowledge is “nothing but the perception of the 
connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our ideas.” (Essay IV.i.2) 
Knowledge, to be an object of the understanding, must be some idea. When we consider what 
idea is signified by a knowledge claim, we will discover that the only candidate we have in mind 
 




is our perception of the ideas agreeing or disagreeing.8586 Agreement is best understood as idea-
containment.87 Agreement is of four kinds: identity, relation, co-existence and real existence.88 In 
the case of identity, agreement consists of the ideas being completely the same.89 To know black 
is not white is to perceive that the idea I signify by the term black is not the same as the idea I 
signify by the name white. In that of relation, one idea is contained by another idea.9091 To know 
 
85 “For when we know that white is not black, what do we else but perceive that these two ideas do not agree? When 
we possess ourselves with the utmost security of the demonstration, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to 
two right ones, what do we more but perceive, that equality to two right ones does necessarily agree to, and is 
inseparable from the three angles of a triangle?” (Essay IV.i.2) 
 
86 Locke divides knowledge into two kinds: actual and habitual. Actual knowledge involves currently having the 
perception, whereas habitual knowledge is having the memory of having had the perception. I have actual 
knowledge of Pythagoras’ theorem when I work through the proof, but when I know that the square of the 
hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the two other sides, without perceiving this agreement but relying 
on a memory of having done the proof, I have habitual knowledge. Only one piece of knowledge is ever actual, 
because we are only capable of perceiving one agreement (or disagreement) at a time. (Essay IV.i.8-9) 
 
87 This view is expounded in greater detail in Priselac (2013) and Newman (2007). Locke’s full account of 
knowledge is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
 
88 “Within these four sorts of agreement or disagreement, is, I suppose, contained all the knowledge we have, or are 
capable of: For all the inquiries we can make concerning any of our ideas, all that we know or can affirm concerning 
any of them, is, that it is, or is not, the same with some other; that it does or does not, always co-exist with some 
other idea in the same subject; that it has this or that relation with some other idea; or that it has a real existence 
without the mind. Thus "blue is not yellow"; is of identity: "two triangles upon equal bases between two parallels are 
equal"; is of relation: "iron is susceptible of magnetical impressions"; is of co-existence: "God is"; is of real 
existence.” (Essay IV.i.7) 
 
89 “First, as to the first sort of agreement or disagreement, viz. identity or diversity. It is the first act of the mind, 
when it has any sentiments or ideas at all, to perceive its ideas; and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it 
is, and thereby also to perceive their difference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutely necessary, that 
without it there could be no knowledge, no reasoning, no imagination, no distinct thoughts, at all. By this the mind 
clearly and infallibly perceives each idea to agree with itself, and to be what it is; and all distinct ideas to disagree, 
i.e. the one not to be the other: And this it does without pains, labour, or deduction; but at first view, by its natural 
power of perception and distinction.” (Essay IV.i.4) 
 
90 “Secondly, the next sort of agreement or disagreement, the mind perceives in any of its ideas, may, I think, be 
called relative, and is nothing but the perception of the relation between any two ideas, of what kind soever, whether 
substances, modes, or any other. For since all distinct ideas must eternally be known not to be the same, and so be 
universally and constantly denied one of another, there could be no room for any positive knowledge at all, if we 
could not perceive any relation between our ideas, and find out the agreement or disagreement they have one with 
another, in several ways the mind takes of comparing them.” (Essay IV.i.5) 
 
91 Both identity and co-existence are types of relation, but Locke classifies them as their own types of agreement 
because they are more specific in their form of agreement. “Though identity and co-existence are truly nothing but 
relations, yet they are such peculiar ways of agreement or disagreement of our ideas, that they deserve well to be 
considered as distinct heads, and not under relation in general; since they are so different grounds of affirmation and 
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that murder is wrong is to perceive that my idea of murder includes my idea of immorality 
(joined with my idea of homicide). Co-existence is a particular type of relation, wherein some 
idea is contained within my idea of a substance.92 To know that coffee tastes bitter is to know 
that my idea of bitterness is a part of my idea of coffee, which is an idea compounding my ideas 
of heat, bitterness and liquid. Real existence is perception that the idea of existence is contained 
in some other idea.93 To know that my mind exists is to perceive that my idea of my mind 
contains the idea of existence. These four examples are all cases of intuitive knowledge, wherein 
the agreement or disagreement is immediately apparent on the comparison of the two ideas.94 
Intuitive knowledge is the most certain, but it is almost always trivial.95 It concerns only what is 
 
negation, as will easily appear to any one, who will but reflect on what is said in several places of this essay.” (Essay 
IV.i.7) 
 
92 “Thirdly, the third sort of agreement, or disagreement, to be found in our ideas, which the perception of the mind 
is employed about, is co-existence, or non-co-existence in the same subject; and this belongs particularly to 
substances. Thus when we pronounce concerning gold that it is fixed, our knowledge of this truth amounts to no 
more but this, that fixedness, or a power to remain in the fire unconsumed, is an idea that always accompanies, and 
is joined with that particular sort of yellowness, weight, fusibility, malleableness, and solubility in aq. regia, which 
make our complex idea, signified by the word gold.” (Essay IV.i.6) 
 
93 “Fourthly, the fourth and last sort is that of actual real existence agreeing to any idea.” (Essay IV.i.7) 
 
94 “For if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we shall find, that sometimes the mind perceives the 
agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other: And this, 
I think, we may call intuitive knowledge. For in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives 
the truth, as the eye doth light, only by being directed towards it. Thus the mind perceives, that white is not black, 
that a circle is not a triangle, that three are more than two, and equal to one and two. Such kinds of truths the mind 
perceives at the first sight of the ideas together, by bare intuition, without the intervention of any other idea; and this 
kind of knowledge is the clearest and most certain, that human frailty is capable of. This part of knowledge is 
irresistible, and like bright sunshine forces itself immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the mind turns its view 
that way; and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt, or examination, but the mind is presently filled with the clear 
light of it.” (Essay IV.ii.1) 
 




already a part of our definitions as an idea contained within the idea some word signifies.9697 For 
this reason, much of the knowledge Locke grants humans seems valueless for any purpose 
beyond description of a system of verbal signification (as in a dictionary).98 Demonstrative 
knowledge goes beyond this limit as it involves the use of intermediate ideas. A series of 
perceptions of agreement of ideas (each step being intuitive knowledge) may take us beyond 
what is included in our definition of the initial terms.99100 For example, it is more than trivial 
when one learns the proof of the Pythagorean theorem, because my idea of the hypotenuse 
contains only the ideas of being the longest side of the triangle and of being opposite the right 
angle, not the idea of being equal to the square root of the sum of the squares of the two other 
sides. I can perceive that the idea of the hypotenuse is equal to the idea of the square root of the 
square of the hypotenuse, that the idea of the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the idea of 
 
96 “"Every man is an animal, or living body," is as certain a proposition as can be; but no more conducing to the 
knowledge of things, than to say, "a palfry is an ambling horse, or a neighing ambling animal," both being only 
about the signification of words, and make me know but this: That body, sense, and motion, or power of sensation 
and moving, are three of those ideas that I always comprehend and signify by the word man; and where they are not 
to be found together, the name man belongs not to that thing: And so of the other, that body, sense, and a certain 
way of going, with a certain kind of voice, are some of those ideas which I always comprehend, and signify by the 
word palfry; and when they are not to be found together, the name palfry belongs not to that thing.” (Essay IV.viii.6) 
 
97 “And therefore he trifles with words, who makes such a proposition, which, when it is made, contains no more 
than one of the terms does, and which a man was supposed to know before; v.g. a triangle hath three sides, or 
saffron is yellow.” (Essay IV.viii.7) 
 
98 “When by these two rules we have examined the propositions that make up the discourses we ordinarily meet with 
both in and out of books, we shall, perhaps, find that a greater part of them, than is usually suspected, are purely 
about the signification of words, and contain nothing in them, but the use and application of these signs.” (Essay 
IV.viii.13) 
 
99 “Instruction lies in something very different; and he that would enlarge his own, or another's mind, to truths he 
does not yet know, must find out intermediate ideas, and then lay them in such order one by another, that the 
understanding may see the agreement or disagreement of those in question.” (Essay IV.viii.3) 
 
100 “We can know then the truth of two sorts of propositions with perfect certainty; the one is, of those trifling 
propositions which have a certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, but not instructive. And, secondly, we 
can know the truth, and so may be certain in propositions, which affirm something of another, which is a necessary 
consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it: As that the external angle of all triangles is bigger 
than either of the opposite internal angles; Which relation of the outward angle to either of the opposite internal 
angles, making no part of the complex idea signified by the name triangle, this is a real truth, and conveys with it 
instructive real knowledge.” (Essay IV.viii.8) 
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some number, and that the idea of the sum of the squares of the two other sides is equal to the 
same idea of some number. I can therefore mediately perceive the agreement of the idea of the 
hypotenuse and the idea of the square root of the sum of the squares of the two other sides, and I 
thus acquire the knowledge of the Pythagorean theorem, which goes beyond anything contained 
in my original definition. Demonstrative knowledge is less certain than intuitive, given the 
possibility of any step being wrong, but is not trivial insofar as it is less obvious, especially as 
proofs grow longer.101102 
Locke describes a third source of knowledge which is distinctly different from intuition 
and deduction. This is sensitive knowledge, our knowledge of the existence of particular external 
objects on the basis of sensations.103 Its genetic structure is unclear insofar as Locke does not 
stipulate what is the perceived agreement. Some suggest that it is the agreement of the simple 
 
101 “It is true the perception produced by demonstration is also very clear, yet it is often with a great abatement of 
that evident lustre and full assurance, that always accompany that which I call intuitive; like a face reflected by 
several mirrors one to another, where as long as it retains the similitude and agreement with the object, it produces a 
knowledge; but it is still in every successive reflection with a lessening of that perfect clearness and distinctness, 
which is in the first; till at last, after many removes, it has a great mixture of dimness, and is not at first sight so 
knowable, especially to weak eyes. Thus it is with knowledge made out by a long train of proof.” (Essay IV.ii.6) 
 
102 Demonstrative knowledge is most frequently considered in the form of mathematical proofs, but Locke holds that 
these are not the only instances. Mathematics is susceptible of precise measurement, whereas modes other than 
number are measured in imprecise degrees (for instance, this green is brighter than that). Demonstrative 
mathematical knowledge may involve equality, whereas demonstrative knowledge of other modes can only 
determine relations imprecisely (for instance, I know that the sound of a piccolo is higher than the sound of a flute, 
and I know that the sound of a flute is higher than the sound of a clarinet, so I know that the sound of a piccolo is 
higher than the sound of a clarinet.) Insofar as primary qualities can be measured precisely, and secondary qualities 
cannot, a distinction between primary and secondary qualities is that we can have demonstrative knowledge of the 
equality of primary qualities that we cannot have of secondary qualities. (Essay IV.ii.9-13) Demonstrative 
knowledge of moral principles is also possible (I may learn that temperance is a virtue via my knowledge that 
virtues are things that help one to flourish and that temperance helps one to flourish), but is made problematic by the 
difficulty of keeping the signification of terms fixed. (Essay IV.iii.18-20) 
 
103 “There is, indeed, another perception of the mind, employed about the particular existence of finite beings 
without us; which going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of 
certainty, passes under the name of knowledge. There can be nothing more certain, than that the idea we receive 
from an external object is in our minds; this is intuitive knowledge. But whether there be any thing more than barely 
that idea in our minds; whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of any thing without us, which 
corresponds to that idea, is that, whereof some men think there may be a question made; because men may have 




ideas of sense with reality, but that would be a bad mistake on Locke’s part insofar as that would 
be agreement with something other than an idea. Others therefore argue that sensitive knowledge 
is not in fact knowledge.104  I construe it as the perceived agreement of the ideas of sense with 
the ideas of the real existing powers which cause them.105 Sensitive knowledge persists only so 
long as the sensation, and therefore we only know (again, in Locke’s strict sense) that external 
bodies exist while they are affecting us.106107108 As a result, it is always knowledge of the 
existence of a particular body, rather than of a type of body.109 It is the only knowledge one has 
 
104 See Rickless (2008), Yolton (1970), Ayers (1993), and Jolley (1999). 
 
105 I will elaborate in the course of my discussion of power. 
 
106 “The knowledge of the existence of any other thing, we can have only by sensation: For there being no necessary 
connexion of real existence with any idea a man hath in his memory, nor of any other existence but that of God, with 
the existence of any particular man; no particular man can know the existence of any other being, but only when by 
actual operating upon him, it makes itself perceived by him. For the having the idea of any thing in our mind, no 
more proves the existence of that thing, than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or the visions of 
a dream make thereby a true history.” (Essay IV.xi.1) 
 
107 “But this knowledge extends as far as the present testimony of our senses, employed about particular objects that 
do then affect them, and no farther. For if I saw such a collection of simple ideas, as is wont to be called man, 
existing together one minute since, and am now alone, I cannot be certain that the same man exists now, since there 
is no necessary connexion of his existence a minute since, with his existence now: By a thousand ways he may cease 
to be, since I had the testimony of my senses for his existence. And if I cannot be certain, that the man I saw last to-
day is now in being, I can less be certain that he is so, who hath been longer removed from my senses, and I have 
not seen since yesterday, or since the last year; and much less can I be certain of the existence of men that I never 
saw. And therefore though it be highly probable, that millions of men do now exist, yet, whilst I am alone writing 
this, I have not that certainty of it which we strictly call knowledge; though the great likelihood of it puts me past 
doubt, and it be reasonable for me to do several things upon the confidence that there are men (and men also of my 
acquaintance, with whom I have to do) now in the world: But this is but probability, not knowledge.” (Essay 
IV.xi.9) 
 
108 “Thus seeing water at this instant, it is an unquestionable truth to me, that water doth exist: And remembering 
that I saw it yesterday, it will also be always true; and as long as my memory retains it, always an undoubted 
proposition to me, that water did exist the 10th of July, 1688, as it will also be equally true, that a certain number of 
very fine colours did exist, which at the same time I saw upon a bubble of that water: But, being now quite out of 
sight both of the water and bubbles too, it is no more certainly known to me that the water doth now exist, than that 
the bubbles or colours therein do so: It being no more necessary that water should exist to-day, because it existed 
yesterday; than that the colours or bubbles exist to-day, because they existed yesterday, though it be exceedingly 
much more probable, because water hath been observed to continue long in existence, but bubbles and the colours 
on them quickly cease to be.” (Essay IV.xi.11) 
 
109 “1. There is one sort of propositions concerning the existence of any thing answerable to such an idea: As having 
the idea of an elephant, phoenix, motion, or an angel, in my mind, the first and natural inquiry is, Whether such a 
thing does anywhere exist? And this knowledge is only of particulars. No existence of any thing without us, but only 
of God, can certainly be known farther than our senses inform us. 2. There is another sort of propositions, wherein is 
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of the existence of substances other than oneself and God.110 Sensitive knowledge is markedly 
less certain than intuitive or deductive knowledge because of the possibility that any given 
sensation is a hallucination or a dream. When hallucinations and sensations are considered in 
isolation from their causes, I have the same evidence for the existence of some finite substance 
beyond myself when I hallucinate a pink elephant as I do when I bite into a pineapple. In either 
case, I passively receive simple ideas of sense. These experiences are both distinct from 
imagining these sensations, where the same simple ideas are present in the mind but I am also 
aware of my own activity.111112 Locke is unconcerned by the possibility of dreams (and one may 
extend this argument to hallucinations) because he believes that we are not affected by 
consequences like pleasure or pain in dreams as in waking life, nor do we find that our senses as 
regularly concur, and therefore we may distinguish between sensations caused by dreams and 
those caused by real external objects.113114 Furthermore, if we are in a dream, we won’t be 
bothered by concerns like the truth of our knowledge, and therefore the objection is one that 
 
expressed the agreement or disagreement of our abstract ideas, and their dependence on one another. Such 
propositions may be universal and certain.” (Essay IV.xi.14) 
 
110 “We have the knowledge of our own existence by intuition; of the existence of God by demonstration; and of 
other things by sensation.” (Essay IV.ix.2) 
 
111 “For I ask any one, whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception, when he looks on 
the sun by day, and thinks on it by night; when he actually tastes wormwood, or smells a rose, or only thinks on that 
savour or odour? We as plainly find the difference there is between any idea revived in our minds by our own 
memory, and actually coming into our minds by our senses, as we do between any two distinct ideas.” (Essay 
IV.ii.12) 
 
112 Essay IV.xi.4-5 
 
113 “I believe he will allow a very manifest difference between dreaming of being in the fire, and being actually in 
it.” (Essay IV.ii.14) 
 
114 “He that sees a fire, may, if he doubt whether it be any thing more than a bare fancy, feel it too; and be convinced 
by putting his hand in it. Which certainly could never be put into such exquisite pain, by a bare idea or phantom, 
unless that the pain be a fancy too: Which yet he cannot, when the burn is well, by raising the idea of it, bring upon 




would not be raised by someone in the appropriate situation for doubt.115116 Indeed, Locke 
generally treats the skeptic who raises the argument from dreams as something of a joke.117 If 
someone continues to press him about the possibility of dreams and hallucination, Locke further 
argues that the purpose of sensitive knowledge is to guide us towards pleasure and away from 
pain.118 If our dreams are sufficiently vivid that we cannot distinguish between them and external 
objects as causes of our sensations, because the pleasure and pain are equally intense, then those 
dreams are as real as ought to suffice, since they affect our happiness in a fashion analogous to 
real external objects.119120121 Sensitive knowledge is not certain, but it is adequate to its purpose, 
and it is the only knowledge of the existence of external objects which we are able to acquire. 
 
115 “It is no great matter, whether I remove his scruple or no: Where all is but dream, reasoning and arguments are of 
no use, truth and knowledge nothing.” (Essay IV.ii.14) 
 
116 “But yet, if after all this any one will be so sceptical, as to distrust his senses, and to affirm that all we see and 
hear, feel and taste, think and do, during our whole being, is but the series and deluding appearances of a long 
dream, whereof there is no reality; and therefore will question the existence of all things, or our knowledge of any 
thing; I must desire him to consider, that if all be a dream, then he doth but dream, that he makes the question; and 
so it is not much matter, that a waking man should answer him.” (Essay IV.xi.8) 
 
117 “At least, he that can doubt so far (whatever he may have with his own thoughts) will never have any controversy 
with me; since he can never be sure I say any thing contrary to his own opinion.” (Essay IV.xi.3) 
 
118 “The certainty of things existing in rerum natura, when we have the testimony of our senses for it, is not only as 
great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs. For our faculties being suited not to the full extent of 
being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive knowledge of things free from all doubt and scruple; but to the 
preservation of us, in whom they are; and accommodated to the use of life; they serve to our purpose well enough, if 
they will but give us certain notice of those things, which are convenient or inconvenient to us.” (Essay IV.xi.8) 
119 “But yet if he be resolved to appear so sceptical, as to maintain, that what I call being actually in the fire is 
nothing but a dream; and that we cannot thereby certainly know, that any such thing as fire actually exists without 
us: I answer, that we certainly finding that pleasure or pain follows upon the application of certain objects to us, 
whose existence we perceive, or dream that we perceive by our senses; this certainty is as great as our happiness or 
misery, beyond which we have no concernment to know or to be.” (Essay IV.ii.14) 
 
120 “As to myself, I think God has given me assurance enough of the existence of things without me; since by their 
different application I can produce in myself both pleasure and pain, which is one great concernment of my present 
state.” (Essay IV.xi.3) 
 
121 “So that this evidence is as great as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain, i.e. happiness or 
misery; beyond which we have no concernment, either of knowing or being. Such an assurance of the existence of 
things without us is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the good, and avoiding the evil, which is caused by them; 
which is the important concernment we have of being made acquainted with them.” (Essay IV.xi.8) 
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An objection to Lockean knowledge arises because it is only dependent on ideas, and not 
anything existing outside the mind. He recognizes that he could be charged with creating an 
account of knowledge under which “castles in the air will be as strong-holds of truth.” (Essay 
IV.iv.1) I may have chimerical ideas, and therefore knowledge of species which exist only in my 
imagination.122123 If I conjoin my ideas of a sloth, wings and being green, and choose to call this 
creature a ‘sleeth’ by using that term to signify this new idea, then I know by intuition that 
sleeths are green, even if this idea should never occur to anyone else.124 I know centaurs give live 
birth with the same certainty and by the same mechanism that I know dogs give live birth, 
because the ideas of the species I signify by each name both include my idea of being a mammal, 
and my idea of being a mammal includes the idea of giving live birth. While knowledge of 
fictions is sometimes recognized (it being acceptable to call it fact that Elizabeth Bennet married 
Fitzwilliam Darcy and that selkies can turn into seals), this also permits knowledge of the claims 
 
122 “He that hath liberty to define, i.e. to determine the signification of his names of substances (as certainly every 
one does in effect who makes them stand for his own ideas) and makes their significations at a venture, taking them 
from his own or other men's fancies, and not from an examination or inquiry into the nature of things themselves; 
may, with little trouble, demonstrate them one of another, according to those several respects and mutual relations 
he has given them one to another; wherein, however things agree or disagree in their own nature, he needs mind 
nothing but his own notions, with the names he hath bestowed upon them.” (Essay IV.viii.10) 
 
123 “Knowledge, say you, is only the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas: But who knows 
what those ideas may be? Is there any thing so extravagant, as the imaginations of men's brains? Where is the head 
that has no chimeras in it? Or if there be a sober and a wise man, what difference will there be, by your rules, 
between his knowledge and that of the most extravagant fancy in the world? They both have their ideas, and 
perceive their agreement and disagreement one with another…. If it be true, that all knowledge lies only in the 
perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas, the visions of an enthusiast, and the reasonings of a 
sober man, will be equally certain. It is no matter how things are; so a man observe but the agreement of his own 
imaginations, and talk conformably, it is all truth, all certainty. Such castles in the air will be as strong-holds of 
truth, as the demonstrations of Euclid. That an harpy is not a centaur is by this way as certain knowledge, and as 
much a truth, as that a square is not a circle.” (Essay IV.iv.1) 
 
124 Even as I communicate the idea to the reader, it is quite possible that the further details of my idea of the sleeth 
differ from those of yours, and my idea remains unique. Perhaps the idea I signify by my use of ‘green’ is one of 
emerald green, whereas the sleeths of your imagination are grey-green. I then know that sleeths are emerald green, 




of insanity.125 If I am a madman whose idea of my body includes my idea of glass, and my idea 
of glass includes my idea of fragility then, given those significations of the words, I know that 
my body can shatter. Similarly, if, on the basis of delusions, John Hinkley Jr. perceived an 
agreement between his idea of acts with the power to impress Jodie Foster and his idea of 
assassinating the president, then he knew that she would be impressed if he killed Ronald 
Reagan. 
Locke responds to this objection by creating a subcategory, “real knowledge,” which is 
that knowledge we have of ideas which do conform with the reality of things.126 This is 
complicated in that the mind has no access to anything but its ideas, and therefore cannot 
compare its ideas of something to the reality of that thing.127 Despite the fact that it would be a 
convenient solution,128 real knowledge can never be perception of the agreement of an idea and 
reality, because reality is beyond the mind’s scope. Locke suggests instead that two types of 
ideas necessarily conform with reality, due to their origins, and so these ideas can be the objects 
of real knowledge even as we can never perceive their conformity with reality.129  
The first type are simple ideas, which cannot be created, but must be received passively. 
Simple ideas are therefore the products of powers which must have reality insofar as they do act 
 
125 “To which I answer, that if our knowledge of our ideas terminate in them, and reach no farther, where there is 
something farther intended, our most serious thoughts will be of little more use than the reveries of a crazy brain; 
and the truths built thereon of no more weight, than the discourses of a man, who sees things clearly in a dream, and 
with great assurance utters them.” (Essay IV.iv.2) 
 
126 “Our knowledge therefore is real, only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.” 
(Essay IV.iv.3) 
 
127 “But what shall be here the criterion? How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that 
they agree with things themselves?” (Essay IV.iv.3) 
 
128 Which has been proposed, for instance by Yolton (1970). 
 




on us.130 The conformity of a simple idea and a real power is not in the form of exact 
correspondence, because we do not know what causes simple ideas. However, God has made 
simple ideas the regular productions of the powers which cause them, and so their conformity is 
adequate for our interaction with reality. I do not need to know what makes me taste sweetness 
and juiciness in order to benefit from eating whatever bears the powers to cause those sensations, 
and similarly I can remain ignorant of the cause of a sensation of solidity while using it as a 
reliable signal that I cannot walk in some direction.131  
The second type are complex ideas other than those of particular, individual substances, 
because since such ideas are not supposed to represent anything real, then they cannot fail to 
conform to their object.132 Ideas of circles and of justice are not intended to refer to anything 
outside the mind, and if there is nothing in reality which conforms to the description of a circle 
 
130 “First, the first are simple ideas, which since the mind, as has been showed, can by no means make to itself, must 
necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind in a natural way, and producing therein those perceptions 
which by the wisdom and will of our maker they are ordained and adapted to. From whence it follows, that simple 
ideas are not fictions of our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of things without us, really operating 
upon us, and so carry with them all the conformity which is intended, or which our state requires: For they represent 
to us things under those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us, whereby we are enabled to distinguish 
the sorts of particular substances, to discern the states they are in, and so to take them for our necessities, and apply 
them to our uses. Thus the idea of whiteness, or bitterness, as it is in the mind, exactly answering that power, which 
is in any body to produce it there, has all the real conformity it can, or ought to have, with things without us. And 
this conformity between our simple ideas, and the existence of things, is sufficient for real knowledge.” (Essay 
IV.iv.4) 
 
131 This recapitulates some of the argument for sensitive knowledge because this form of real knowledge is sensitive 
knowledge. 
 
132 “Secondly, all our complex ideas, except those of substances, being archetypes of the mind's own making, not 
intended to be the copies of any thing, nor referred to the existence of any thing, as to their originals; cannot want 
any conformity necessary to real knowledge. For that which is not designed to represent any thing but itself, can 
never be capable of a wrong representation, nor mislead us from the true apprehension of any thing, by its 
dislikeness to it; and such, excepting those of substances, are all our complex ideas: Which, as I have showed in 
another place, are combinations of ideas, which the mind, by its free choice, puts together, without considering any 
connexion they have in nature. And hence it is, that in all these sorts the ideas themselves are considered as the 
archetypes, and things no otherwise regarded, but as they are conformable to them. So that we cannot but be 
infallibly certain, that all the knowledge we attain concerning these ideas is real, and reaches things themselves; 
because in all our thoughts, reasonings, and discourses of this kind, we intend things no farther than as they are 




or of justice, this does not undermine the value of the concepts and our deductions therefrom.133 
Were there nothing like a circle outside the mind, it would not make it untrue that the ratio of the 
circumference to the diameter is equal to pi. Similarly, even if Plato’s Republic has and will 
never come to be, we may still possess the concept and deduce how a city should be structured if 
it is to match his archetype of justice. To change the terms is not to change the ideas, and 
therefore if I were to signify my idea of an equilateral and equiangular quadrilateral by the name 
‘circle’ and my idea of the shape formed by all the points equidistant on a plane from central 
point by ‘square,’ what agreements are possible to perceive of each idea, and therefore my 
knowledge, would not change.134 Similarly, if the idea I currently signify by the name of 
’murder’ I were instead to call ‘fluffernutter’ or  ‘charity,’ I would still know it to be a vice.135 
Mathematical and moral knowledge, along with other knowledge of modes, is real knowledge. 
 
133 Essay IV.iv.6-8 
 
134 “No confusion or disorder in the things themselves, nor the reasonings about them; no more than (in 
mathematics) there would be a disturbance in the demonstration, or a change in the properties of figures, and their 
relations one to another, if a man should make a triangle with four corners, or a trapezium with four right angles: 
That is, in plain English, change the names of the figures, and call that by one name, which mathematicians call 
ordinarily by another. For let a man make to himself the idea of a figure with three angles, whereof one is a right 
one, and call it, if he please, equilaterum or trapezium, or any thing else, the properties of and demonstrations about 
that idea will be the same, as if he called it a rectangular triangle. I confess the change of the name, by the 
impropriety of speech, will at first disturb him, who knows not what idea it stands for; but as soon as the figure is 
drawn, the consequences and demonstration are plain and clear.” (Essay IV.iv.9) 
 
135 “Just the same is it in moral knowledge, let a man have the idea of taking from others, without their consent, what 
their honest industry has possessed them of, and call this justice, if he please. He that takes the name here without 
the idea put to it, will be mistaken, by joining another idea of his own to that name; but strip the idea of that name, 
or take it such as it is in the speaker's mind, and the same things will agree to it, as if you called it injustice. Indeed 
wrong names in moral discourses breed usually more disorder, because they are not so easily rectified as in 
mathematics, where the figure, once drawn and seen, makes the name useless and of no force. For what need of a 
sign, when the thing signified is present and in view? But in moral names that cannot be so easily and shortly done, 
because of the many decompositions that go to the making up the complex ideas of those modes. But yet for all this, 
the miscalling of any of those ideas, contrary to the usual signification of the words of that language, hinders not but 
that we may have certain and demonstrative knowledge of their several agreements and disagreements, if we will 
carefully, as in mathematics, keep to the same precise ideas, and trace them in their several relations one to another, 
without being led away by their names. If we but separate the idea under consideration from the sign that stands for 





This solution, however, leaves us deprived of any real knowledge of kinds of 
substances.136137 There is nothing inherent to the type of idea which we have of substances which 
would make them necessarily conform to reality. Since I can have an idea of a centaur, and this 
idea is supposed to represent a substance with certain qualities and which I assume does not 
exist, I cannot remove the doubt that my idea of a dog does not represent a real substance either. 
Furthermore, even if I assume that there is a real substance to which my idea of a dog broadly 
conforms, the lack of necessary relation between the qualities of a substance mean that my idea 
might lack a real dog’s quality of being negatively affected by eating chocolate or superadd the 
idea of being spiritually unclean to its real qualities, and therefore broad conformation does not 
guarantee that my knowledge as deduced from my idea of a dog is all real knowledge. Locke 
proposes that we ought to restrict our ideas of substances to those sets of simple ideas which 
have been previously united in experience.138 The best guide we have to the coexistence of 
 
136 Real knowledge of substances is in this case real knowledge of types of substances, rather than real knowledge of 
the existence of a particular substance (which is provided by sensitive knowledge.) 
 
137 “There is another sort of complex ideas, which being referred to archetypes without us, may differ from them, 
and so our knowledge about them may come short of being real. Such are our ideas of substances, which consisting 
of a collection of simple ideas, supposed taken from the works of nature, may yet vary from them, by having more 
or different ideas united in them, than are to be found united in the things themselves. From whence it comes to 
pass, that they may, and often do, fail of being exactly conformable to things themselves.” (Essay IV.iv.11) 
 
138 “I say then, that to have ideas of substances, which, by being conformable to things, may afford us real 
knowledge, it is not enough, as in modes, to put together such ideas as have no inconsistence, though they did never 
before so exist; v.g. the ideas of sacrilege or perjury, &c. were as real and true ideas before, as after the existence of 
any such fact. But our ideas of substances being supposed copies, and referred to archetypes without us, must still be 
taken from something that does or has existed; they must not consist of ideas put together at the pleasure of our 
thoughts, without any real pattern they were taken from, though we can perceive no inconsistence in such a 
combination. The reason whereof is, because we knowing not what real constitution it is of substances, whereon our 
simple ideas depend, and which really is the cause of the strict union of some of them one with another, and the 
exclusion of others; there are very few of them, that we can be sure are, or are not, inconsistent in nature, any farther 
than experience and sensible observation reach. Herein therefore is founded the reality of our knowledge concerning 
substances, that all our complex ideas of them must be such, and such only, as are made up of such simple ones, as 
have been discovered to co-exist in nature…. The ideas must be taken from the real existence of things. Whatever 
simple ideas have been found to co-exist in any substance, these we may with confidence join together again, and so 





qualities in substances is which sensations have previously co-occurred, because given the 
conformity of simple ideas to reality, what can co-exist in sensation can co-exist in reality.139 I 
can deduce no real knowledge from an idea of a centaur, because my idea of a centaur is not an 
idea composed of simple ideas which have been united by something beyond fancy. Insofar as 
my idea of a dog is an idea composed of a group of co-occurring simple ideas, which conform to 
a real set of powers, it should conform to a real substance. The idea may not include everything 
which is part of the real essence of the species, but it will not include anything incompatible or 
extraneous, therefore whatever agreements we can perceive of the idea do constitute real 
knowledge.140 If my idea of gold is limited to that yellow color, ductility, malleability, fixedness 
and weight which I have previously experienced together and now take as the nominal essence of 
gold, then my knowledge of gold is real knowledge, even if the real essence of gold were 
(without my ever knowing or perhaps even being able to know) to include further qualities that 
would only be revealed by further experimentation (like its conductivity of electricity or its 
solubility in mercury at room temperature.)141 
 
139 “And we are left only to the assistance of our senses, to make known to us what qualities they contain. For of all 
the qualities that are co-existent in any subject, without this dependence and evident connexion of their ideas one 
with another, we cannot know certainly any two to co-exist any farther than experience, by our senses, informs us.” 
(Essay IV.iii.14) 
 
140 “And our ideas being thus true: Though not, perhaps, very exact copies, are yet the subjects of real (as far as we 
have any) knowledge of them. Which (as has been already shown) will not be found to reach very far: But so far as 
it does, it will still be real knowledge.” (Essay IV.iv.12) 
 
141 “Our reasonings from these ideas will carry us but a little way in the certain discovery of the other properties in 
those masses of matter wherein all these are to be found. Because the other properties of such bodies, depending not 
on these, but on that unknown real essence, on which these also depend, we cannot by them discover the rest; we 
can go no farther than the simple ideas of our nominal essence will carry us, which is very little beyond themselves; 
and so afford us but very sparingly any certain, universal, and useful truths. For upon trial having found that 
particular piece (and all others of that colour, weight, and fusibility, that I ever tried) malleable, that also makes now 
perhaps a part of my complex idea, part of my nominal essence of gold: Whereby though I make my complex idea, 
to which I affix the name gold, to consist of more simple ideas than before; yet still it not containing the real essence 
of any species of bodies, it helps me not certainly to know (I say to know, perhaps it may be to conjecture) the other 
remaining properties of that body, farther than they have a visible connexion with some or all of the simple ideas, 
that make up my nominal essence. For example, I cannot be certain from this complex idea, whether gold be fixed, 
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Locke admits that knowledge as he describes it is extremely limited.142143 We have 
knowledge of our own concepts and of particular experiences of sensations. However, this 
knowledge is sufficient to give us knowledge of the existence of the external world and the 
ability to navigate it, and therefore to avoid skepticism. The impossibility of knowledge of the 
means by which powers cause sensations is no reason to deny knowledge of the existence of 
these powers and that of the substances to which they belong. He has thus proved that his anti-
nativist position is not equivalent to external world skepticism. Ideas derived from experience are 
enough to produce knowledge of the existence of material objects.144 
Opinion, by contrast, consists of our assent to the many propositions beyond those we 
know.145 The limited extent of knowledge means that it is not adequate to guide all our conduct. I 
 
or no; because, as before, there is no necessary connexion or inconsistence to be discovered betwixt a complex idea 
of a body yellow, heavy, fusible, malleable; betwixt these, I say, and fixedness; so that I may certainly know, that in 
whatsoever body these are found, there fixedness is sure to be. Here again for assurance, I must apply myself to 
experience; as far as that reaches, I may have certain knowledge, but no farther.” (Essay IV.xii.9) 
 
142 “And therefore we shall do no injury to our knowledge, when we modestly think with ourselves, that we are so 
far from being able to comprehend the whole nature of the universe, and all the things contained in it, that we are not 
capable of a philosophical knowledge of the bodies that are about us, and make a part of us: Concerning their 
secondary qualities, powers, and operations, we can have no universal certainty. Several effects come every day 
within the notice of our senses, of which we have so far sensitive knowledge; but the causes, manner, and certainty 
of their production, for the two foregoing reasons, we must be content to be very ignorant of. In these we can go no 
farther than particular experience informs us of matter of fact, and by analogy to guess what effects the like bodies 
are, upon other trials, like to produce.” (Essay IV.iii.29) 
 
143 “Our knowledge, as has been shown, being very narrow, and we not happy enough to find certain truth in every 
thing which we have occasion to consider; most of the propositions we think, reason, discourse, nay act upon, are 
such, as we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth.” (Essay IV.xv.2) 
 
144 It is this position which most distinguishes Locke from other empiricists. Berkeley does not believe we have any 
evidence for material objects as the causes of our sensations, and therefore he proposes immaterialism. Hume makes 
no claims about the causes of our sensations - we know that we have perceptions, but this does not entail knowledge 
of the real existence of an external cause. 
 
145 “Therefore as God has set some things in broad day-light; as he has given us some certain knowledge, though 
limited to a few things in comparison, probably, as a taste of what intellectual creatures are capable of, to excite in 
us a desire and endeavour after a better state: So in the greatest part of our concernments he has afforded us only the 
twilight, as I may so say, of probability; suitable, I presume, to that state of mediocrity and probationership, he has 
been pleased to place us in here; wherein, to check our over-confidence and presumption, we might by every day's 
experience be made sensible of our short-sightedness and liableness to errour.” (Essay IV.xiv.2) 
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only know that the stream exists so long as I have a sensation of it. But insofar as it is beneficial 
to my survival to assent to the proposition that the water I perceived yesterday is still present in 
the stream to quench my current thirst, it is rational to assent beyond the scope of knowledge.146 
Locke is merely cautious to distinguish that such assent is only opinion rather than knowledge, 
which is to say that its degree of fallibility is higher.147 Opinion is the product of the faculty of 
judgment, where knowledge is that of intuition, demonstration or sensation.148 The ideational 
structure of opinion is very close to that of knowledge: it is assumed agreement of ideas rather 
than the perceived agreement of ideas.149 The remainder of Book IV covers the ways in which 
 
146 Locke’s concern with describing what belief is suited to human function despite the impossibility of knowledge 
in the case prefigures Hume’s psychological account of the human understanding. 
 
147 “Probability is likeliness to be true, the very notation of the word signifying such a proposition, for which there 
be arguments or proofs, to make it pass or be received for true. The entertainment the mind gives this sort of 
propositions, is called belief, assent, or opinion, which is the admitting or receiving any proposition for true, upon 
arguments or proofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so. And 
herein lies the difference between probability and certainty, faith and knowledge, that in all the parts of knowledge 
there is intuition; each immediate idea, each step has its visible and certain connexion; in belief, not so. That which 
makes me believe is something extraneous to the thing I believe; something not evidently joined on both sides to, 
and so not manifestly showing the agreement or disagreement of those ideas that are under consideration.” (Essay 
IV.xv.3) 
 
148 “The faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge, in cases where that 
cannot be had, is judgment: Whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree; or which is the same, any 
proposition to be true or false, without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs. The mind sometimes 
exercises this judgment out of necessity, where demonstrative proofs and certain knowledge are not to be had; and 
sometimes out of laziness, unskilfulness, or haste, even where demonstrative and certain proofs are to be had. Men 
often stay not warily to examine the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, which they are desirous or concerned 
to know; but either incapable of such attention as is requisite in a long train of gradations, or impatient of delay, 
lightly cast their eyes on, or wholly pass by the proofs; and so without making out the demonstration, determine of 
the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, as it were by a view of them as they are at a distance, and take it to be 
the one or the other, as seems most likely to them upon such a loose survey.” (Essay IV.xiv.3) 
 
149 “Judgment, which is the putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their 
certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so; which is, as the word imports, taken to 




opinion may be ranked in terms of probability150 and of degree of assent,151 the roles of reason 
and faith in the having of beliefs,152 and the sources of error.153 
This summary of the Essay shows the significance of Locke’s account of power to 
multiple aspects of his project. Our ideas of substances are composed from ideas of qualities, 
which are ideas of powers. Sensitive knowledge, which provides all knowledge of the external 
world and of material substances, is dependent on ideas of power. His positions on these topics 
are often regarded as flawed. I propose to use Locke’s own method of analyzing the origin and 
internal structure of the ideas signified by uses of the word power to determine the limits and 
extent of our knowledge of powers. This will clarify his positions on ideas of qualities and on 
sensitive knowledge.
 
150 Essay IV.xv 
 
151 Essay IV.xvi 
 
152 Essay IV.xvii-xviii 
 
153 Essay IV.xix-xx 
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SECTION 3: Problems with Power 
Locke’s account of power (alongside that of qualities) has often been taken to be irreparably 
flawed in rather embarrassing ways.154 In this section, I will provide an overview of the various 
ways in which Locke seems to make mistakes or open himself up to criticism. In a later section 
(10 Resolving the Problems) I will return to these problems and consider possible solutions. 
3.1 ‘Powers are not interesting’ 
Comparatively little has been written specifically on Locke’s account of power. Significant 
collections of commentary do not dedicate any chapters to the topic.155 This suggests that 
Locke’s account of power is seen as unworthy of explication (whether because it is too brief or 
lacks insight) or that it collapses into some other topic. In the case of material substances power 
may be subsumed by the discussion of qualities, where the distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities is an omnipresent topic.156 While it is acknowledged that Locke dedicates a 
 
154 As by Dean (1824), Bennett (2001), and Jacovides (2003) among others. 
 
155 Chappell (1992) does include a piece by Ayers titled ‘The Ideas of Power and Substance in Locke’s Philosophy’, 
but this discusses the idea of power only as an analogy to the idea of substance. Mackie (1976) and Ayers (1991) do 
not cover power. 
 
156 The latter is the reason given by Chappell (2007) for not treating the powers of material substances: “since 
qualities and substances are being treated in other chapters in this volume, I shall deal very briefly with these two 
topics.” (p130) Stuart (2013) argues in his chapter on secondary qualities that “Locke conceives of colours and other 
secondary qualities as powers that bodies have to produce certain ideas in us, but powers in a degenerate sense,” 




chapter to power separate from his chapters on qualities,157 this idea of power may not be 
important in itself, but only as a descriptor or component of an idea of our own agency. 158159 It is 
true that a significant majority of the text of Essay II.xxi discusses the will and liberty rather than 
power more broadly (although much of this was added in later editions).160 
3.2 Power a simple or a complex idea? 
Locke categorizes all ideas into two types: simple and complex. All ideas can be classified as 
one or the other, and the categories are exclusive. “Some of them [ideas] are simple, and some 
complex.” (Essay II.ii.1) I take simplicity as absolute, rather than relative. A simple idea is “one 
uniform appearance, or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas.” 
(Essay II.ii.1) Any simple idea cannot be broken down or otherwise analyzed into parts. It is the 
most basic intellectual unit, as received from experience. “These simple ideas, the materials of 
all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the mind only by those two ways above-
mentioned, viz. sensation and reflection.” (Essay II.ii.2) Complex ideas are composed of 
combinations of simple ideas. They are created by the mind’s activity, rather than passively 
received. 
 
157 Essay II.xxi 
 
158 Chappell (2007) does begin with discussion of power in general, but dedicates most of his attention to the topics 
of will, freedom and motivation.  
 
159 Stuart (2015) includes only a chapter on liberty. 
 
160 “These I must inform my reader are not all new matter, but most of them either farther confirmations of what I 
had said, or explications, to prevent others being mistaken in the sense of what was formerly printed, and not any 
variation in me from it; I must only except the alterations I have made in Book II. chap. 21. What I had there writ 
concerning liberty and the will, I thought deserved as accurate a view, as I am capable of; those subjects having in 
all ages exercised the learned part of the world, with questions and difficulties, that have not a little perplexed 
morality and divinity; those parts of knowledge that men are most concerned to be clear in. Upon a closer inspection 
into the working of men's minds, and a stricter examination of those motives and views they are turned by, I have 
found reason somewhat to alter the thoughts I formerly had concerning that, which gives the last determination to 
the will in all voluntary actions.” (Essay ‘Epistle to the Reader’) 
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“The acts of the mind, wherein it exerts its power over its simple ideas, are chiefly these 
three: 1. Combining several simple ideas into one compound one, and thus all complex ideas 
are made. 2. The second is bringing two ideas, whether simple or complex, together, and 
setting them by one another, so as to take a view of them at once, without uniting them into 
one; by which way it gets all its ideas of relations. 3. The third is separating them from all 
other ideas that accompany them in their real existence; this is called abstraction: and thus all 
its general ideas are made.” (Essay II.xii.1) 
The idea of power, as Locke describes it in various locations, however, seems to be both 
simple and complex. He lists the idea of power as a simple idea in Essay II.vii.1 but elsewhere 
describes an idea of power which has obvious parts and relations (power is the ability of 
substance A to cause change C in substance B), and therefore must be complex. “Existence, 
Knowledge, Power, Happiness, etc. infinite and eternal: which are all distinct Ideas, and some of 
them being relative, are again compounded of others...” (Essay II.xxiii.35) might be taken to 
indicate that the idea of power, being relative, is one of those “compounded of other” ideas and 
therefore complex. Locke’s claim that “I confess power includes in it some kind of relation, (a 
relation to action or change)” (Essay II.xxi.3) confirms such a reading. 
Locke says both that “Power also is another of those simple ideas, which we receive from 
Sensation and Reflection.” (Essay II.vii.8) and that “Powers, considered in themselves, are truly 
complex Ideas.” (Essay II.xxiii.7) He therefore is readily charged with some kind of categorical 
error. An idea cannot be both simple and complex under Locke’s definition of those terms, and 
yet he describes that associated with ‘power’ in both ways. He may be misguided in the 
exclusivity of being either simple or complex, but this would profoundly affect the whole of 
Locke’s account of ideas, not just his idea of power. A smaller error would be to think that Locke 
does not in fact intend for one of these categories to apply to the idea of power. Locke may have 
lapsed and called a complex idea relatively simpler, for instance, or the complexity suggested by 
the relations of a specific power is not truly part of the idea. Texts like “Our Idea therefore of 
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Power, I think, may well have a place amongst other simple Ideas, and be considered as one of 
them...” (Essay II.xxi.3) seem to indicate that Locke means that the idea of power is relatively 
simple, but truly complex, since it is only “considered” as a simple idea, rather than being one. 
The remainder of the text suggests that the idea is simple in the context of its inclusion in the 
more complex ideas of substances: it “being one of those that make a principal ingredient in our 
complex ideas of substances.” (Essay II.xxi.3)  If he is lacking in rigor when he describes the 
idea of power as simple, Locke is failing to follow his own definitions in a disappointing fashion 
but may not produce a contradiction to his position that any idea cannot be both simple and 
complex. 
Yet more commentators161 conclude that the nature of the idea of power as both simple and 
complex indicates that the distinction Locke draws is in itself flawed. Locke is therefore not 
mistaken in how he categorizes or describes the idea of power, but rather he fails to recognize 
that he has found an example which confounds his story of exclusively simple or complex ideas. 
The idea of power is both simple and complex, and therefore Locke’s taxonomy of ideas fails at 
its most essential distinction. 
The ambiguity as to whether the idea of power is simple or complex generates questions as to 
the source of the idea. Simple ideas are impressed upon the mind from experience. “These 
 
161 Bolton (2007) says this passage “cuts against the atomic view of simple ideas in general” because “it shows no 
trace of the illusion that the idea of power is resolvable into nothing but ideas exclusive of relations” and suggests 
that while the idea of power is “regarded as simple” it has an internal structure. (p75) When Chappell (2007) 
discusses the idea of power in general (rather than the idea of human will which occupies the majority of his 
attention), he also takes our ideas of power to include relations, and therefore indicates an inconsistency when Locke 
describes a simple idea of power. “Because every power is a power to do or suffer something, something different 
from the power itself, Locke says that the idea of power includes that of relation, “a relation to Action or Change”: 
powers are, in other words, relational properties of their bearers. Yet Locke also says the idea of power is a simple 
idea. This is surprising, since in an earlier passage he had characterized a simple idea as one that is “in itself 
uncompounded, [and] contains in it nothing but one uniform Appearance, or Conception in the mind, and is not 
distinguishable into different Ideas” )E II.ii.1: 119). By that standard, power is anything but a simple idea.”(Chappell 
2007, p131-2) Jacovides (2003) also describes the confusion of the idea of power between simple and complex. 
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simple ideas, when offered to the mind, the understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter, 
when they are imprinted, nor blot them out, and make new ones itself, than a mirror can refuse, 
alter, or obliterate the images or ideas which the objects set before it do therein produce.” (Essay 
II.i.25) Complex ideas are the product of the mind’s activity upon these simple ideas. Were 
Locke to give a clear account of the source of the idea of power (in experience or from 
compounding), that account would contribute to answering the question whether the idea of 
power is simple or complex. Locke, however, does not adequately explain the source of the idea. 
It is thus an open interpretive question whether power is something which can be experienced or 
not. Although there are texts which suggest that the idea is obtained in the fashion of a complex 
idea (for instance, the mind “considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple 
ideas changed, and in another the possibility of making that change: and so comes by that idea 
which we call power” (Essay II.xxi.1)), this is in tension with the inclusion of the idea of power 
in the list of simple ideas obtained from both sensation and reflection. (Essay II.vii.1) Whether or 
not power can be experienced has implications for sensitive knowledge.162 
3.3 Inadequate metaphysics 
Locke describes powers but does not explain how they bring about their effects. The greatest 
level of detail offered is that “fire has a power to melt gold, i. e. to destroy the consistency of its 
insensible parts, and consequently its hardness, and make it fluid.” (Essay II.xxi.1) This merely 
parses the melting of gold in terms of a set of changes to particular sensations, which together 
constitute the complex idea of “melting”. The power to cause a simple idea of color is another 
example which Locke commonly uses, but this merely identifies the power in terms of its effect 
 
162 If power is a simple idea, it will necessarily conform with reality. If it is a complex idea, it is an idea of a mode, 




without an account of how or by what feature some substance is able to cause an idea in a 
perceiver. The account is therefore too sparse to explain what powers are beyond their effects or 
to say how they are grounded. Locke’s apparent contention that some powers are superadded to 
substances by God has confused the matter further: he posits some powers (particularly those 
which produce ideas of sensation in a form of mind-body interaction) are “effects produced by 
the appointment of an infinitely Wise Agent, which perfectly surpass our Comprehensions.” 
(Essay IV.iii.28) Many commentators have attempted to fill this gap by explanation of Locke’s 
mechanist position, with varying degrees of success.163 
3.4 Questions about primary and secondary qualities 
Sensation provides us with a great number of different simple ideas, including those of 
colors, textures, and temperatures. (Essay II.iii.1) These ideas are received as a result of 
something outside of the mind. Each is therefore correlated to a quality, which is defined as the 
power to cause that simple idea of sensation. These qualities are not supposed to be independent 
entities, because we take our sensations to be of objects. I do not receive some simple idea of 
color as though the power to cause that color were independent, but as though some object 
caused this simple idea along with others as for instance of shape and of solidity. Thus, “the 
power to produce any idea in our mind I call quality of the subject wherein that power is.” (Essay 
II.viii.8) Since all of our sensory experience is the reception of simple ideas, substances are 
known only as the unifying support of some collection of powers causing these simple ideas. 
This follows the Aristotelian model of a substance-mode ontology, whereby substances 
instantiate properties or qualities like sizes, colors and flavors. Qualities “are modifications of 
 
163 Some examples: Wilson (1979) p. 143–50, Wilson (1982) p. 247–51, Ayers (1981), McCann (1998), Ayers 
(1991) vol. 2: p. 142–53; and Bolton (1998). 
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matter in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us.” (Essay II.viii.7) Because qualities are 
powers, and in fact power cannot be received from sensation or attributed to material bodies in 
any other guise than qualities in objects to produce simple ideas in us, many ideas of powers are 
ideas of qualities.164 
Writing on Locke’s account of qualities is usually focused on what he says about different 
types of quality. Locke categorizes qualities as being of three kinds: primary qualities, which are 
those “such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in what estate soever it be;” (Essay II.viii.9) 
secondary qualities, “which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce 
various sensations in us by their primary qualities;” (Essay II.viii.10) and a third category, 
frequently called (although not by Locke) tertiary qualities, “the power that is in any body, by 
reason of the particular constitution of its primary qualities, to make such a change in the bulk, 
figure, texture, and motion of another body, as to make it operate on our senses, differently from 
what it did before.” (Essay II.viii.23) This third category, although more commonly called just 
powers, are like other qualities although they involve changes in the simple ideas produced by 
other objects rather than directly causing simple ideas in the perceiver. Let me explain each of 
these three categories in turn. 
The distinction Locke makes between primary and secondary qualities is reminiscent of the 
Cartesian distinction between modifications of extension and modifications of mind attributed to 
bodies. Primary qualities are identified as those which are always present in a material substance: 
“Take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts, each part has still solidity, extension, figure, and 
mobility; divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on till the parts 
 
164 Exceptions will be ideas of powers of spirits, particularly related to our actions and God. 
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become insensible, they must retain still each of them all those qualities. … These I call original 
or primary qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. 
solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number.” (Essay II.viii.9) Secondary qualities 
describe all those sensations which the body causes in us which are not of this category. Colors, 
tastes and scents are caused by bodies, but it is not supposed that the constituents of the body 
retain these after division to an infinitesimal scale. These qualities are possessed by a substance 
insofar as it causes the appropriate sensations but are not supposed to be part of the essential 
nature of material substances in general. “The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the 
parts of fire, or snow, are really in them, whether any one’s senses perceive them or no; and 
therefore they may be called real qualities, because they really exist in those bodies: but light, 
heat, whiteness or coldness, are no more really in them, than sickness or pain is in manna. Take 
away the sensation of them; let not the eyes see light, or colours, nor the ears hear sounds; let the 
palate not taste, nor the nose smell; and all colours, tastes, odours, and sounds, as they are such 
particular ideas, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, i. e. bulk, figure, and motion 
of parts.” (Essay II.viii.17) Locke uses the example of porphyry (Essay II.viii.19) to justify the 
position that we do not believe color to remain in an object when it does not cause the requisite 
sensation. 
Both secondary and tertiary qualities are described as being the consequences of primary 
qualities: “the two latter sorts of qualities are powers barely, and nothing but powers, relating to 
several other bodies, and resulting from the different modifications of the original qualities.” 
(Essay II.viii.24) Locke does not, however, elaborate on how primary qualities might cause these 
other powers. Such an explanation would do something towards indicating the mechanism 
through which Locke takes powers to operate to cause ideas. Primary qualities are supposed to 
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produce ideas which resemble what is present in the object while other qualities do not resemble, 
but Locke cannot explain why the process of production and representational accuracy differ 
between the categories. 
Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities is problematic because it 
appears to rely on commitments about what is beyond experience. When he describes the 
properties of insensible particles, he is making claims about something he cannot have any 
experience of. Experience of material objects is in the form of sensation, and thus ideas and 
knowledge of corpuscles are inconsistent with their insensibility.165 It is also strange that Locke 
claims insensible particles retain primary qualities because in a strict sense it is impossible that 
corpuscles could have any qualities at all- corpuscles are insensible, and therefore cause no 
simple ideas of sensation in us, but qualities are defined as powers to cause simple ideas in 
perceivers.166 I therefore prefer to call the features of corpuscles like “properties” rather than 
“qualities”. Additionally, what has been called the “veil of perception” prevents access beyond 
ideas to the objects which cause them.167 The idea of yellow is the sensation we perceive, not an 
idea of a particular wavelength of light or textural arrangement of corpuscles, regardless of 
scientific hypotheses about the causes of the sensation of yellow. We might theorize about the 
underlying properties which give substances the powers to cause simple ideas in us, but this can 
 
165 In the best case, the idea of a corpuscle is an obscure one like that of substratum, posited for similar reasons, not 
an idea like that of a given substance. 
 
166 Jacovides (2007) raises a similar concern: “There is no interesting sense in which a picometer (a trillionth of a 
meter) is a power to produce the corresponding idea in perceivers. Are we supposed to imagine that, for Locke, a 
picometer is the power to produce the idea of a meter in humans, when combined with a trillion other particles of the 
same size? I suppose it’s true that picometer-wide corpuscles have that power, but so do smaller particles.” (p117) 
 
167 Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2004, volume 85, issue 3) includes several articles on this topic. See Chappell 




never be the subject of knowledge. Locke therefore does not know that primary qualities 
resemble the real properties of corpuscles, nor that infinitesimal particles lack secondary 
qualities.168 
This appears to be a departure from his commitment to empiricism. Where Descartes, as a 
rationalist, can make conclusions on the basis of a thought experiment if he clearly and distinctly 
perceives the infinite division of extension, Locke ought not to make claims on such grounds. To 
say that the simple ideas produced by primary qualities resemble the real qualities of substances 
is to claim knowledge of the nature of something outside experience, and therefore ideas not 
sourced from either sensation or reflection. 
3.5 Circularity with causality 
Power is defined by Locke in terms of causation, where there is a capacity either to make a 
change or be changed: “Power, thus considered, is two-fold, viz. as able to make, or able to 
receive, any change.” (Essay II.xxi.2) The conjunction of an active power and a passive power 
causes some effect. The idea of power is obtained from the experience of causal events: “The 
mind being every day informed, by the senses, of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes 
in things without, and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceases to be, and another 
begins to exist which was not before; reflecting also on what passes within himself, and 
 
168 He suggests that were we to have eyes which could see corpuscles, secondary qualities like color would 
disappear from our sensations and be replaced with particular textures. “Had we Senses acute enough to discern the 
minute particles of Bodies, and the real Constitution on which their sensible Qualities depend, I doubt not but they 
would produce quite different Ideas in us; and that which is now the yellow Colour of Gold, would disappear, and 
instead of it we should see an admirable Texture of parts of a certain Size and Figure.” (Essay II.xxiii.11) Kochiras 
(2020) emphasizes Locke’s example of blood under a microscope immediately following this passage, and suggests 
his intent is that colors will change in a fashion analogous to how a green image might resolve into blue and yellow 
pixels on magnification given that blood looks red as a whole but is in fact only red in some parts. I find this 
problematic because then it would appear that corpuscles have colors, and therefore that his argument about the 
difference between primary and secondary qualities has even more issues. 
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observing a constant change of its ideas, sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the 
senses, and sometimes by the determination of its own choice; and concluding from what it has 
so constantly observed to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the same 
things by like agents, and by the like ways; considers in one thing the possibility of having any 
of its simple ideas changed, and in another the possibility of making that change: and so comes 
by that idea which we call power.” (Essay II.xxi.1) 
Causation, in turn, seems to be defined either as power or in terms of powers. “A cause is 
that which makes any other thing, either simple idea, substance or mode, begin to be.” (Essay 
II.xxvi.2) Powers are those things which make simple ideas appear in our minds. When the white 
quality of snow produces in me a sensation of white, this is the power of the snow as cause of the 
appropriate simple idea coming into existence in my mind. Further, it is experiences of powers 
which are the source of our ideas of cause and effect: “In the notice that our senses take of the 
constant vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe, that several particular, both qualities and 
substances, begin to exist; and that they receive this their existence from the due application and 
operation of some other being. From this observation we get our ideas of cause and effect.” 
(Essay II.xxvi.1) When I watch fire consuming a log, I understand the fire (or some quality of it) 
as the cause of the simple ideas of my sensations composing my idea of the log changing from 
solid and brown to powdery and white and thus that the fire has the power (or quality) of 
changing wood into ash. 
 If powers are understood in terms of causes, and causes are understood in terms of powers, 
then it seems as though Locke cannot provide an account of either which would not involve 
circular definitions. The idea of each seems to include the other. Locke’s description of the 
construction of our complex ideas thus seems to assume that each idea is obtained while one has 
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access to the other. Powers are recognized when one substance is known to have caused some 
effect in another substance. Causes are recognized when some substance has been observed to 
exercise its power on some other substance. If each idea can only be acquired through access to 
the other, Locke cannot in fact explain the origin of the ideas in experience. Some idea of one 
must be prior to the acquisition of the idea of either, which would suggest that there is an innate 




SECTION 4: Motivation for Epistemological Reading 
Locke’s stated goal in writing the Essay is frequently disregarded.169 The full title of the 
work is An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, indicating that for Locke the primary 
purpose of the work is to examine the human understanding, and therefore that his project as a 
whole is first and foremost epistemological.170 The four books of the Essay respectively address 
the lack of innate ideas, the true sources of human ideas in sensation and reflection, the system of 
language by which we signify ideas, and the extent of human knowledge and justified belief. 
Each of these four areas of consideration constitutes a traditional branch of epistemology. This 
title and schema are in stark contrast with a work like Descartes’ Meditations, which presents 
itself as being on “prima philosophia” or metaphysics, and which in its full title raises the 
explicitly metaphysical questions of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. The 
very title of the Essay indicates that it should not be considered as aiming to address the same 
sorts of questions as the Meditations - or at least not as them being its primary concern.171 Locke 
 
169 The first article in Newman (2007) has Rogers say “So in some obvious sense the Essay was written as a natural 
history of the understanding,” (p31) but other articles in the volume favor a metaphysical reading. 
 
170 One might also consider the naturalized epistemology as a form of psychology, wherein Locke’s explanation of 
the origins of knowledge is an examination of the general principles and behaviors by which people come to have 
certain thoughts and beliefs. I prefer epistemology so as to foreground the Essay’s ultimate goal of distinguishing 
knowledge from opinion. 
 
171 Even the term ‘Essay’ may be chosen for similarly modest reasons, involving the now obsolete definition of an 
“essay” as “A trial, testing, proof; experiment” (modern use is “assay”) which was then current. (cf. Helyn 1631 “I 
will make bold to venture on it, by way of tryall and essay,” Glanville 1665 “No higher title, then that of an essay, or 
imperfect offer at a Subject” and Defoe 1725 “He has made an essay by which he knows what he can, and cannot 
do.”) ("essay, n." in 2020, OED Online, Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
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would not indicate that his aim was to consider epistemological questions if he intended for the 
work to provide similar proofs for the existence and essential natures of substances. His aims are 
explicitly limited: “Nor did I propose to myself, in publishing my Essay, to be an answerer of 
questions; or expect that all doubts should go out of the world, as soon as my book came into 
it.”172 Again unlike the Meditations, which are intended to present proven truths about reality, 
the Essay merely offers an exploration of its subject (the human understanding). Hume’s Treatise 
of Human Nature, similarly promising only an effort at explanation of the limited field of what 
humans comprehend, has much more in common with the Essay in terms of aim and scope than 
does the Meditations.173174 
Locke’s aims are also made especially clear in the Epistle to the Reader at the beginning 
of the work. He is explicit about “the subject of this treatise, the UNDERSTANDING.” (Essay, 
Epistle) He explains his motivation for writing the Essay as seeking the right course for 
intellectual discussion (both scientific and moral) by setting out to “examine our own abilities, 
and see what objects our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with.” (Essay, Epistle) 
While he was motivated to write the Essay by participation in disagreements about moral 
principles and scientific facts, he does not aim to resolve these questions, but rather considers our 
minds’ capacities for investigations of such topics. Locke describes his hope for the Essay as 
“removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge,” (Essay, Epistle) and it 
 
172 “An Answer to Remarks Upon the Essay.”  Locke (1824), vol. 4: p. 188 
 
173 Both Locke and Hume also engage in proto-psychology, explaining human beliefs in descriptive (rather than 
normative) terms. 
 
174 See Essay I.i, II.xxix-xxxiii, IV.i-v 
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therefore clears the way for claims of knowledge by the epistemological project of describing 
what knowledge is, what its limits are, and how it might be obtained. 
Locke states at the beginning of the work that investigation of the understanding is 
worthy of consideration because of the difficulty of comprehending our tool for inquiry: “The 
understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice 
of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance, and make it its own object.” (Essay, 
I.i.1) He believes that “all the light we can let in upon our own minds, all the acquaintance we 
can make with our own understandings” (Essay, I.i.1) will have great utility in further inquiries. 
These inquiries however remain beyond the scope of the Essay itself. Locke clearly distinguishes 
between his project and that of a work like the Meditations: “This, therefore, being my purpose, 
to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge; together with the grounds 
and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent; I shall not at present meddle with the physical 
consideration of the mind; or trouble myself to examine, wherein its essence consists, or by what 
motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any sensation by our organs, 
or any ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any, or all of 
them, depend on matter or no: These are speculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I 
shall decline, as lying out of my way in the design I am now upon.” (Essay, I.i.2) In his 
introduction to the work, he has therefore dismissed the topics of the essence of the mind, the 
method of receipt of ideas of sensation, and the existence of matter, all of which are prominent in 
the metaphysical Meditations, in favor of the topics of the limits and sources of knowledge and 
opinion. He offers what he calls the “historical, plain method” (Essay I.i.2) for the explanation of 
knowledge and opinion by examination of the involved ideas.175 The method is ‘historical’ in 
 
175 See Brown (2006) p44-6 for further discussion 
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that it gives an account of the origins of an idea in a mind that has it. It is ‘plain’ because it traces 
ideas (ultimately) to common sources in experience. 
Accepting that Locke does not intend to answer metaphysical questions leads to dismissal 
of many of the concerns about Locke’s account of power insofar as they apply to the 
cogency/internal consistency of the project. If the project is primarily epistemological (aside 
from its consequences for metaphysics and Locke’s intermittent asides), it is not a problem that 
Locke fails to explain the mechanism of powers or how secondary qualities resolve into primary 
qualities, because these are outside of his scope. Perhaps the method described in the Essay will 
elucidate how one ought to or whether one can provide answers for these questions upon further 
work in the field of science, but these are not intended to be included in what is said within the 
text. Locke cannot be said to have failed to include something which he deliberately held to be 
separate from the project. Many complaints made against Locke in the secondary literature 
ultimately resolve to a desire for metaphysical answers in an epistemological work.176
 
176 This does not resolve the issues of confused simplicity/complexity and circularity with causation described 
above, but I will argue later in the dissertation that the strict epistemological reading (and the historical plain method 
it advocates) provides solutions. 
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SECTION 5: The Strict Interpretation 
The Strict Interpretation is a reading of the Essay which is focused on unifying Locke’s 
account of ideas with his account of knowledge. While other commentators177 observe a sharp 
divide between the apparently metaphysical work done in Books II and III178 and the clearly 
epistemological work in Book IV, this reading takes every Book to be concerned with ideas, 
wherein knowledge as addressed particularly in Book IV is merely a type of idea as described in 
Book II. Such a reading is warranted by Locke’s definition of knowledge, which describes it as 
the agreement of ideas.179 It is also a straightforward reading of Locke’s own description of the 
(whole) project: it “being my Purpose to enquire into the Original, Certainty and Extent of 
humane Knowledge; together, with the Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent.” 
(Essay I.i.2) After explaining his goals, Locke provides a method for his project, which he calls 
 
177 e.g. Ayers in Locke: Epistemology and Ontology (1993), Stuart in Locke’s Metaphysics (2013); Bolton (1976), 
Woolhouse (2005) treat positions in Book II as metaphysical 
 
178 Where Locke introduces the concepts of real and nominal essence. 
 
179 It has been suggested (for example by Yolton (1970) that sensitive knowledge is agreement between ideas and 
the world, but I contend that Locke is strict in his definition and construes sensitive knowledge as agreement 
between sensations and ideas of real existence (of powers or of substances), and that contact with the world is 
achieved by the necessary conformity of simple ideas of sensation and their causes. Newman (2007) argues for 
something similar: “Unlike intuition and demonstration, sensitive knowledge purports, via sensation, both to make 
cognitive contact with external things and to be knowledge- thus encompassing agreement between ideas. As I 
understand Locke, the key to this twofold cognitive status stems from the twofold role of sensation: as veridical, 
sensations stand in causal relations with external things, thus establishing a cognitive link (though not strictly a 
known link) with external reality; as ideas, sensations can stand in relations of agreement with other ideas, thus 
making possible that reflective awareness of sensation would satisfy the definition of knowledge. These dual 
cognized relations are both essential to achieving the third degree of knowledge. Only a relation between two ideas 




the “Historical, plain Method,” (Essay I.i.2) whereby he will investigate his thoughts and his 
faculties so as to establish what is within the limits of his understanding to know and what is not. 
I take it to be the case that this provides a very rough outline to the contents of the Essay. The 
method as given has three stages: 
“First, I shall enquire into the Original of those Ideas, Notions, or whatever else you 
please to call them, which a Man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his 
Mind; and the ways whereby the Understanding comes to be furnished with them. 
Secondly, I shall endeavor to shew, what Knowledge the Understanding hath by those 
Ideas; and the Certainty, Evidence, and Extent of it. 
Thirdly, I shall make some Enquiry into the Nature and Grounds of Faith, or Opinion: 
whereby I mean that Assent, which we give to any Proposition as true, of whose Truth 
yet we have no certain Knowledge: And here we shall have Occasion to examine the 
Reasons and Degrees of Assent.” (Essay I.i.3) 
The Strict Interpretation is the result of reading the Essay as though it does hew to this method, 
so that for any particular question he determines whether there is knowledge or opinion worthy 
of assent by initially examining the genesis and the content of the ideas involved. Any claim 
must be translated into the ideas which the words intend to signify in order to make 
determinations of epistemic status.  These ideas are described in terms of their compositional 
structure and which simple ideas they contain. The ideas can then be compared in order to 
perceive agreement (in the form of idea-containment) or disagreement. If there is agreement (or, 
in the case of negative knowledge like “x is not y”, disagreement), then there is knowledge. 
Where there is not knowledge but there is still assent, we can make determinations of probability 






The Strict Interpretation can be partly characterized by the following theses: 
1. Ideas are the objects of the understanding. 
2. Ideas are either simple or complex. 
3. There are two sources of simple ideas: sensation and reflection. 
4. Complex ideas are (theoretically) fully analyzable into simple ideas. 
5. Complex ideas are the products of mental operations. 
Thesis 1: He considers only the sources and composition of our ideas. Locke does not, 
significantly, address what ideas are- that is to say, their metaphysical status. (Essay I.i.8) This is 
a consequence of (and evidence for) the status of his work as a piece of epistemology. What an 
idea is ontologically has no import for our perception of it or its role in knowledge, and therefore 
the question is irrelevant to Locke. ‘Ideas’ are defined functionally, in terms of their role as the 
objects of the mind. In his giving of the historical plain method, Locke equates “Ideas, Notions, 
or whatever else you please to call them, which a Man observes, and is conscious to himself he 
has in his Mind”. (Essay I.i.3) His consideration of what I have called the ‘composition’ of our 
ideas does not belie this: what he describes are the relationships between different ideas whereby 
some ideas can be partially constitutive of others, rather than the metaphysical nature of ideas.180 
 
180 It is tempting to describe ideas as mental modifications, and Locke does seem to frequently assume dualism, but 
he is open to the possibility of thinking matter, and therefore does not commit to ideas as immaterial. “We have the 
ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know, whether any mere material being thinks, or 
no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover, whether 
omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined 
and fixed to matter so disposed a thinking immaterial substance: It being, in respect of our notions, not much more 
remote from our comprehension to conceive, that God can, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, 
than that he should superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking; since we know not wherein thinking 
consists, nor to what sort of substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any 
created being, but merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator.” (Essay IV.iii.6) 
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Thesis 2: The most basic unit of experience- that element which is unmixed and a unity 
and is annexed to some other idea to produce sensation or reflection- is what Locke calls a 
“simple idea”. A simple idea is defined as one which “being in it self uncompounded, contains in 
it nothing but one uniform Appearance, or Conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable 
into different Ideas.” (Essay II.ii.1) Simple sensitive ideas will be particular impressions within a 
single modality, like a color or a taste; (Essay II.i.3) whereas simple reflective ideas are of 
mental activities, like memory or perception. (Essay II.i.4) All other ideas are composed from 
such simple ideas by annexing first simple ideas into complex ideas, and then mixes of simple 
and complex ideas into further complex ideas. (Essay II.vii.10) 
Thesis 3: Book I argues against innate ideas. Therefore, Locke commits to empiricism 
and takes it to be the case that all ideas have their origin in experience. There are two ways of 
experience (and this is a point on which Locke agrees with the Cartesians): sensation and 
reflection. (Essay II.i.2) Sensations are experiences of objects outside the mind, (Essay II.i.3) 
while reflections are experiences of the mind and its activity. (Essay II.i.4) The ideas we receive 
from these two “fountains” must be adequate to construct all ideas we have. (Essay II.i.5) Any 
idea supposed to include something beyond what can be acquired from experience in these two 
ways is the result of confusion. 
Theses 4 & 5: The combination of simple(r) ideas into a complex idea occurs as a result 
of a mental operation which unifies the components, because a complex idea is itself an idea and 
therefore somehow unified as an object of the understanding, rather than a mere collection of 
different ideas without such bundling. (Essay II.xii.1) “The understanding … has the power to 
repeat, compare, and unite [simple ideas], even to an almost infinite variety; and so can make at 
pleasure new complex ideas.” (Essay II.ii.2) Complex ideas therefore possess genetic 
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structures181 which can be identified with the mental operations which produce them. (Essay 
II.xii.1) Some complex ideas are formed from mental operations on other complex ideas, rather 
than directly from simple ideas. The genetic structures of such ideas retain the order of their 
operations. “Simple” and “complex” are therefore descriptors of the compositional structure of 
the idea. Simple ideas are absolutely simple, rather than relatively simple, because of the nature 
of a simple idea as unmixed and uniform.182  (Essay II.ii.1) These simple ideas are not 
abstractions, because abstraction is one of the mental activities which forms complex ideas. 
 The import of these five theses is that by understanding how an idea is constructed and 
where its sources are in experience, we can clarify that idea. There are many ideas which we use 
despite being confused, perhaps most egregiously when we use words to signify an idea without 
adequate attention to the idea itself. (Essay III.ii.7) Locke intends to be able to take a claim as 
made in common speech and to suggest a possible candidate idea which the words are intended 
to signify, one which he can explain the derivation of from experience and to which we can 
appropriately attend.183 By performing this translation from language to strictly constructed 
ideas, we are supposed to gain a clearer understanding, and this will further sciences and human 
knowledge insofar as confusion and conflict will be reduced.
 
181 Brown (2006) illustrates these structures by means of several schema. 
 
182 Simple ideas, especially of sense, are difficult to name for reasons which will be explained later, and therefore 
both I and Locke occasionally use abstractions of simple ideas (themselves complex ideas) as surrogates, for 
instance speaking as though “whiteness” were a simple idea when it is distinguishable into many particular shades. 
Furthermore, to be aware of a simple idea is to have a perception of it, and that perception is a complex idea, and so 
we also cannot think about a particular simple idea in itself. 
 
183 Locke describes the relationship between words and ideas in Essay III.i-ii. Words are used as signs of ideas by 
their speakers. Words “signify only men’s peculiar ideas, and that by a perfect arbitrary imposition.” (Essay III.ii.8) 
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SECTION 6: Powers as Qualities of Substances 
The science for which Locke hopes to clear a path is the study of material substances and 
their interactions, both with other material substances and with our minds (in the form of the 
sensory ideas they cause). Scientists like Boyle and Newton provide accounts, based on 
observation, of how substances behave: describing the relationship between the pressure and 
volume of a given sample of gas or what occurs when one billiard ball causes the movement of 
another. The qualities of material substances are therefore highly relevant to his project. If Locke 
can clarify our ideas of qualities, he is better positioned to determine what knowledge can be had 
of them, and therefore of substances, the ideas of which are primarily collections of ideas of 
qualities. 
Locke says that he uses “quality” in the following way: “The power to produce any idea in 
our mind I call a quality of the subject wherein that power is. Thus a snow-ball having the power 
to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round, the power to produce those ideas in us, as 
they are in the snow-ball, I call qualities.” (Essay II.viii.8) “Quality” is therefore technically used 
to describe the powers of substances to cause sensitive simple ideas directly.184 Qualities are 
therefore a subset of powers (there are also the powers of the mind to operate on its ideas, for 
example). However, “powers”, when Locke uses the term in isolation in his account of 
substances, are often “powers we observe in [some substance], to change some sensible qualities 
 
184 I say directly because fire seems to cause my sensory ideas of melting gold, but only mediately, insofar as we 
believe it has a power to change the qualities of the gold which cause my sensations. 
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in other subjects”. (Essay II.xxiii.7) However, Locke is willing to “reckon” powers along with 
qualities, and therefore he frequently uses “qualities” in a way that suggests the inclusion of 
“powers”. (Essay II.xxiii.7) Such powers are often termed tertiary qualities by Locke 
interpreters.185 Analysis of the ideas of qualities and these “powers” reveals both include the 
simple idea of power. 
6.1 Inadequacy of language for qualities (and substances) 
Qualities are those features which we attribute to substances, but our ideas of them must 
also be described. The words we use to describe qualities are much less clear in their 
signification than one might think.186 There are many different ideas which the word might 
signify, and so part of the task of translating a claim into the ideas which a speaker intends to 
signify is disambiguation. Locke illustrates this well with the example of claims made about gold 
when he explains his conviction that “the greatest part of Disputes were more about the 
signification of Words, than a real difference in the Conception of Things” (Essay III.ix.16):  
“Let us only here consider a little more exactly the fore-mentioned instance of the Word 
Gold, and we shall see how hard it is precisely to determine its Signification. I think all 
agree, to make it stand for a Body of a certain yellow shining Colour, which being the 
Idea to which Children have annexed that name, the shining yellow part of a Peacock’s 
Tail, is properly to them Gold. Others finding Fusibility join’d with that yellow Colour in 
certain parcels of Matter, make of that Combination a complex Idea to which they give 
the name Gold to denote a sort of Substances; And so exclude from being Gold all such 
yellow shining Bodies, as by Fire will be reduced to ashes….” (Essay III.ix.17) 
Locke here speaks of the differences between the ideas associated with a word by different 
individuals. However, the idea signified by a word will also vary for the same individual at 
 
185 Campbell (1980) argues that Locke’s preferred definition of “quality” even excludes secondary qualities, but his 
argument relies on explaining primary qualities as the consequence of many powers rather than powers to produce 
ideas themselves. 
 
186 See Bolton (1976) 
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different times. The idea an individual signifies by a term is affected by learning, attention or the 
conditions of the signification: the child may train as a metallurgist, and the chemist might speak 
intending the element gold (including ideas of its melting point and its solubility in various 
liquids) or merely the material (an alloy of gold) composing her jewelry (where ideas of melting 
point and of solubility are irrelevant, and the idea includes only being a soft, yellow metal). The 
reasons why the words we use to refer to qualities and substances are conflated are many. 
First, there is the issue common to any discussion of ideas- there are more ideas than 
there are words to refer to these ideas, and therefore necessarily many references are potentially 
either vague or ambiguous.187 Our simple ideas of sensation exceed our vocabulary. (Essay 
II.iii.2)188 While it is possible to make an attempt at precision - where I mean a very particular 
shade of green, I might arbitrarily designate it green-52 - this is not sufficient to actually 
designate or describe a particular idea in the fashion of a definition (Essay III.iv.7) and will be 
more difficult for those modalities which lack as nuanced a vocabulary as sight.  For instance, 
our vocabulary around experiences of scent, as Locke also recognized, is very limited: “The 
variety of Smells, which are as many almost, if not more than the Species of Bodies in the 
World, do most of them want Names. Sweet and Stinking commonly serve our turn for these 
Ideas, which in effect, is little more than to call them pleasing or displeasing; though the smell of 
a Rose, and Violet, both sweet, are certainly very distinct ideas.” (Essay II.iii.2) It is quite 
possible for me to call up a very particular sensory idea by reference to the idea of a substance of 
which a power to cause it is a component - for instance, the taste of aspartame - and yet be 
 
187 This sets aside the complication that one might choose to signify any idea by any sound, and assumes that we are 
considering proficient speakers who intend to communicate with other speakers of the same dialect. 
 
188 See also: “Thus we see that there are great varieties of simple ideas, as of tastes and smells, which have no 
names…. Which either not having been generally enough observed, or else not being of any great use to be taken 
notice of in the affairs and converse of men, they have not had names given to them….” (Essay II.xviii.7) 
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unable to in any way name the idea I have of that taste independently so as to recognize that it is 
a simple idea which could be caused by the power of some other object and not to the one by 
which I referenced it. Consider that I might say “this soda tastes like aspartame”, making a 
comparison, but not “this tastes aspartame”, as though ‘aspartame’ names the quality. Ideas of 
substances only compound the insufficiencies of language because these complex ideas can be 
composed of any number of other ideas. (Essay II.xii.2) My idea of this particular mug of tea 
lacks a name, but I do have an idea of it. That idea includes the ideas of the qualities of being 
black tea, in a mug painted with warthogs, hot enough to burn, with the complex power to sate 
my caffeine craving. That idea of this mug of tea is distinct from my idea of that mug of tea, 
which is green tea in a blue mug at room temperature. Similarly, there is a difference between 
my idea of this mug of tea now, when it is hot, and my idea of this mug of tea later, when it has 
cooled enough to drink, even though I continue to refer to it as the same mug of tea. Since a 
complex idea can be formed from countless conjunctions of other ideas, it is also possible to 
form ideas of substances which do not accord with experience and are so novel or unusual as to 
lack a name (for instance, the idea of a frog with a horn like a unicorn is a complex idea quite 
obviously composed of two other [complex] ideas for which we seem to have names, but the 
idea is not associated with a word itself).189 
 Second, the ideas we receive directly from sensation are simple ideas, but language 
cannot refer to these rather than abstracted or conjoined and thus complex ideas.190 A simple idea 
 
189 Although I am always able to signify this idea with any sound I so desire. When I say ‘unifrog’ and intend this 
idea, it is with the same propriety as when I say ‘frog’ and intend to signify my idea of a member of the order Anura. 
 
190 One might dispute the SI Locke on whether we can think simple ideas. Insofar as consciousness of an idea is the 
same as the mental activity of perception (which is a controversial claim, but I take this to be the import of 
“Perception, as it is the first faculty of the mind exercised about our ideas; so it is the first and simplest idea we have 
from reflection, and is by some called thinking in general.” (Essay II.ix.1)), then the simple idea of perception (from 
reflection) will be conjoined to the simple idea of sensation of which I take myself to think. If I cannot think a 
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is defined as one which “being in it self uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform 
Appearance, or Conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different Ideas.” (Essay 
II.ii.1) A simple idea of sensation is therefore the most basic unit of sense within a single 
modality. Whenever a distinction can be made within a sensory idea - between, for instance, the 
starchiness of rice and the sour of pickling in the taste of sushi rice - this entails that the level on 
which it was originally being considered was as a complex idea.191 “As a Man sees at once 
Motion and Colour; the Hand feels Softness and Warmth in the same piece of Wax: Yet the 
simple Ideas thus united in the same Subject, are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by 
different Senses.”  (Essay II.ii.1) Intriguingly, while Locke writes here as though “softness”, 
“warmth” and “color” are simple ideas, they are not, by his own definitions.192 Insofar as there 
are gradations of warmth and shades of color, “warmth” and “color” signify complex ideas. Of 
course, simple ideas are included within the ideas of these qualities, as they are constituents of all 
complex ideas. We may signify by these terms either an idea of a type of simple idea (abstracting 
from all simple ideas of one sense modality) or an idea of collection of simple ideas (all the 
 
simple idea in isolation, it seems impossible for a word to signify it, and yet Locke does provide names for simple 
ideas. It is certainly the case that in actual sensation, the simple idea of what is felt must be conjoined to that of 
perception: ”How often may a man observe in himself, that whilst his mind is intently employed in the 
contemplation of some objects, and curiously surveying some ideas that are there, it takes no notice of impressions 
of sounding bodies made upon the organ of hearing, with the same alteration that uses to be for the producing the 
idea of sound? A sufficient impulse there may be on the organ; but it not reaching the observation of the mind, there 
follows no perception: And though the motion that uses to produce the idea of sound be made in the ear, yet no 
sound is heard. Want of sensation, in this case, is not through any defect in the organ, or that the man's ears are less 
affected than at other times when he does hear; but that which uses to produce the idea, though conveyed in by the 
usual organ, not being taken notice of in the understanding, and so imprinting no idea in the mind, there follows no 
sensation. So that wherever there is sense, or perception, there some idea is actually produced, and present in the 
understanding.” (Essay II.ix.4) Locke’s discussion of particular sensations in the context of chapters on simple ideas 
seems to ignore this recognition. 
 
191 The taste of aspartame is a simple idea because it is the idea of a certain degree of sweetness. 
 
192 Bolton (1976) treats “hardness” and “flexibility” as simple ideas, however insofar as these are features which 
come in degrees (consider the Mohs scale), they cannot be particular unmixed sensations. Furthermore, “hardness” 
and “flexibility” are both commonly used to refer to a range of powers- something which is “hard” can exert 
pressure on many different subjects and something which is “flexible” can be deformed by many other substances. 
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various degrees are separate simple ideas which are conjoined and signified jointly).  Suppose 
that the piece of wax is not evenly heated, having been exposed to flame only on one side - there 
will be varying degrees of softness and heat at different parts of the wax, therefore entailing 
further distinctions among the simple ideas of sensation even as I say that the wax is soft and hot. 
Similarly, ‘color’ describes any number of different sensory ideas: “white, red, yellow, blue; 
with their several Degrees or Shades, and Mixtures, as Green, Scarlet, Purple, Sea-green, and the 
rest.” (Essay II.iii.1) While one might think that the whiteness of a sheet of paper is sufficiently 
precise as to pick out a simple idea of a color, it is not, because distinction remains possible, 
insofar as shadows or textural variations are visible on that paper, meaning that the color is not 
wholly uniform. While Locke does discuss the names of simple ideas, he does so in a way that 
separates them from other terms:  
“the Names of Simple Ideas, and those only, are incapable of being defined, The reason 
whereof is this, That the several Terms of a Definition, signifying several Ideas, they can 
altogether by no means represent an Idea, which has no Composition at all: and therefore 
a Definition, which is properly nothing but the shewing of the meaning of one Word by 
several others not signifying each the same thing, can in the Names of simple Ideas have 
no Place.” (Essay III.iv.7)  
Definitions, or descriptions, involve parts, and therefore necessarily signify complex ideas and 
never simple ones. 
Third, there are some ideas which we acquire through more than one modality. These are 
cases in which we associate at least two very different simple ideas with a single name. Ideas of 
shapes are one such type of idea. They are frequently discussed by Locke, as in his answer to 
Molyneux’s question of whether someone blind from birth who could distinguish shapes by 
touch could do so by sight were that to be restored.  There is the way that a sphere feels and the 
way that it looks, and these are different ideas, but we refer to both of these sensory ideas as 
‘spherical’. “We can receive and convey into our Minds the Ideas of the Extension, Figure, 
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Motion and Rest of Bodies, both by seeing and feeling.” (Essay II.v) Because (for people with 
access to both modalities) these sensory ideas seem to co-occur in regular ways, we may be 
tempted to think that the two ideas somehow represent a single quality, but as qualities are 
powers to cause simple ideas in the mind, and the simple ideas of feeling and looking spherical 
are different, so the qualities therefore must be distinct. 
Finally, our use of words can be ambiguous between referring to sensory ideas and to 
ideas of qualities. Locke pairs each simple idea of sensation with some quality in the relevant 
object which produces it. This allows him to distinguish between ‘white’ as a type of idea in the 
mind and ‘white’ as a feature of this page, which is a quality which produces the relevant sensory 
idea and is understood as a modification of matter.  “Whatsoever the Mind perceives in it self, or 
is the immediate object of Perception, Thought or Understanding, that I call Idea; and the Power 
to produce any Idea in our mind, I call Quality of the Subject wherein that power is.” (Essay 
II.viii.8)193 The perceiver is the location of the sensory idea and the quality is a feature of the 
perceived object. Thus, there is nothing like my idea of white as a quality of this page, although 
it does have the quality ‘white’. In large measure,194 sensory ideas are “no more the likeness of 
 
193 It is on the basis of this quote, and others like it, that I take qualities and powers to be the same. Where my use of 
the terms diverge, it is following Locke’s division of primary, secondary and tertiary qualities, wherein primary and 
secondary qualities are powers to bring about certain simple ideas but tertiary qualities are the more conventional 
“powers” and involve an effect on the simple ideas attributed to some other substance. 
 
194 Locke does describe primary qualities as “resembling” their causes in a certain sense: “the ideas of primary 
qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves” (Essay 
II.viii.15) However, in this context the causes of sensible qualities are the insensible arrangements of minute parts. 
Locke claims a resemblance between the primary qualities of a perceivable substance and the properties of 
corpuscles because he thinks that all bodies (and corpuscles are bodies) have extension, motion and solidity. This is 
therefore not to say that there is something like what a circle looks like to me in the substance itself. McCann (2011) 
elaborates on the distinction between what he calls “primary primary qualities” (which are insensible properties of 
minute parts) and “secondary primary qualities” (which are sensible complex qualities of macroscopic bodies). 
Insofar as a length of a foot will appear differently at different distances, there is no principled distinction between 




something existing without us, than the Names, that stand for them, are the likeness of our Ideas, 
which yet upon hearing, they are apt to excite in us.” (Essay II.viii.7) While we know of the 
existence of the quality, given perception of a sensory idea and the necessity of a power which 
causes this idea, we do not know how it produces the complex sensory idea, although Locke is 
inclined to assume it relates to corpuscularian structure via the sense organs.195 
When we receive simple ideas of sensation, we attribute the quality which caused that 
idea to some particular substance: if I taste strawberry - have a certain idea - on sipping my 
smoothie, I might then believe that the smoothie has the quality which produces that strawberry 
taste. Locke acknowledges that he does on occasion speak as though the idea were in the 
object,196 but that whenever this occurs, the reference should be understood as being to the 
quality which produces that idea. 
“For the cause of any Sensation, and the Sensation it self, in all the simple Ideas of one 
Sense, are two Ideas; and two Ideas so different, and distant one from another, that no 
two can be more so…. And therefore the Cartesians very well distinguish between that 
Light which is the cause of that Sensation in us, and the Idea which is produced in us by 
it, and is that which is properly Light.” (Essay III.iv.10) 197 
 
195 We are sometimes, as in the cases of illusions and dreams, wrong that the power causing our sensation is fully 
external. We are nonetheless correct in such situations that there is some power- of my own body- which does 
produce the simple ideas. My mind is affected in such a way as to have the sensation that I do. We therefore know 
that some power exists, not that it belongs to a particular substance. One may think that if sometimes our sensations 
don’t come from real bodies (and we don’t know when this occurs), it is ridiculous to assent to the claim that our 
sensations are usually caused by real bodies. However, Locke’s position is that I really know the power belongs to 
something outside the mind, and that is sufficient to know (with the reduced certainty of sensitive knowledge) that 
things beyond my mind exist. Then, on the basis of the regular co-occurrence of certain powers, I form ideas of 
particular substances or substance types, and I believe that these substances are the causes and supports of the 
powers. 
 
196 It is not unusual to have to work to disambiguate Locke. Other cases where he uses confused terminology include 
his use of the word “idea”, as discussed in Stuart (2010). 
 
197 There are commentators who believe that the distinction I draw here does not in fact apply, and that a sensation 
of some object is in fact an experience of that object, insofar as sensations are appearances. Lennon (2004), for 
instance, argues that sensations are related to their extra-ideational causes in the same way that a reflection in a 
mirror relates to its original, so that to perceive the appearance/reflection is to perceive the real object. I take this 
reading to be belied by texts such as the above, where if Lennon’s reading were correct, Locke ought to equate the 
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Many different ideas can be associated with the same words.198 Where we might take the 
claim ‘this mug is green’ to be a straightforward attribution of some sharply individuated 
property, ‘being green’, to some substance, ‘this mug’, the Strict Interpretation indicates that this 
is not the case for Locke. The claim is ambiguous between the many different ideas which might 
be associated with the word ‘green’ in some speaker at some time (setting aside completely the 
ambiguity of the name ‘this mug’). An incompetent speaker of English, or someone for whom 
successful communication was not a priority, might signify by the term ‘green’ an idea which is 
not that of a color quality. However, while such idiosyncratic signification is possible, it is 
unlikely. More plausible ideas which the term might signify are those ideas of powers to cause 
sensory ideas of color. A range of possible significations yet remains. There is an idea of the 
power which causes the speaker to currently receive some simple idea of a particular shade, and 
‘green’ might signify this particular power. There is an idea of the power to cause some simple 
idea of a green shade in the speaker were they in different circumstances, for example when they 
call the mug green while in the dark. There is an idea of the collection of particular powers 
which cause the various simple sensitive ideas of the different tonalities of green which the 
speaker currently experiences. There is an idea of the collection of particular powers to produce a 
specific simple idea of green in different circumstances, as when the speaker takes the mug 
which looks green under sunlight to also look green under fluorescent lighting. There is an idea 
of the collection of particular powers to produce different color sensations in different 
environments - a power to look green in sunlight, a power to look black in the dark, and a power 
 
idea produced in us by ‘Light’ and “that Light which is the cause of that Sensation in us” as both “properly Light” 
since one is the appearance of the other, and thus the same, but he does the opposite. 
 
198 By a competent speaker of the language, who can make themselves understood by others. Strictly, one might 
idiosyncratically associate any idea with any term. 
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to look blue in blue-tinted lighting. There is an idea of the collection of particular powers which 
produce different sensory ideas in different perceivers, as when a speaker tells their colorblind 
friend that the mug is green while knowing that for the friend it produces an idea different than it 
does for them. The numerous ideas which the same words might signify and the speaker’s 
privileged access to their ideas and thus what the words intend to signify entail that the words are 
frequently insufficient to clearly convey their signification to a listener.  
6.2 Problems with substances 
Locke’s account of substances is one that is often regarded as unsatisfying.199 He does not 
think that we can experience substances directly, because we only receive from sensation the 
simple ideas caused in us by other substances. (Essay II.i.3) However, because the qualities 
which we take to cause these sensory ideas are supposed to be unable to exist independently, 
Locke must posit something supporting them. (Essay II.xii.6) Whatever supports and unifies 
qualities is a substance, and whatever feature that substances share which gives this capacity to 
have qualities inhere is called “substratum”, however due to lack of experience of either, he can 
say no more about them. (Essay II.xxiii.1)  
A metaphysical Locke is supposed to have said that substances exist and that they consist of 
substratum, without any description of either and without any evidence beyond his belief that 
modes require such support. This posits the (known) existence of an entity which cannot be 
 
199 See Bennett (2001): “Locke behaves like someone in a jam. Failing to find any account of how there could be a 
Lockean idea of substance in general, he had to conclude that we really have no idea corresponding to this way of 
talking; but then he backed off from that, seeing what an important way of talking it is…. It’s no wonder that the 
substratum texts are two-faced: in them we see a genius in a bind.” Hume critiques accounts like Locke’s in his 
denial of the existence of an idea of substance: “These philosophers carry their fictions still farther … and both 
suppose a substance supporting, which they do not understand, and an accident supported, of which they have as 
imperfect an idea.” (Treatise, I.iv.3) 
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experienced or defined beyond its functional role.200 The Strict Interpretation, however, indicates 
that Locke should be read quite differently. 
 Locke discusses our ideas of substance in Essay II.xxiii. Ideas of substance, as illustrated 
in the above figure, include: the idea of substance in general, ideas of particular substances, and 
general ideas of substances. The source in experience of ideas of substance is in our sensory 
experiences of qualities and powers, which we suppose to inhere in something: “not imagining 
how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some 
substratum wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result, which therefore we call 
substance.” (Essay II.xxiii.1)201 This describes why ideas of substances include an idea of 
substratum,202 but it cannot be a justified description of ontological reality, because “substratum” 
merely signifies an idea of a functional role, which is “suppose[d]” to have some existing 
occupant. The idea associated with the term substratum is the idea of whatever unifies and 
supports the qualities of some particular substance.203 I agree that for Locke to say that the 
existing thing which supports qualities is that which supports qualities (with no further 
description) would be extremely hollow. However, the historical, plain method is intended to 
describe how the ideas of which one is phenomenologically aware can come to exist within 
empiricist constraints. Insofar as people do have ideas of powers as instantiated by some 
 
200 Bennett (2001): “Quite generally, when Locke writes about ‘substance in general’ and ‘substratum’, his topic is 
the instantiation of qualities; he is theorizing about the notion of a thing which….” (p130) 
 
201 I take this reference to “simple ideas” being one of the occasions where Locke (as he admits he does) conflates 
the simple ideas caused by a power with the power to bring them about (the quality of the substance). 
 
202 This explains the difference between the idea of the complex mode (conjunction of ideas) of being warm, soft 
and fuzzy and the idea of a substance which is (exists with the powers to cause ideas of) warm, soft and fuzzy. 
 
203 Inclusion of this idea in a complex idea is what makes it a Lockean idea of a substance, in the way that inclusion 




substance, i.e. as constituents of substance-ideas, rather than ideas of powers as independently 
existing entities, Locke must explain how this idea is constructed. Locke thinks that the only way 
to explain the difference between an idea of a substance which has multiple powers and the idea 
of those powers simply conjoined is to posit that the former idea includes some further idea, an 
idea of that which is somehow unifying. It is possible that we are wrong about the co-existence 
of powers in some entity. This is why our knowledge that there is some power is more accurately 
sensitive knowledge than our belief that there is a substance which has that power. However, it is 
indisputable that people (particularly Locke’s Aristotelian forebearers)204 did have ideas of 
powers as modes of a substance rather than independent entities. Furthermore, insofar as Locke 
does not want to encourage skepticism about the existence of the material world, since he 
believes that it is the best explanatory hypothesis we have about the regularities which we 
observe, he wants to give humans the ideas which constitute having the belief that material 
substances cause their sensations. Since we cannot experience substratum as it is, or whatever is 
in substances beyond the ideas which are caused in us, we cannot construct a more detailed or 
definite idea of it. However, that is not an issue- it is an idea closely equivalent to the concept of 
real essences, which figures in our belief that substances have some material properties which 
constitute the powers we observe, while these real essences remain unknowable because of the 
limitations of human experience. 
Ideas of particular types of substances are complex ideas consisting of a substratum 
supporting those qualities and powers which one associates with the particular type. (Essay 
II.xxiii.9) As material substances are experienced only by their powers to affect us by the 
 




production of sensory ideas, these qualities are the only determinate features of those substance-
ideas. There is no standard idea of any given substance or kind of substance, but rather different 
individual thinkers and the same individual at different times will each have an idea of that 
substance which includes different qualities.205 Many ideas might be associated with the name of 
some substance, and these will vary dependent on context or experience. (Essay II.xxiii.3) The 
qualities that we attribute to a substance, when we take ourselves to have an idea of an existing 
substance, are those which have previously gone together in our experience. “All the ideas we 
have of particular distinct sorts of substances, are nothing but several combinations of simple 
ideas, co-existing in such, though unknown, cause of their union, as makes the whole subsist of 
itself. It is by such combinations of simple ideas, and nothing else, that we represent particular 
sorts of substances to ourselves….” (Essay II.xxiii.6) 
Among the ideas of qualities included in our ideas of substances, there are those of the 
powers to affect other substances (tertiary qualities) which we take the substance to have. Thus, 
our idea of the sun is not only the idea of its appearance to our senses; it also includes its power 
to melt wax and its passive power to have its light occluded by the moon in a solar eclipse. 
“For he has the perfectest idea of any of the particular sorts of substances, who has 
gathered and put together most of those simple ideas which do exist in it, among which 
are to be reckoned its active powers, and passive capacities; which though not simple 
ideas, yet in this respect, for brevity's sake, may conveniently enough be reckoned 
amongst them. Thus the power of drawing iron, is one of the ideas of the complex one of 
that substance we call a load-stone; and a power to be so drawn is a part of the complex 
one we call iron: Which powers pass for inherent qualities in those subjects. Because 
every substance, being as apt, by the powers we observe in it, to change some sensible 
qualities in other subjects, as it is to produce in us those simple ideas which we receive 
immediately from it, does, by those new sensible qualities introduced into other subjects , 
discover to us those powers, which do thereby mediately affect our senses, as regularly as 
its sensible qualities do it immediately.” (Essay II.xxiii.7) 
 
205 I argue this in Section 2’s discussion of nominal essences. 
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Ideas of tertiary qualities are more complex than those of primary or secondary qualities, insofar 
as they are not only ideas of particular powers to cause ideas in us, but are of particular powers to 
change (by bringing into and out of existence) simple ideas of sensation which we believe are 
caused by other substances.206 They therefore include ideas of relations to both the affected 
substance and to us, since their power works on both (mediately, in the second case). Ideas of the 
particular powers we call primary and secondary qualities do not include ideas of relations to 
other material substances. Nonetheless, they are powers we take to be supported by substances in 
a manner analogous to other qualities (and their ideas are partially constitutive of our ideas of 
substances - my idea of this magnet includes the way it repels other magnets and the way iron 
filings are drawn toward its poles), and so they are “conveniently reckon’d” with qualities 
despite their differences of genetic structure.207 
 Locke also describes a general idea of substance (formed by abstraction from ideas of 
particular substances) in terms which describe what it is for anything to be a substance: it is the 
 
206 Ideas of powers to cause us pleasure or pain seem to be ambiguous between secondary and tertiary qualities. 
“And yet he that will consider that the same fire, that at one distance produces in us the sensation of warmth, does at 
a nearer approach produce in us the far different sensation of pain, ought to bethink himself what reason he has to 
say, that his idea of warmth, which was produced in him by the fire, is actually in the fire; and his idea of pain, 
which the same fire produced in him the same way, is not in the fire. Why are whiteness and coldness in snow, and 
pain not, when it produces the one and the other idea in us; and can do neither, but by the bulk, figure, number, and 
motion of its solid parts?” (Essay II.viii.16) This text has been read as a validation of either view. Warmth is a 
secondary quality. Locke is either comparing it to another secondary quality, which is more readily accepted to be a 
bare power, and therefore arguing that warmth and pain should be treated analogously; or alternatively, he is 
indicating the similarity between secondary and tertiary qualities: both are powers of substances which are not 
considered to be really present within the substance in the same fashion as primary qualities. Locke’s frequent lists 
of secondary qualities do not include powers to cause pleasure or pain, and therefore I assume they must be tertiary 
powers. It is possible that the model is that primary and secondary qualities cause ideas in us which then cause us 
either pain or pleasure. (It cannot be that the idea of pain is an idea of a power to modify my body in a way that 
causes me a pain sensation, because secondary qualities like color are powers to modify my sensory organs in such a 
way that a sensation is caused.) This seems more reasonable if one considers that ‘deliciousness’ and ‘scariness’ are 
types of pleasure and pain. If I find this pie delicious, a reasonable analysis is that my ideas of the taste of the pie 
were such that they caused pleasure; similarly, if I say spiders are scary, it is in consequence of my idea of the spider 
including the ideas of skittering movement and pain on being bitten, ideas which cause my displeasure. 
207 “They are as much real qualities in the subject, as those which I, to comply with the common way of speaking, 
call qualities, but for distinction, secondary qualities. For the power in fire to produce a new colour, or consistency, 
in wax or clay, by its primary qualities, is as much a quality in fire, as the power it has to produce in me a new idea 
or sensation of warmth or burning.” (Essay II.viii.10) 
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idea of something which is capable of supporting qualities. “The idea then we have, to which we 
give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown support of those 
qualities we find existing”. (Essay II.xxiii.2) This idea is particularly sparse, because we cannot 
conceive of that thing which is supportive - also called substratum - directly, since it is 
something we cannot experience beyond the effects of its modes. (Essay I.iv.18) We therefore 
identify the kind ‘substance’ by inclusion of an obscure idea. Our idea of substance will never be 
adequate to account for the nature of corporeal substance. (Essay II.xxiii.16; II.xxxi.13) In 
science, we may hypothesize that substratum of sensed substances as it exists is matter or try to 
specify which qualities are shared by all substances, but we have no knowledge in these matters. 
Locke engages in such hypothesizing when he suggests that substances all have some primary 
qualities. 
Ideas of types of substances (species) and of substance in general are formed analogously, by 
abstraction from ideas of particular substances.  However, in the case of species, the abstraction 
is limited to ideas of ones sharing certain qualities and not those of all substances. “When we 
speak of any sort that sounds general, not particular of substance, we say it is a thing having such 
or such qualities… the substance is supposed always some thing besides the extension, figure, 
solidity, motion, thinking, or other observable ideas, though we know not what it is.” (Essay 
II.xxiii.3) My idea of the species ‘dog’ is an abstraction of all those particular ideas which 
include the qualities of being hairy, having the power to bark, and having four legs and the idea 
of substratum.208 
 




The apparent difficulties with both ideas of qualities and ideas of substances as discussed in 
this section are made clearer by a proper understanding of the ideas of power. These are an 
important component of each substance idea because it is on the basis of the relation between 
ideas and powers that Locke is able to claim any sensitive knowledge of the real world. Ideas of 
particular powers causing one’s current simple ideas of sensation involve a real relation between 
sensations and the existence of something outside the mind. 
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SECTION 7: The Many Ideas of Power 
In order to consider the compositional structure of any idea of power, one must first 
establish which idea of power is in question. One division is between passive power, the ability 
to be changed by something else, and active power, the ability to change some other object. 
“Power, thus considered, is two-fold, viz. as able to make, or able to receive any change: The one 
may be called active, and the other passive power.” (Essay II.xxi.2) “Power” alone generally 
refers to “active power (which is the more proper signification of the word power)” (Essay 
II.xxi.4). The term recurs in the text in ways that suggest it is used variously to refer to several 
different ideas of powers. First, the abstract general idea of powers (the idea of what it is to be a 
power): the mind “considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas 
changed, and in another the possibility of making that change: and so comes by that idea which 
we call power.” (Essay II.xxi.1) Second, the simple idea of power (the idea which we receive 
from experience of power and include in any complex idea of power)209: “our idea therefore of 
power, I think may well have a place amongst other simple ideas, and be considered as one of 
them.” (Essay II.xxi.3) Third, the idea of some particular power (the idea of a particular power to 
cause a simple idea or set thereof) as attributed to substances or abstractions thereof: “fire has a 
power to melt gold.” (Essay II.xxi.1). Connolly (2013) says “Locke is speaking about (at least) 
 
209 This idea is phenomenologically present as part of the complex idea of a particular power in these experiences - 
that is to say, conjoined with its effect (or ability to be affected) - rather than in isolation, but I can direct my 
attention toward that aspect in order to focus on the simple idea. This is analogous to how I see colors along with 
shapes, and yet I can distinguish the simple idea of color from the simple idea of shape, or how sound is heard with 
both pitch and volume, but I can distinguish these components. 
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two distinct types of idea of power. One type I will call the Simple Idea of Power. The other type 
I will call Ideas of Specific Powers.” (p29) The simple idea of power he describes is the same 
that I describe, and he similarly agrees that ideas of specific powers are complex ideas. He adds 
“I think there is also a simple mode of power and an abstract idea of power.” (p29, footnote 11) 
The construction of these ideas is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
Book II of the Essay is primarily a catalogue of ideas and their sources in external and 
internal sense. These sources must be explained insofar as the source of a complex idea is not 
evident from mere inspection of the idea. Consider the distant relationship between a sensory 
perception of two billiard balls striking and my idea of solidity, which contains nothing of 
billiard balls. Indeed, insofar as possession of some ideas depends on learning, there is yet more 
mediation than in the previous example between the perception of a right-angled triangle and my 
idea of the Pythagorean theorem. Recall that in Book II, Locke first introduces the simple ideas 
which compose all our other ideas, and then devotes chapters to some kinds of complex ideas 
which he takes to be especially worthy of analysis. As discussed earlier in section 2, the 
catalogue of simple ideas considers them under three types: those whose source was sensory 
experience (Essay II.iii-v), those whose source was reflection (Essay II.vi, ix-xi), and those 
which are acquired from both types of experience (Essay II.vii). Locke first discusses an idea of 
power in the context of his list of simple ideas acquired from both sensation and reflection 
(Essay II.vii.8). This idea of power is the simple idea that is a constituent of all of our ideas (and 
experiences) of some cause bringing about some effect. “For observing in ourselves, that we can 
at pleasure move several parts of our bodies which were at rest; the effects also, that natural 
bodies are able to produce in one another, occurring every moment to our senses, we both these 
ways get the idea of power.” (Essay II.vii.8) This idea is not had in isolation; we can merely 
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attend to that part of the complex idea of a power to do something. For example, this simple idea 
is a constituent of the ideas of bringing about movements of my body or moving when impacted 
by another billiard ball. The Strict Interpretation is ambivalent as to whether there is a single 
simple idea of power, or two, one corresponding to active power and another to passive power. I 
believe that one simple idea of power is adequate. Active and passive power are broad abstract 
ideas, covering the types of powers which bring about changes in other substances and the types 
of powers wherein the substance which has the power is the one that changes. These abstract 
ideas of active and passive power are complex rather than simple. The simple idea of power is 
merely of causing an idea. All complex ideas of causal processes terminate in the simple idea of 
power. Both active and passive powers are responsible for the causing of our ideas, because it is 
by their conjunction that any change occurs. The simple idea of power is therefore an idea of 
power as neither active nor passive, and it occurs in complex ideas of both forms. 
Locke titles the 21st chapter of Book II “Of Power”, indicating that the goal of the chapter 
is to describe, as part of the inventory of ideas which he is providing in this book, ideas of power 
and their origins. At this point in Book II, what is now called the idea of power is not the simple 
idea of II.vii.8, but a class of complex ideas that include that simple idea. Chapter xxi is located 
in the sequence of chapters dedicated to complex ideas, and in particular to that part listing ideas 
of modes.210  Locke classifies all complex ideas as either modes, substances or relations (Essay 
II.xii.3). “Modes I call such complex ideas, which, however compounded, contain not in them 
the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependences on or affections 
of substances; such as are the ideas signified by the words triangle, gratitude, murder, &c.” 
 
210 Other modes include space (Essay II.xiii), duration (Essay II.xiv), number (Essay II.xvi), infinity (Essay II.xvii), 




(Essay II.xii.4)211 Specific powers are modes because they are attributed to substances and called 
qualities. The powers which Locke therefore names as examples are ideas of particular powers 
which are included in our idea of some substance, and these are modifications or combinations of 
the simple idea of power discussed previously. 
“Concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been, that the like changes 
will for the future be made in the same things by like agents, and by the like ways; 
considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed, and in 
another the possibility of making that change: And so comes by that idea which we call 
power. Thus we say, fire has a power to melt gold, i.e. to destroy the consistency of its 
insensible parts, and consequently its hardness, and make it fluid; and gold has a power to 
be melted: That the sun has a power to blanch wax, and wax a power to be blanched by 
the sun, whereby the yellowness is destroyed, and whiteness made to exist in its room.” 
(Essay II.xxi.1)  
The ideas of powers (both active and passive) which we attribute to substances as modes include 
in their construction both the idea of some related substance (that affected by the active power or 
that effecting the passion) and particular simple ideas (the change which is sensed). While Locke 
says that our experiences of power, from which the idea is derived, include experiences which 
we describe as of one object affecting the other, it is important to note that when applying 
Locke’s HPM, the result is that the powers we have ideas of are only those powers to change our 
ideas. “The power we consider is in reference to the change of perceivable ideas: For we cannot 
observe any alteration to be made in, or operation upon, any thing, but by the observable change 
of its sensible ideas.” (Essay II.xxi.1) The idea of a power a thing has is complex in virtue of its 
construction. As discussed in this chapter, the relevant idea of power is of particular modes like 
 
211 Locke does distinguish between “simple modes” and “mixed modes”, but this alterative use of simple is 
confusing, insofar as simple modes are all complex ideas. Modes are either simple, being composed of “only 
variations, or different combinations of the same simple idea, without the mixture of any other” (Essay II.xii.5),211 or 
mixed, being “compounded of simple ideas of several kinds” (Essay II.xii.6). An idea like murder is a mixed mode, 
because it includes very diverse simple ideas, including some sensitive ones in the idea of killing and some 
reflective ones in the ideas of premeditation and of intentionality. The idea of a triangle, in contrast, is a simple 
mode, because it is an idea of a set of different combinations of simple sensitive ideas of extension. Power is 
discussed in Essay II.xxi as a simple mode. The following chapter is “Of mixed modes”, and starts: “Having treated 
of simple modes in the foregoing chapters…” (Essay II.xxii.1) 
82 
 
‘the power to melt wax’. Abstraction from such an idea of a power can produce the most general 
idea of a power (the kind of mode usually referenced by the word ‘power’), in the same way that 
abstraction from ideas of particular triangles (a simple mode of shape) can produce the most 
general idea of a triangle.212 
Since particular powers (not abstract powers) are individuated by the ideas that are their 
particular effects, such powers are necessarily single-track.213  This is to say that there cannot be 
a single particular power which brings about different sensory ideas, even if the object 
possessing the power does so under different conditions. Let’s return to the example of a ball. A 
ball which appears white in sunlight and green under a green light does not have a single color 
quality which explains its interaction with different wavelengths of light on this account, but 
rather two distinct powers: one to bring about a white sensory idea under sunlight and another to 
bring about a green sensory idea under green light.214 This is illustrated in texts such as the one 
wherein Locke defines what it is for an object to be called “white” as it possessing “that quality 
or accident … whose appearance before my eyes always causes that idea.” [my emphasis] 
(Essay IV.xi.2) Thus, any particular power must be relativized to the particular circumstances of 
 
212 The structure of abstract ideas is discussed elsewhere, but I will not specify the mental operation(s) which 
produce such abstract ideas. 
 
213 Marusic (2016) develops the insight that Locke’s powers are identified by the bringing about of a particular 
sensation in a perceiver. In her words, “Powers are individuated by their effects because, Locke assumes, a power to 
produce sensations of some type can only produce sensations of that type, or else it would be a different power.” 
Marusic focuses on environmental conditions as being what powers are relativized to, but I believe that this misses a 
significant part of Locke’s intent, because it encourages the conflation of several different ideas (of a power to bring 
about the same effect but in different types of people), and therefore does not adequately individuate the powers. 
 
214 Although we call the baseball white in all conditions, we do so where ‘white’ is associated with an abstract idea 




the environment of the object possessing the power at the point when the sensitive simple idea 
caused by that power was experienced.215 
Having accepted that any particular power of an object is single-track, I argue that we 
must recognize that a change in the perceiver, rather than the environment, may also lead to a 
change of received sensitive simple idea and therefore the idea must be the result of a different 
particular power. This is a feature which has been neglected even by Marusic, who originates the 
argument that external circumstances do differentiate powers along with the sensory ideas 
caused.216 A particular power is one which always causes a specific sensitive simple idea in an 
exactly specified internal and external environment. One might think that the power of a lemon 
to taste sour is a quality and a particular power. However, if I eat a ‘miracle berry’217 beforehand, 
the taste of the lemon will be sweet. The lemon therefore has two separate powers related to 
taste: the particular power to taste sour in the normal condition, and the particular power to taste 
sweet in the miracle berry condition. In his discussion of secondary qualities, Locke is sensitive 
to the fact that the condition of our body determines what we experience: “we may understand, 
how it is possible, that the same water may at the same time produce the sensation of heat in one 
hand, and cold in the other;… if a body be applied to the two hands, which has in its minute 
particles a greater motion, than in those of one of the hands, and a less, than in those of the other, 
it will increase the motion of the one hand, and lessen it in the other, and so cause the different 
 
215 This is the point on which I agree with Marusic (2016). 
 
216 See Marusic (2016) 
 




sensations of heat and cold, that depend thereon.” (Essay II.viii.21) 218  Powers are also sensitive 
to changes in perceiver which affect the sensations for reasons that are not even hypothesized: 
“the taste of grapes delights him; let an alteration of health or constitution destroy the delight of 
their taste, and he then can be said to love grapes no longer.” (Essay II.xx.4)219 Locke further 
recognizes that different types of perceiver (as opposed to a single perceiver in different states) 
will be sensitive to different powers. Perhaps the classic example in this regard is his answer to 
Molyneux’s question, wherein Locke acknowledges that a blind man is necessarily insensitive to 
visual stimuli, and so will not have produced in him all the ideas which are produced in someone 
sighted perceiving the same object. This is to say that a white ball does not have the power to 
produce the visual idea of its shape or the idea of white in a blind person (so long as that 
individual remains blind and was always blind), and indeed the blind person will therefore be 
unlikely220 to have an idea of a white ball. “Those that want the organs of any sense, never can 
have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in their minds.” (Essay IV.xi.4) 
While Locke does not consider the case, we may take a colorblind individual to 
analogously lack sensitivity to powers which do affect non-colorblind individuals: for instance, 
someone who is red-green colorblind (deuteranopic) experiences the same sensation from two 
different objects which someone with standard vision would take to produce the disparate 
sensations of green and red. Since a quality is attributed only on the basis of a sensation, and 
 
218 This is an example of Locke indulging in a corpuscularian hypothesis. The relevant point is merely that hands in 
different states (one hot, one cold) will produce different sensations. 
 
219 The delight produced by eating grapes is a sensation of pleasure, and therefore the relevant power is the power to 
cause that sensation of pleasure. It is separate from those powers which cause sensations of the taste of the grape- 
the taste of the grape is not supposed to have changed, only the pleasure taken from it. 
 
220 Unlikely because there are circumstances where someone who cannot see color might still have an idea of white 
in terms of the power to make sighted individuals say that they see white, and therefore may have an idea of a white 
ball if they mean to ascribe such a power to the ball. (They will have an idea of a ball which includes the ideas of the 
powers to cause certain touch sensations, but not ideas of any powers to cause visual sensations.) 
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only so as to correspond to it (in such-and-so conditions, this object produced this particular 
sensation), the colorblind individual will not attribute different qualities to the two objects.221 
Thus, where a deuteranopic individual and one with standard color vision might both say ‘the 
grass is green’, it is quite possible that they in fact signify different ideas: in the red-green 
colorblind individual’s case, the grass possesses the quality (shared by all apples and all 
stoplights) of producing a sensation he calls ‘green’; whereas in the case of the individual with 
standard vision, the grass has some power to cause a ‘green’ sensation (shared by some set of 
apples and stoplights, but by no means most). If both speakers refer only to themselves, such that 
their ideas might more clearly be signified by ‘the grass is causing a green idea in me right now’, 
and they use the term  ‘green’ to signify the simple idea of a shade they currently experience, 
then the proposition is true. Each refers to a different simple idea of sensation, but they 
accurately claim that the power to cause their sensation exists and is part of their idea of the 
grass. However, were either to use ‘green’ to refer to an abstract (and complex) idea of the power 
to cause a green sensation in any human perceiver, then each would be engaging in enthusiasm, 
which is making a claim of knowledge without a basis in the agreement of ideas. This is because 
a complex idea of a power to cause a green sensation in any human perceiver is in fact the 
conjunction of a number of particular powers to cause green sensations in a variety of types of 
perceiver- the colorblind, the one with standard sight, the tetrachromat, and even the blind. 
Where the colorblind individual might name as green a sensation which is caused by objects with 
powers to disparately produce red or green sensations in someone with normal sight, what the 
normally-sighted individual might describe as ‘green’ may in fact be divisible into powers to 
 
221 At least he will not on the basis of his own sensations of the object - he might remark that one has the power to 
make his wife call it red, and the other has the power to make his wife call it green, and therefore that there is a 
difference in the qualities and presumably the compositional structure of each. 
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produce ‘green-A’ and ‘green-B’ sensations by the tetrachromat, and the blind individual will be 
insensitive to any power which acts on the sight of the others. 
As a result of the limitation of our sensitive knowledge to those powers which currently 
affect us, as opposed to those which affect others, each person’s sensitive knowledge is intensely 
personal. The fact of frequent interpersonal agreement is a result of God’s providence in giving 
most humans sufficiently coinciding sensory ideas. The apparently regular coexistence of a 
power to make me see green and a power to make my mother see green (whether or not the 
sensory idea we signify by green is the same)222 makes it easy to conjoin the particular powers 
and assume a shared cause in a fashion analogous to how tactile and visual sensory ideas of 
spheres regularly coexisting leads me to an idea of a single quality of ‘spherical shape’ which is 
supposed to affect both modalities.223
 
222 : Locke sees no issue with inverted qualia: “Neither would it carry any Imputation of Falshood to our 
simple Ideas, if by the different Structure of our Organs, it were so ordered, That the same Object should produce in 
several Men’s Minds different Ideas at the same time; v.g. if the Idea, that a Violet produced in one Man’s Mind by 
his Eyes, were the same that a Marigold produces in another Man’s, and vice versâ. For since this could never be 
known: because one Man’s Mind could not pass into another Man’s Body, to perceive, what Appearances were 
produced by those Organs; neither the Ideas hereby, nor the Names, would be at all confounded, or any Falshood be 
in either. For all Things, that had the Texture of a Violet, producing constantly the Idea, which he called Blue, and 
those which had the Texture of a Marigold, producing constantly the Idea, which he as constantly called Yellow, 
whatever those Appearances were in his Mind; he would be able as regularly to distinguish Things for his Use by 
those Appearances, and understand, and signify those distinctions, marked by the Names Blue and Yellow, as if the 
Appearances, or Ideas in his Mind, received from those two Flowers, were exactly the same, with the Ideas in other 
Men’s Minds.” (Essay II.xxxii.15) 
 
223 Lacking access to the underlying (and potentially shared) causes of powers means that experimental science is 
limited to the realm of belief and hypothesis rather than knowledge (an important feature of the distinction between 
knowledge and opinion that Locke draws). I believe that objects which have the power to look sharp also have the 
power to split skin and therefore the power to cause pain on forceful contact, but I cannot know this in Locke’s strict 
sense of ‘know.’ I believe that objects which have the power to look green to me have the power to look green to my 
mother, but I cannot know this either. This may not be satisfying (Locke expects it will not be, insofar as we expect 
science to provide scientia) but it is how God has limited human understanding by not providing us with access to 
real essences (assuming they exist). 
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SECTION 8: Taxonomy of Ideas of Power 
 As we have seen in the previous section, there are many types of idea which the word 
‘power’ is used to signify. In this section, I will explain each of these types of ideas of power. To 
apply Locke’s method to uses of the word ‘power’, it is necessary to consider the various origins 
of the ideas associated with the word. Recall that every complex idea has a genetic structure 
which results from the particular mental activities which formed it and the simple ideas from 
sensation and reflection which compose it. The variety of ideas of power which can be described 
according to their structure correspond to the different senses with which the word ‘power’ is 
used in common speech. In this section, I describe the use of seven different types of idea of 
power and break down those ideas in order to show how they are constituted of simple ideas. The 
aim of the historical, plain method is to analyze the ideas back to their origins. 
The various types of idea of power and their production: 
1. Simple idea of power: received as constituent of experience 
2. Ideas of particular power to produce a simple idea (in me, presently): perceived simple 
idea (effect) + simple idea of power 
3. Ideas of a power to produce a collection of simple ideas (in me, presently): collection of 
perceived simple ideas (effects) + simple idea of power 
4. Ideas of power(s) to produce different simple idea(s) (in a variety of conditions): 
collection of ideas of particular powers (from 2 and 3) 
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5. Ideas of power(s) to produce some one or part of a range of simple ideas: abstraction of 
some number of ideas of particular powers (from 2 and 3) or collections thereof (from 4) 
6. Ideas of power(s) to produce any simple ideas of a given modality: abstraction of ideas of 
powers to produce some simple idea of a type (from 5) 
7. Idea of powers in general: abstraction of all ideas of particular powers 
Type 1: 
Recall that simple ideas, including the simple idea of power, cannot be created by the 
mind but are received from experience. It is acquired in the complex experience of any exercise 
of the will or any affection by something external in the same way that the simple idea of some 
particular scent is acquired by the perception of a sensory idea including the odor. This 
absolutely simple idea is not of any particular power (quality) of a substance. It is also not the 
general idea of such particular powers as a class, because general ideas are abstractions and 
therefore complex products of mental activity. The simple idea of power is a constituent of all 
such complex ideas of powers. It is what makes them complex ideas of powers. The simplicity of 
the idea makes it impossible to discuss or think as it is by itself, since it will always occur in a 
complex idea with other constituent ideas. For an analogy, consider that there is a simple idea of 
sensation for every experienced particular color, however the human mind can only perceive (or 
imagine) color as applied to some body or shape. A complex idea of that color which does not 
appear to include anything else will still be of a field or pixel of the color. One might abstract the 
color from multiple objects which feature it, but to do so is to produce an abstract idea of the 
shade. It is not in fact to isolate the simple idea. Similarly, there is some simple idea of reflection 
produced by the mental activity of memory, but this simple idea is not found in isolation, but 
instead as a constituent of any memory or of the complex general idea of remembering. The 
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simple idea of power is received from experience and is found in a variety of related complex 
ideas, but it cannot be defined or described on its own.224 
Type 2: 
 The ideas of particular powers are composed of some experienced simple idea and the 
simple idea of power. Such ideas of power are the only ones which pertain to sensitive 
knowledge. Our passive power to be affected by something such that a simple idea is produced is 
necessarily paired to the active power of some object.225 To attribute the simple idea in 
experience to some external cause is to have an idea of a particular power. One way in which we 
can apply the words ‘To smell a scent’ is for there to be a sense of passively receiving the simple 
idea of the odor, and thus to have an idea of a particular power that produces it. The qualities 
which we attribute to individual substances are frequently of this kind. My idea of this rose 
before me now includes the idea of the power to make me smell the scent I am currently 
smelling. The power is the power which has produced the simple idea at this particular time, 
 
224 One might object to simple ideas being categorized as ideas if they are never on their own objects of the 
understanding. However, his account of simple ideas of reflection and the necessity of perception for all thought, as 
well as the impossibility of thinking about memory outside a particular memory of something or the abstract idea of 
remembering in general, suggest that he accepts that simple ideas are not thought of in themselves. A charitable 
reading is to assume that simple ideas are objects of the understanding mediately, insofar as they compose the 
complex ideas which we are conscious of. An analogy to atoms and molecules may again be helpful: there are 
indisputably atoms of oxygen even if oxygen only exists in the form of a component of the molecules of dioxygen 
(the common form of oxygen gas, O2), ozone (O3), water (H2O), etc. We receive simple ideas from experience, but 
we may only attend to them in forms which make them complex ideas (when I call up my most stripped down idea 
of some particular shade of green, I imagine it, and therefore my idea is the complex idea of imagining this shade). 
Locke falters when describing what it is to have an idea which one is not currently conscious of (e.g. the question of 
memories to which I am not currently attending) and therefore does not explain how we can possess simple ideas but 
not be aware of them in this basic form. 
 
225 I describe the case of sensation. There are also particular powers of the mind to produce ideas- the ideas of 
powers which we get from reflection instead of sensation. In these cases, I have both the active and the passive 
power: I cause myself to imagine a dragon by willing that I do (so I am both acting and acted upon). General ideas 
of powers of the mind are abstracted in the same fashion as general ideas of powers to cause sensory ideas. 
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because the idea is of concurrent passivity with respect to the simple idea and is therefore one 
restricted to the present conditions of environment and the perceiver. 
Type 3: 
 Most of the qualities we attribute to substances are complex and consist of more than one 
particular power to produce a simple idea. For something to have the power to cause a sensory 
idea of roughness is for it to produce a collection of tactile simple ideas at different points. When 
a surface causes an idea of some color, it only rarely does so perfectly uniformly, and therefore 
its power is to produce a number of different simple ideas of particular shades. The power to 
melt wax is a power to change the simple ideas of color, of temperature and of texture. The 
complex idea of power in such cases is therefore the idea of a cause of multiple simple ideas. It is 
similar in structure to the ideas of more particular powers in that it also contains the simple idea 
of power and an idea of its effect. However, it includes a collection of simple ideas as the effect 
rather than a single one. 
Type 4: 
As discussed before, ideas of qualities are sometimes more complex than ideas of 
particular powers. A term like ‘white’ might signify more than a power to cause one to currently 
experience a single simple idea. Some of the powers to which we refer are supposed to be 
constant features, as is often implied when we say something is white rather than currently 
appearing white. Something being white here means it has the power to look white in some 
situations, and the power to look green under certain lights, and the power to look red under 
certain other lights, etc. The idea of power in question is therefore the idea of the collection of its 
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powers to produce simple ideas in different conditions, a complex idea which is the conjunction 
of ideas of specific powers. 
Type 5: 
 There are general ideas of types of powers which are associated with each other due to 
what we consider the resemblance of their effects. This idea is a general idea of a kind in the 
fashion of the idea of dog which includes what is common to all dogs. There is an idea of what it 
is for something to produce a rose scent which is the abstraction of the ideas of various particular 
powers we have experienced at various times and in different circumstances which produce an 
idea of a rose scent, which will have produced a variety of different simple ideas analogous to 
the variety of intensities of the scent. Similarly, there is an idea of the power to cause a green 
sensory idea which is an abstraction of the ideas of different powers to cause simple ideas of 
particular shades of green. When an idea of a power is attributed to a general idea of a type of 
substance, it is often of this kind. For example, while the idea of roses includes the power to 
produce a rose scent, we acknowledge that different roses will have scents which can be 
distinguished from each other. The difference between ideas of individual substances which 
include ideas of particular powers and ideas of species of substances which include ideas of 
types of powers explains some of the divergence between our knowledge of the existence of 
individual substances and our lack of knowledge of the existence of species. There can be 
agreement between my idea of a particular substance (including my idea of a particular power) 
and my ideas of sensation (including the simple idea which is the effect of that power), and 
therefore there can be sensitive knowledge of particular substances, while the same is not true of 
ideas of general substances.  
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Similarly, ideas of shapes are often ideas abstracted from different conjunctions of visual 
and tactile sensory ideas caused by some material thing. Sensory ideas of a five inch cube are 
typically different than those caused by a ten inch cube, and yet calling each a cube is to include 
in both the idea of the power to cause complex sensory ideas of a type associated with that name. 
These ideas are also ideas of types of particular power. 
Type 6: 
 There are ideas of powers to produce a simple idea or collection of simple ideas which 
belongs to a single modality, without further specification. An idea signified by the term 
‘visibility’ is the highly abstract idea of a power to produce a visual idea without any detail about 
the caused simple ideas. The term ‘audibility’ can signify a similarly abstract idea of a power to 
produce any simple idea of the kind included in the abstract idea of the category of sounds. Such 
ideas are ideas of the further abstraction of the ideas of different abstract types of power. An idea 
of visibility, for instance, could be an idea of the abstraction of all ideas of powers to produce 
ideas of color, which are themselves abstractions of all particular powers to produce simple ideas 
of a kind associated with the name of that color. 
Type 7: 
 The simple idea of power is a constituent of all ideas of powers, but it is not the idea of 
all of these powers. However, individuals have ideas which signify classes of things which are 
called powers and provide a criterion for class membership. An idea which one associates with 
the word ‘power’ as a type is a general idea is of this kind. Ideas of active power and of passive 
power in general are ideas of this kind. They are abstractions of ideas of powers intended to 
describe only the causal force included in these ideas. They are ideas of the type of ideas which 
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classify as ideas of powers closely analogous to general ideas of substance. As an idea of 
substance in general is an abstract idea from all ideas which include the idea of substratum, an 
idea of power in general is an abstract idea from all ideas which include the simple idea of 
power. Similarly, ideas of active and passive powers as species of powers are abstract ideas from 




SECTION 9: Examples of Disambiguating Ideas of Power 
The previous section makes clear how many different types of idea of power there are. As 
a result, which idea of power is associated with any given quality name is frequently quite 
ambiguous. My interpretation emphasizes Locke’s strict adherence to a single project: explaining 
claims of knowledge and reasoned opinion- especially in cases where speakers disagree. He is 
concerned with conflicts such as those that arise when one person says that something is healthy 
and another claims that same thing is harmful or one says that it is just to give others what they 
are owed and another says it is just to promote equality. Some of the confusion in disputes 
among scientists that interest Locke is attributable to verbal conflations of different ideas. I now 
propose to illustrate the applicability of my reading of Locke’s account of powers to this project 
by taking various words for qualities and suggesting some candidate ideas of power which these 
words might signify in different circumstances. These lists of ideas possibly signified by the 
words are not intended to be exhaustive but are rather intended to illustrate the sorts of 
distinctions which can be drawn. All of these ideas of power belong to categories described in 
the taxonomy given earlier in section eight.  
‘Green’ (as an idea of a quality of an object): 
• An idea of a power to cause a particular green sensation 
• An idea of a power to cause one of those sensations in the class ‘green’ 
• An idea of a power to cause a green sensation under sunlight 
• An idea of a power to cause a green sensation under green light 
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• An idea of a power to cause a green sensation in someone with standard color vision 
• An idea of a power to cause a green sensation in a deuteranope (someone who cannot 
distinguish between what others would call ‘red’ and ‘green’) 
• An idea of a power to cause a set of slightly different green sensations arrayed in a 
manner suggestive of some shape 
‘The power to cause a green sensation’ is ambiguous between a number of ideas of power. One 
might have an idea of a particular power, which is to say a power to bring about a simple idea, 
which causes a sensation of a very particular green in one at that moment. One might instead 
refer to a power which is shared between different objects which are different shades of green, in 
which case the relevant idea is the abstraction of the set of different powers which cause 
sensations of the type one associates with the word ‘green’. A body which causes a green 
sensation in one set of environmental conditions may not in different conditions, and therefore 
the idea of power to which one refers when one says that a body is green could be different if the 
body looks green under sunlight than if the body looks green under green lighting. Similarly, a 
body which causes a green sensation in a deuteranope may not cause a green sensation in 
someone with standard color vision (because it causes a red sensation instead), and therefore the 
ideas of the powers to affect either type of perceiver with a green sensation are different. A body 
rarely causes uniform color sensations across the whole of its surface: consider that often when 
one sees a sphere, one in fact sees a circle shaded in a particular way. These different shades 
cannot be attributed to the same particular power, because such a power is to bring about a 
particular simple idea, and each different shade is a different simple idea. When we attribute 
green to such a body as a whole then, we in fact attribute a range of powers to cause sensations 
96 
 
of shades of green, which we then abstract and combine to form a more complex idea of the 
power to cause sensations of green which vary across parts of the body. 
 ‘Smoothness’: 
• An idea of a power to cause a certain set of consistent simple touch sensations  
• An idea of a power to cause any set of consistent simple touch sensations 
‘Smoothness’ is frequently treated as an example of a simple idea based on its inclusion by 
Locke in discussion of sensitive simple ideas. However, I take this to be a mistaken 
understanding of a case where Locke uses a relatively simple (yet still complex) sensory idea due 
to the impossibility of naming truly simple ideas in a fashion analogous to his use of abstract 
ideas like ‘green’ and ‘warmth’ as examples. ‘Smoothness’ usually signifies an idea of feeling a 
regular surface, which provides regular pressure to the touch without variance. This indicates 
that smoothness does not name a simple idea of sensation, but rather a set of simple ideas of 
sensation, which by their similarity produce this abstract idea of ‘smoothness’. Thus, the idea of 
the power to cause this complex sensory idea of smoothness is the idea of a set of powers to 
cause simple ideas of tactile sensation. By further abstraction, one might produce an idea of 
power to bring about any consistent set of tactile sensations. This is an idea of the type of power 
to which a more particular power to produce a specific idea of smoothness belongs. 
‘Spherical’ 
• An idea of a power to cause any of a set of visual sensations of appropriately shaded 
circles 
• An idea of a power to cause any of a set of tactile sensations 
• An idea of a power to cause both these visual and tactile sensations 
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• An idea of a power to cause a visual sensation of a shaded circle of a particular size  
Locke’s answer to the Molyneux problem (Essay II.ix.8)226 indicates his belief that the 
sensations of shape received through sight and touch are distinct from one another. 
Consequently, the mind associates them on the basis of experience. Thus, the ideas of the powers 
to produce the visual and tactile sensations may be distinguished from each other, and someone 
might refer to either. If one refers to the power to produce those visual sensations related to 
spheres, one more precisely has the idea of the power to produce a visual sensation of a circle 
which is shaded in a certain way. Someone who has had repeated experiences of the visual and 
tactile sensations simultaneously and therefore conjoined them might therefore produce an idea 
of the conjunction of the powers to bring about these sensations. Alternatively, one might have a 
more precise idea of a particular power of any of these kinds, where the idea includes some 
specified size. 
‘Cold’ 
• An idea of a power to bring about a cold sensation in my hand in its current condition 
• An idea of a power to bring about a cold sensation in my hand when it is at its usual 
temperature 
• An idea of a power to remove heat from my hand 
• An idea of a power to make a thermometer show an appropriately low number 
Locke recognizes that temperature properties are relative, such that ‘cold’ in terms of sensation 
only describes something as colder than that part of a body which touches it, since “the same 
water, at the same time, may produce the idea of cold by one hand and of heat by the other”. 
 
226 Discussed earlier in Section 6 
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(Essay II.viii.21) The most particular idea of the power to bring about a cold sensation then is the 
one which relativizes the power to the current condition of the body part which experiences the 
sensation. One might, however, intend a more general idea of power, which is the conjunction of 
these particular powers to affect one’s body in a variety of conditions, whereby to say that 
something is cold is intended to signify the idea of its power to cause a cold sensation in a range 
of conditions, even if not the current ones (consider saying that snow is cold even when one’s 
hand is too numb to feel a cold sensation). There is also an idea of the power to cause a cold 
sensation which is taken from education, such that one has learned that cold is merely the 
absence of heat, and thus to ascribe the power to cause a cold sensation may signify the idea of 
the power to remove heat from the sensing body in its current condition. There is also an idea of 
cold which is part of the experience of seeing a thermometer distant from oneself show a certain 
number absent any sensation, and so one might intend this power to affect the thermometer when 
one says something like ‘the stratosphere is cold’. 
‘Sun’s power to melt wax’ 
• An idea of power derived from seeing wax melt in the sun 
• An idea of power from varied experiences of seeing wax melt 
• An idea of power derived from education 
• An idea of power mediated by other powers 
The sun’s power to melt wax is an example of an idea of power that Locke uses himself several 
times.227 One such idea of power, the one which is perhaps most common, is the one taken from 
the experience of seeing wax, when under the sun, cease to produce those simple ideas 
 
227 E.g. at Essay II.xxi.1. 
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associated with hardness and instead produce those associated with fluidity. The idea of power 
thus produced is simply of the sun’s power to bring about a change in the wax, without any 
further complication. A different idea of the sun’s power to melt wax is produced by 
experiencing a variety of incidences of wax melting, from which one might produce the 
abstraction of the power to melt wax as a shared quality between all those different substances 
which have caused the melting of wax, including the sun. Yet another idea of the sun’s power to 
melt wax is produced by education, wherein one learns that the sun provides the energy which 
excites the particles of the wax and changes its state from solid to liquid. There is also an idea of 
the sun’s mediated power to melt the wax, derived either from a simpler understanding of 
science or an expanded idea of the sun’s power to produce heat which assumes an effect on wax 
like that felt on one’s skin, whereby the sun heats the wax, and it is this heat which has the power 
to melt the wax. 
‘Power to smooth stone’ 
• Idea derived from observing a sculptor naively 
• Idea of the power of sandpaper to smooth stone 
• Idea of a sculptor working to smooth stone with sandpaper 
Some powers are capacities which can be attributed to human bodies. An experience of seeing a 
sculptor take rough stone and produce the smooth planes of a statue produces the idea that the 
sculptor has a power to smooth stone. If this experience is taken in isolation, without any 
opportunity to closely view the process, this idea of power may be of a power the sculptor 
possesses to smooth stone voluntarily at any time. An analogous case might be a child’s viewing 
of a magician, whereby they might come away with the idea of the magician’s real power to pull 
a bunny from an empty hat. In contrast, an educated and attentive viewer, who sees the 
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sandpaper in the sculptor’s hand and recognizes its properties, will have an idea of the 
sandpaper’s power to smooth stone instead. If such a viewer were to consider what occurs when 
the sculptor uses the sandpaper, they might either have the idea of the sculptor’s power to move 
the sandpaper along with the idea of the sandpaper’s power to smooth stone or conflate these 
ideas into one, more complex idea of power where the sculptor, when in the circumstance of 
holding sandpaper, has the power to smooth stone.
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SECTION 10: Resolving the Problems 
Locke’s account of power is not frequently discussed in secondary literature, and when it is, 
the commentators’ focus on only some type(s) of ideas of power leads to confusion and the 
attribution of mistakes to Locke. Many commentators treat Locke’s account of either human 
agency or the primary/secondary quality distinction as the sole text on powers which is of 
interest, and therefore neglect what is written elsewhere.228 Other commentators attempt to 
identify the powers which Locke describes our ideas of with particular features of substances, 
and therefore suggest various grounds for the specific powers without attention to what Locke 
says about the relevant ideas.229 Those commentators who do recognize that Locke identifies a 
simple idea of power and then discusses the complex ideas of specific powers frequently charge 
him with a category error, whereby he misclassifies the same type of idea as both simple and 
complex, ignoring the distinction which Locke draws between the types of ideas of power.230 
 
228 Discussed previously in Section 3. 
 
229 This is frequently on the basis of reading Locke’s personal belief in the corpuscularian hypothesis as a necessary 
feature of the account of qualities. Ott (2009) critiques this and recognizes that Locke sees flaws in the 
corpuscularian view which suggest it may be susceptible to replacement with another hypothesis of mechanism: “In 
his ‘pessimistic’ moments, Locke finds the corpuscular model wanting. Locke's pessimism is limited to four issues: 
cohesion (IV. iii. 29: 559–60), gravity (1823: iv. 467–8), impulse (II. xxiii. 28: 311), and the means by which 
primary qualities produce ideas of secondary qualities in us (IV. iii. 13: 545).” (p179) 
 
230 See for example Jacovides (2003): “I will argue that his neglect to do so [modify his account of power] reflects a 




The interpretation of Locke’s account of power which I have put forward is not susceptible to the 
same complaints. Returning to the problems from the literature on Locke on powers which I 
described in the fourth section, I will show how Locke in fact avoids these pitfalls. I will proceed 
through the solutions in the same order that I earlier considered the apparent problems.  
10.1 ‘Powers are not interesting’ 
Significant attention has been paid to Locke’s account of our own powers to act.231 His 
account of power is significant beyond its application to issues about will, despite the focus in 
the literature on his ideas of freedom and volition due to their implications for moral and political 
theory. As we have seen, he identifies the qualities of bodies as powers as well. Since our ideas 
of substances are primarily composed of ideas of their qualities (along with a confused idea of a 
unifying substratum), powers are intimately linked to applying Locke’s theory of ideas to 
material objects. The importance of Locke’s accounts of qualities and of substances are 
acknowledged in the literature by the amount written on both. An account of power in general, 
then, is indispensable for consideration of Locke on agency, qualities and substances, and 
therefore is necessary to study of the Essay. While Locke’s account of power may not be the 
topic of a large body of literature, this is not indicative of a failing in the account itself, or of its 
being merely a consequence of some of his other positions.232 
Locke frequently considers particular cases as sidebars from his more general account, and 
the discussion of the idea of power in the particular case of human will is one of these. The 
experience of active human power is the best source for abstract ideas of active power. Such 
 
231 See the discussions of agency by Garrett (in Stuart 2015), Chappell (2007), Stuart (2013) ch 9-10 
 
232 It may be the result of commentators believing that the problems about power in Locke’s account have already 
been pointed out by Berkeley and Hume (e.g. Bennett (2001) 
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ideas, of course, all contain the simple idea of power as a component. The simple idea of power 
is thus received in the experience of our will bringing about some consequence, whether in one 
thought having the power to produce another or in our volition to move an arm being followed 
by the sensations of that arm moving.233 It is natural that Locke shows that even the idea of our 
own agency is composed like the other complex ideas of power which he discusses. He however 
continues with an extended metaphysical discussion of which actions are voluntary and free. The 
fact that this particular aside presents as the majority of the chapter is not to indicate that it 
supersedes what is written more generally at the beginning and end of the chapter or the intended 
subject of the chapter according to its title and location in the text. He writes as much as he does 
because he expects that clarity on the ideas of the will and of freedom will inform the progress of 
moral science. Furthermore, many of the passages on human will were added to the chapter in a 
later edition,234 and so Locke’s account of power more generally is something he took to be 
adequate without this addition. 
Some commentaries assume that powers as possessed by material substances will be included 
(perhaps implicitly) in the discussion of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. 
The assumption is frequently made that the difference between secondary qualities and primary 
 
233 Such ideas of power are the clearest that we have, because in this context we are directly aware of both our 
activity and its effect, as opposed to only having experience of the effect of some power on us (in the form of our 
sensations) or the regular conjunction of some substance with a change in our sensations of another substance (we 
determine that sun has the power to melt wax because our sensations of the wax regularly change in certain ways 
with exposure to the sun). 
 
234 Describing the changes in the second edition, Locke says “These I must inform my reader are not all new matter, 
but most of them either farther confirmations of what I had said, or explications, to prevent others being mistaken in 
the sense of what was formerly printed, and not any variation in me from it; I must only except the alterations I have 
made in Book II. chap. 21. What I had there writ concerning liberty and the will, I thought deserved as accurate a 
view, as I am capable of; those subjects having in all ages exercised the learned part of the world, with questions and 
difficulties, that have not a little perplexed morality and divinity; those parts of knowledge that men are most 
concerned to be clear in. Upon a closer inspection into the working of men's minds, and a stricter examination of 
those motives and views they are turned by, I have found reason somewhat to alter the thoughts I formerly had 




qualities is that the former are mere powers while the latter are resemblances to real features of a 
substance in some way. This leads to many attempts to explain the ways in which secondary 
qualities are the consequences of primary qualities. This again is to focus on one of Locke’s 
intriguing asides.235 The corpuscularian hypothesis is made only as an explanation of how 
substances might have powers to cause sensations beyond those which we believe to reflect true 
features of the substance. In particular, he is considering those sensations which we take to be 
caused by absences, or “positive ideas from privative causes.” (Essay II.viii.1) These are tricky if 
one assumes that non-existence can cause nothing. What he says is therefore in reply to a 
hypothetical objection to his account of the ideas of qualities as ideas of powers to cause simple 
ideas of sensation. This objection follows Aristotelian science. It is founded on the premise that 
some qualities are privations and therefore sensation cannot furnish simple ideas caused by them. 
The appropriateness and justification of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities 
has been the subject of many responses to Locke, but this ignores his statement that “the 
understanding, in its view of them, considers all  [sensitive simple ideas] as distinct positive 
ideas, without taking notice of the [metaphysical] causes that produce them: which is an inquiry 
not belonging to the idea, as it is in the understanding, but to the nature of the things existing 
without us” (Essay II.viii.2) While Locke may discuss a hypothesis of the mechanism behind the 
powers which cause positive ideas from privative properties, he does so as something beyond the 
scope of human understanding, and therefore of the Essay.236 
 
 
235 Despite the extent to which most courses on Locke focus on this distinction! 
 
236 Mackie (1976) discusses power in this context, as does Campbell (1980). These both also treat powers only in 
terms of their metaphysical grounding and their mind-independent reality as features of material substances. 
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10.2 Power a simple or a complex idea? 
Some commentators take Locke’s account of the idea of power to generate complications for 
his distinction between simple and complex ideas, frequently as a result of confusing abstract 
ideas of particular types of power with the simple idea of power itself. ‘Greenness’ or the idea of 
some range of powers which cause the sensation we call green cannot be a simple idea, because 
such an idea is the product of abstraction rather than received from experience. Either Locke is 
assumed to have meant that there was a scale of simplicity, or he is taken to have made an error 
which undermines his commitment to the absolute simplicity of simple ideas. 
The qualities which Locke discusses are named in general terms, as whiteness, sweetness and 
cold. However, it is indisputably the case that there are shades and degrees of each of these. 
Simple ideas cannot have distinctions drawn between them in such a way, since they are 
uniform. There is no simple idea of white if white is supposed to refer equally to cream, eggshell 
and pure white. An idea of a color which includes all its shades is a complex idea, more 
particularly a complex idea formed by abstraction. The idea of whiteness is a general idea in the 
fashion that the abstract idea of the type dog is general, encompassing as that does ideas of 
dachshunds, Great Danes, and pugs. Since powers are supposed to cause simple ideas in 
perceivers, it seems there ought to be no power which is capable of causing such a complex idea 
of whiteness, and yet Locke does speak of such a power, as in “a snow-ball having the power to 
produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round.” (Essay II.viii.8) 
A similar issue arises with tertiary qualities. Locke describes a single power causing a 
collection of distinguishable changes, rather than a single simple idea, when he writes “fire has a 
power to melt gold, i. e. to destroy the consistency of its insensible parts, and consequently its 
hardness, and make it fluid.” (Essay II.xxi.1) This may seem to indicate that at least some tertiary 
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qualities are powers to produce complex ideas, which is in conflict with the claim that powers 
produce simple ideas in the mind. ‘Whiteness’ might be supposed to intend a very particular 
tone, and therefore for the quality to be a power which produces a simple idea, assuming Locke 
intends this inexact language to signify an exact idea.237 This solution works less well for the 
case of tertiary ideas, insofar as ‘melting’ is not merely causing a single simple idea (the new 
sensation of fluidity), but the ending of some set of simple ideas and the commencement of 
another set. However, the quote suggests (while positing a corpuscularian explanation) that “the 
power to melt gold” is an idea of the conjunction of a power to destroy an idea of hardness and a 
power to cause an idea of fluidity. Locke may count a power to melt gold as a tertiary quality 
because it is the idea of a collection of tertiary qualities. An idea of an object’s power to cause 
some combination of visual sensations (i.e. polka dots) is similarly structured, and it is accepted 
as a power which can be treated as a secondary quality. 
Jacovides (2003) discusses abstract ideas of power, in treating ideas of power as ideas of 
bringing about (in a variety of circumstances) some effect which we attribute to all substances of 
a certain kind: when one has seen some brick break some window, one then takes all bricks to 
have the power of breaking windows (p330). Such an idea is clearly complex, and Jacovides 
therefore discusses why Locke has committed a taxonomic error in counting the idea of power as 
a simple idea. This assumes that all references to power signify the same idea. It is to take one 
sort of idea of power which might be associated to the term and to assume that all references to 
an idea of power are to an idea constructed and complicated in this particular way. In fact, 
Jacovides conflates the simple idea of power which is a constituent of any idea of a power, an 
 
237 As he must for consistency with his definition of qualities. “The white of the snowball” may be intended to 
signify the particular white sensation which is currently being caused in me by the power of the snowball. 
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idea of the particular power causing a simple idea, and an abstract idea of some type of particular 
powers. Jacovides further disregards the close relation between ideas of the powers of material 
substances and an idea of one’s own agency. The simple idea of power, as a constituent of both 
of these, explains their connected treatment by Locke. If ideas of power are only those which 
Jacovides describes, there is a gap in the account of agency and volition. 
The taxonomy of ideas of power indicates how many different ideas might be associated with 
the word power in common use. Each of these ideas is itself either simple or complex, so there is 
no error in Locke’s classification. Commentators have usually been correct when they identify 
some idea of power as complex, but wrong when they assume that the idea they analyze is the 
singular idea of power and equivalent to the one Locke discusses as a simple idea. Much 
confusion results from the difficulty of discussing ideas of particular powers instead of 
abstractions thereof. 
10.3 Inadequate Metaphysics 
Many commentators who do discuss his account of power assume that Locke’s project in the 
Essay is metaphysical, and so much of the literature is preoccupied with identifying where in 
reality Locke locates powers. Ott (2009) spends a chapter considering a “geometrical model” for 
Locke on power wherein there is an objective ground for our ideas of powers and contextualizing 
this within corpuscularianism, and then a second chapter on the mind-independent mechanisms 
of the powers of bodies. Ayers (1993) divides his work on Locke into two separate volumes on 
epistemology and on ontology and treats powers in the latter. McCann (1998) treats power in his 
account of Locke’s mechanism, wherein he treats the Essay as continuous with Locke’s work on 
natural philosophy. While commentators vary on the degree to which they believe Locke’s 
position to be that of corpuscularianism or that corpuscularianism is an illustration of the 
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scientific hypotheses made possible by his metaphysical account, this reading takes him to be 
trying to describe the real and existing features or dispositions of substances. This disregards the 
number of times that Locke indicates he is discussing ideas of powers, rather than powers 
themselves. On an epistemological reading of the Essay, such concerns are irrelevant, and the 
interpretations significantly misapprehend Locke’s intent. He analyzes the origins of ideas, not 
the metaphysical mechanisms by which powers operate. 
 
10.4 Questions about primary and secondary qualities 
Some commentaries assume that powers as possessed by material substances will be included 
(perhaps implicitly) in the discussion of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. 
The assumption is frequently made that the difference between secondary qualities and primary 
qualities are that the former are mere powers while the latter are resemblances to real features of 
a substance in some way. This leads to many attempts to explain the ways in which secondary 
qualities are the consequences of primary qualities. This again is to focus on one of Locke’s 
intriguing asides. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is made only as an 
explanation of how substances have powers to cause sensations beyond those which we believe 
to reflect true features of the substance. In particular, Locke is considering those sensations 
which we take to be caused by absences, or “positive ideas from privative causes” (Essay 
II.viii.1), which are tricky if one assumes that non-existence can cause nothing. What he says is 
therefore in reply to a hypothetical objection to his account of the ideas of qualities as ideas of 
powers to cause certain sensations. This objection follows Aristotelian science and is founded on 
the premise that privative causes cannot be described in this way. The appropriateness and 
justification of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities has been the subject of 
109 
 
many responses to Locke, but this ignores his statement that “the understanding, in its view of 
them, considers all as distinct positive ideas, without taking notice of the causes that produce 
them: which is an inquiry not belonging to the idea, as it is in the understanding, but to the nature 
of the things existing without us” (Essay II.viii.2) While Locke may discuss the mechanism 
behind positive ideas from privative causes, he does so as something beyond the scope of human 
understanding, and therefore of the Essay. Mackie (1976) discusses power in this context, as 
does Campbell (in Chappell 1998). These both also treat powers only in terms of their 
metaphysical grounding and their mind-independent reality as features of material substances. 
Stuart (2013) discusses power as part of Locke’s metaphysics in both the contexts of secondary 
qualities and of agency. 
10.5 Circularity with causality 
In many of these examples, I have made reference to something either causing or 
affecting something else. Locke also frequently uses the language of causation in his discussion 
of powers. “Power, thus considered, is two-fold, viz. as able to make, or able to receive any 
change.” (Essay II.xxi.2) This description of power indicates that Locke’s account of power is 
related to Locke’s account of change. Locke’s examples of powers, like the power to melt wax, 
also indicate that powers are commonly understood to be about the alteration of our ideas of 
substances, although his account of alteration is not with his discussion of powers, but in the 
chapter concerning our ideas of cause and effect (Essay II.xxvi.2). This all suggests the close 
110 
 
conceptual relationship between powers and causation. It is therefore worthwhile to look to 
Locke’s own account of causation.238 
Locke identifies the source of our ideas of cause and effect in the experience of coming to 
have some simple idea, or collection of simple ideas, as part of one’s sensory experience, when 
that idea was not formerly present. “In the notice that our senses take of the constant vicissitude 
of things, we cannot but observe, that several particular, both qualities and substances, begin to 
exist; and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some 
other being. From this observation we get our ideas of cause and effect. That which produces any 
simple or complex idea we denote by the general name cause; and that which is produced, 
effect.” (Essay II.xxvi.1) Locke makes the connection to his discussion of powers more explicit 
when he again uses the example of melting wax: “Thus finding that in that substance which we 
call wax fluidity, which is a simple idea that was not in it before, is constantly produced by the 
application of a certain degree of heat; we call the simple idea of heat, in relation to fluidity in 
wax, the cause of it, and fluidity the effect.” (Essay II.xxvi.1) The experiences which produce 
our ideas of powers and our ideas of cause/effect pairs seem to be identical. The conjunction of 
an idea of heat, present as a component in sensation, with the appearance of fluidity in the wax 
and the idea that this fluidity succeeds a different state, leads to the idea of the fluidity as an 
effect of the heat and the idea of the passive power of the wax to become fluid with the presence 
of heat. In this case, the cause and effect are both ideas which are components of our complex 
ideas of other substances, and both powers are ideas of modes attributed to the same substances. 
Locke adds a second example: “So also finding that the substance of wood, which is a certain 
 
238 Connolly (2013) treats causation and power together. He explains that “Locke thinks we understand causation as 
a relation between two powers.” (p iii) Ideas of causation are therefore defined in terms including power because the 
simple idea of power is contained by all ideas of causation. 
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collection of simple ideas, so called, by the application of fire is turned into another substance, 
called ashes, i.e. another complex idea, consisting of a collection of simple ideas, quite different 
from that complex idea which we call wood; we consider fire, in relation to ashes, as cause, and 
the ashes as effect.” (Essay II.xxvi.1) In this case, “cause” and “effect” are ideas which we take 
to be of (or descriptions of the whole of) the substances. This is in contrast to the powers, which 
are attributed to substances as ideas of qualities or modes of that substance and are not ideas of a 
substance itself. Thus, the fire itself is considered as cause, while the active power to burn wood 
is a mode of that fire. Locke concludes that causes and effects can be thought of as both modes 
and substances, in contrast to powers, which are always a component of the complex idea of the 
substance as opposed to a signification of the complex idea. 
 “So that whatever is considered by us to conduce or operate to the producing any 
particular simple idea, or collection of simple ideas, whether substance or mode, which did not 
before exist, hath thereby in our minds the relation of a cause, and so is denominated by us.” 
(Essay II.xxvi.1) This is to say that causes and effects are ideas of functional roles rather than 
ideas either of modes or of substances: “a cause is that which makes any other thing, either 
simple idea, substance or mode, begin to be: And an effect is that which had its beginning from 
some other thing.” (Essay II.xxvi.2) 
Locke identifies several different types of causation. The first division is between 
creation, which involves the bringing into being of something wholly new, and mere change such 
that a new (different) collection of simple ideas is brought into existence. (Essay II.xxvi.2) 
Changes can occur in a variety of ways: “a man is generated, a picture made, and either of them 
altered, when any new sensible quality or simple idea is produced in either of them, which was 
not there before.” (Essay II.xxvi.2) If a new collection of simple ideas arises but the cause seems 
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to be within the same substance as the collection, then we call the change “generation”. An 
example is the coming into being of a flower from the existing matter of a plant, or the birth of a 
human from a fertilized egg. If a new collection similarly arises but the cause is determined to be 
external, then we call the change “making”. This is what occurs when a block of wood is carved 
in such a way as to become a chair (a collection of ideas that were not in the wood in its original 
shape), or a painting is composed from paint and canvas. The final type of change is more vague, 
and appears to be the one which most closely corresponds with the causation/change that 
accompanies experiences of power: “When any simple idea is produced, which was not in that 
subject before, we call it alteration.” (Essay II.xxvi.2) When the wax is melted, it is not the case 
that some new collection of simple ideas, different from the wax, has come into being. Rather, 
when the wax melts, the collection of simple ideas which I take to be my experience of this wax 
changes as it loses solidity and becomes fluid, and one simple idea is replaced by another. 
The ideas which are associated with the terms cause and effect are constructed from 
simple ideas sourced from experience in the same way as ideas associated with the term power. 
The genesis of these ideas, both in the case of causes and of powers, can be explained without 
reference to the other idea. Sometimes, it seems that the two terms might both be associated with 
some particular idea, as when the sun’s power to melt wax is described as the cause of some 
piece of wax melting. An idea might readily be associated with multiple terms: my idea of my 
sister is associated both with the term ‘sister’ and her name. In the same way that this does not 
raise questions of the ontological grounds on which she is either, no further metaphysical 
explanation is required when the terms ‘cause’ and ‘power’ might refer to the same idea. 
There is no circularity in Locke’s accounts of power and of causation. Ideas of power and 
ideas of causation both terminate in a simple idea of power. This is no more of a problem than 
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that ideas of different particular powers also all terminate in a simple idea of power. The 
apparent verbal circularity when power and causation are defined is irrelevant to the structure or 
origin of our ideas. The simple idea of power does not include any idea of causation. Connolly 
(2013) has shown how the Strict Interpretation resolves the issue of the interdefinition of ‘power’ 
and ‘causation’. (p. 39-43)
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SECTION 11: Possible Extensions of the Present Project 
As mentioned in previous sections, the relationship between an idea of power and the simple 
idea which it causes in the mind is the basis of all knowledge of the external world. Sensitive 
knowledge is the non-intuitive, non-demonstrative form of this knowledge of material bodies. 
Simple ideas are necessarily real ideas because they have no structure beyond their content and 
are not our own constructions, so they therefore necessarily conform to their own existence.239 
 
239 Even in cases where it is not caused by what we would consider the usual method. If I experience an illusion or 
hallucination, I still receive the simple idea of sensation, but due to the power which causes it being in something 
other than a particular substance (defined by its conjunction of qualities) that I take it to inhere in. If I see a mirage 
of an oasis, I know that I see water (as a part of the oasis) and that some powers have caused the requisite simple 
ideas of sensation. I am only wrong about reality if I further claim that the powers which cause these sensations are 
conjoined to the power to quench my thirst, because in this case they are not (mirages of water have only powers to 
cause visual sensations). It is a common belief that to see water is for there to be a substance which conjoins these 
powers with the powers that regularly have coexisted with them. Every other time I have seen what looked like 
water, it quenched my thirst- and I therefore have an idea of the nominal essence which includes both powers. There 
is a high probability that these powers are related to each other (possibly by the same corpuscular properties causing 
both- our current hypothesis is that H2O molecules have the properties which lead them to be liquid at ambient 
temperatures, to look clear, and to quench thirst) on the basis of previous experience, and always occur in the same 
substances. However, no particular case of coexistence of powers is real or known until we do simultaneously 
receive both effects. A mirage is only false insofar as I have an idea of the coexisting powers, which I only do 
because of previous association. My belief in the coexistence of the power to look like water and the power to 
quench my thirst in this particular substance will be disproven when I have the knowledge that there is no power to 
quench my thirst in the circumstances. The situation is analogous to seeing a yellow metal and believing that it is 
gold, because in my past experience the powers causing looking yellow and the combination of powers I refer to as 
‘being metallic’ have always coexisted with certain other qualities I associate with the name gold (ductility and 
malleability), only to discover that it is instead iron pyrite (which I do by realizing that the particular substance 
before me does not have the powers related to ductility and malleability). Mirages are therefore no more of a 





Since simple ideas are effects, we recognize that they must have a cause.240 This cause is the 
power to bring about that effect. There is therefore a clear agreement between a simple idea and 
the idea of the power which causes it. This however leaves open the question of whether these 
powers are justifiably attributed to particular substances, and thus whether our sensitive 
knowledge extends to the existence of any substance. One might merely know that there really 
exists some power(s) by which one is currently affected, rather than that a given substance really 
exists and has this set of existing powers. An interpretation of Locke whereby we have real 
knowledge of particular substances through sensation might be susceptible to the same bundling 
problem faced by some interpretations of Hume.241 
The Strict Interpretation, as applied to Locke’s account of powers, allows for him to 
accommodate the wide range of ideas which one might signify by the name of any quality. It 
therefore better explains what exactly it is that is a part of our ideas of substances. Locke’s 
flexibility here is a positive feature insofar as it allows him to explain the many different ideas 
which different individuals will have, and therefore why there are disparities between a child’s 
idea of an apple after the first time they eat one and an apple grower’s idea of some particular 
apple. This is an advantage of the epistemological reading of Locke, because a metaphysical 
interpretation usually takes Locke to intend to describe some real power as it exists outside the 
mind, something which ought to remain static despite changes in perceiver, and yet as something 
beyond experience this is beyond an empiricist’s remit. Elucidating the variety of ideas which 
might be signified also serves to explain the disagreements between individuals who have 
 
240 On the basis of knowledge of the principle that “nothing comes from nothing.” For Locke, this is an intuitive 
disagreement of ideas: the idea of nothing can include nothing, and therefore includes no powers, so it disagrees 
with the idea of any power, and can have no efficacy. 
 
241 For Hume’s bundling problem, see Inukai (2007). 
116 
 
different ideas associated to the same terms, and therefore indicates how this account of powers 
is intended to serve the project which Locke says is the work of the Essay. 
I argue that Locke’s argument for limits on knowledge is consistent with, and perhaps in 
service of, a project more usually discussed in the context of his political work. He is known as 
an advocate of religious tolerance. Locke was involved in the political conflicts precipitating the 
Glorious Revolution, and in exile he traveled Continental Europe, observing religious conflict 
between Catholics and Protestants. He concluded that civil unrest was an inevitable result of 
religious suppression by the state. His initial Letter Concerning Toleration was written before the 
Essay, and it argues that individuals must be permitted their religious beliefs without intervention 
of force.242 Locke claims in the Letter that it is impossible for someone to change their beliefs 
voluntarily.243 An account of knowledge and opinion which emphasizes that it is curtailed so as 
to be of one’s own ideas can explain apparent disagreements in a way which does not diminish 
the warrant of either disputant to their belief. I take the Essay to provide such an account, and 
therefore to support his general argument for tolerance. This is a benefit of what has hitherto 
been seen as a flaw in Locke’s account of knowledge. It may be the cost of such tolerance that 
knowledge cannot be objective. Further work on Locke’s account of tolerance might make the 
connection to his account of knowledge more explicit. 
Further work might be done on the simple idea of power. There is uncertainty as to 
whether there is a single simple idea of power or two are necessary, one of active power and one 
 
242 Tolerance was a significant concern of his throughout his career. See Tuckness (2015): “The issue of religious 
toleration was the most enduring interest of Locke's intellectual life, spanning his earliest published writings to the 
uncompleted Fourth Letter on Toleration that he was writing at the time of his death in 1704.” 
 
243 See Tabb (2018) and Tuckness (2015) and we can only expose ourselves to things intended to change the degree 
of probability of the agreement of ideas. 
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of passive power. Simple ideas ought not to be susceptible to further distinction, and it seems 
possible that ‘active’ and ‘passive’ constitute such a distinction. However, it is also possible that 
‘active’ and ‘passive’ are characterizations of particular powers, particularly concerning their 
relation to some other particular power. If this is the case, activity and passivity involve relation 
and are therefore too complex to be simple ideas. A single simple idea of power would be a 
component of ideas of active and of passive power. I have tended in this dissertation to favor an 
account whereby a single simple idea of power is adequate, but further consideration of what 
Locke writes about passive powers would make clear whether this is the case. 
In this dissertation, I have made frequent reference to abstract ideas without examination 
of Locke’s account of abstraction.  An interpretation of the operation of abstraction would be of 
utility given the ubiquity of abstract ideas. While Locke mentions abstraction as a method 
whereby complex ideas are formed, there remains a question as to whether abstraction is a 
mental activity in itself. If abstraction is analogous to mental activities like memory or 
perception, it would also have a characteristic reflective simple idea. This would suggest that all 
abstract ideas include such a simple idea in their composition. Further work on abstraction would 
therefore permit greater clarity on the complete structure of abstract ideas both of powers and of 
substances. Locke does not give a simple idea of abstraction in his list of simple ideas from 
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